mag.Escale à Iasi pour Bernard Pivot
"la plus francophonedes villes roumaines"magazine Double je :Spéciale Roumanie jeudi 30 septembre à 23.00
Après le Portugal en juin dernier, Bernard Pivot consacre l’intégralité de son émission à la Roumanie. Difficile pour lui de partir à la découverte des pays francophiles de l’Europe de l’Est sans débuter par la Roumanie.Une émission risquée
"Il est plus aisé de réaliser un Double je depuis Venise, Berlin ou
Alexandrie que d’emmener les téléspectateurs de France 2 et TV5
dans une ville située au nord-est de la Roumanie. Mais une émission
comme la mienne doit prendre ce risque en sortant de temps à autre
des sentiers battus…
Et contrairement au Portugal, où de moins en
moins de jeunes optent pour le français, l’enseignement de notre
langue s’est maintenu en Roumanie. Si dans ce pays francophile, la
tradition, la langue et la culture françaises sont célébrées et étudiées, ilexiste aussi un contexte historique qui a permis d’en préserver L’apprentissage. En effet, les Ceausescu, pour se singulariser et montrer leur indépendance à l’égard de Moscou, préconisaient le français comme première langue au détriment du russe.
Aujourd’hui,les jeunes apprennent l’anglais pour les affaires et notre langue pour la culture."
Iasi
"Bien que cela puisse sembler bizarre, nous n’avons pas enregistré
l’émission à Bucarest. C’est à la limite de la Moldavie et de l’Ukraine,dans une ville universitaire nommée Iasi que nous avons réalisé Doubleje. De tradition, c’est la plus francophone des grandes villes roumaines.
Parmi mes rencontres, je retiens celle d’une professeur enseignant le
français à l’usage des Roumains désirant émigrer au Québec. Et celle
d’une autre professeur amoureuse de notre pays. Du temps des
Ceausescu, et bien que donnant des cours de français, il lui était
interdit de quitter le pays, aussi avait-elle demandé à ses enfants de disperser, à sa mort, ses cendres au dessus de Paris. Avec la fin du communisme, elle a enfin pu découvrir notre capitale."
Emerveillés
"La première fois que je me suis rendu en Roumanie, c’était deux ou
trois ans après la chute du mur de Berlin. Les enseignants roumains
dispensaient leurs cours de français dans un tel dénuement que j’avais fait appel à la générosité des téléspectateurs de Bouillon de culture.
Avec l’argent récolté, j’ai pu acheter puis distribuer dans plusieurs
écoles, collèges et lycées, des Petit Robert, des Petit Larousse, des
livres de grammaire et des Bescherelle. Je garde un souvenir
inoubliable de ces hommes tenant ces livres neufs avec tant de fierté,de plaisir et d’émerveillement.Qu’ils sont forts, ces Roumains !
"Au lendemain de la finale du Mondial 98, j’ai organisé à la Sorbonne
une dictée à l’attention de toutes les délégations étrangères de jeunes venues assister aux matches. Les Roumains sont arrivés premiers.
A l’annonce des résultats, l’euphorie qui a gagné leurs rangs équivalait à celles des Français lors du but final. Ils étaient si fiers d’avoir remporté cette dictée. Une fierté que j’ai retrouvée chez les personnes rencontrées à Iasi. Il aurait été impensable d’imaginer un jour clore Double je sans passer par la Roumanie."
luni, septembrie 27, 2004
starea de fapt
Vei spune ca asta e viata si eu voi spune ca asta nu e viata/si mai apoi cat echilibru pe o sarma-n singuratate.../Pentru ca nu poate fi vorba despre iertarea crimelor/ci numai despre macul ingropat care se catara si plange...Virgil Mazilescu
Vine o vreme cand trebuie spus lucrurilor pe nume. Cand cei care, acum-aici, asteptand acel maine, trebuie sa gandeasca indelung la scenariile care pot fi impuse poporului roman pe linia dreapta a aderarii la Uniunea Europeana. Cu ce plecam la drum? Cu o industrie ramasa la nivelul anilor 70. Sunt altii care produc mai ieftin si mai bun. Dupa 90 am exportat petrol, aluminiu, lemn - mai avem ceva? In acesti ultimi cincisprezece ani am epuizat toate rezervele. S-a dus pana si fierul vechi. Unii s-au pus sa demonteze sinele de cale ferata. In locul unui Vasinski occidental am avut parte de dirijori -alesi de noi, vezi Doamne! - care au contribuit profesionist la atingerea acestui moment al dezastrului. A cui a fost aceasta idee de aducere in sapa de lemn pentru a ne vinde pe nimic? Inca mult mai rau: pentru a ruga sa fim cumparati! Cei ce ne-au bagat in cusca ne-au folosit si nu putem fi - inca - eutanasiati. De unde a venit „numirea“ paznicilor nostri? De la acele Inalte Porti care acum ne arata cu degetul: sunteti infirmi, nu aveti fata comerciala pentru UE. Reprosul major pe care il fac multi gardienilor-liderilor „capitalisti“ este renuntarea la orice proiect national. Am fi putut sa ne imprumutam si sa facem noi autostrazi? Ce am fi transportat pentru a face rentabile respectivele autostrazi? Am fi primit un loc de munca stand cu mana intinsa pentru a fi globalizati? Ce am fi produs pentru a intra pe piata? Si cu cine? Cu fostii „dictatori proletari“, cu fostii „stapani ai mijloacelor de productie“ - vai de ei si de noi! - care veneau la serviciu doar ca sa se odihneasca si, desigur, sa fure ceva? Am putea sta de vorba despre acest popor cu frica lui Dumnezeu, popor azvarlit intr-o tragica experienta istorica, alungat din datina sa spre a intra in fabricile hiperpoluante, importate din Occident. Unde e granarul Europei, unde petrolul romanesc? Parca nici pamantul pe care-l calcam nu ne mai rabda. Avem aproape doua milioane de romani plecati sa slugareasca Occidentul; dar au plecat destui sa faca rele, sa ne faca de ras. Au si ramas destui care taie frunza la caini sau sunt subiecte pentru prima pagina a ziarelor. Fabrici din paleolitic, muncitori in asteptarea salariilor compensatorii, un aparat administrativ, corpul medical, cei din justitie si invatamant - prost platiti, deci coruptibili, subsolul gol pana la zece mii de metri, padurile-cioturi. Societatea romaneasca a inceput perioada postrevolutionara ca americanii dupa anii 20. Prohibitia (respectiv perioada postdecembrista) a permis aparitia marilor gangsteri, a marilor averi. Atunci-acum banii trebuie sa produca alti bani. Si in conditii de maxima siguranta. Atunci-acum gangsterii doresc statul de drept, cu institutii care sa le asigure o viata burgheza tihnita. Nomenclatura de rezerva s-a constituit intr-o echipa ce se vrea reprezentativa: o va lua Occidentul in brate? Si daca nu, pe cine? Puneti mana si cautati o recunoastere europeana, stimati sau nestimati burghezi! Noi am vrut schimbarea si libertatea. Nu stiam - la inceput - de ce o vreti si voi. Ati mediatizat destule exemplare scolite in Occident, dar marionetele nu stiu decat sa ia pozitia de drepti in fata celor care le-au propulsat in icoane de „salvatori ai neamului“, in „stindarde ale democratiei de tip occidental“. In acest an, cel al alegerilor, unii vor trage spre Est, altii spre Vest, dupa cum au foaia de drum si ordinul pe unitate. Doar acestia conteaza; ceilalti, cei multi, asista la spectacole pe care Nenea Iancu nici nu le-a visat. Productia de paiate, diversiuni, manipulari, inscenari, partide de buzunar, ziare personale, politicieni de cumetrie creste ca Fat Frumos. Oamenii necesari si devotati ca sa numere voturile nu pot fi decat cei cu dosarul plin cu „fapte frumoase“. Daca uita sa numere „conform“ li se arata pisica si sunt scosi si de pe listele celor care decid impartirea fondurilor comunitare. Vor veni multi bani de la Unitatea Europeana si cei care ii trimit au obligatia sa urmareasca modul in care sunt cheltuiti. Spectrul politic european actual evolueaza evident spre centru-dreapta. Poate este o incercare de raspuns la forta americana, la petrolul rusesc. Ce politicieni gasesc europenii pe pamantul nostru parjolit? Vom completa parlamentul european cu parlamentari social-democrati? Vor dori occidentalii sa colaboreze cu cei corupti? Si daca ar fi incoruptibili pe aici - cam cati sunt? Chiar are nevoie Occidentul de maini curate, sau dirijam atentia opiniei publice spre tot felul de camatari, hoti de buzunare? Se vor gasi mereu facatori de noi dosare, noi armaghedoane care sa indrepte consilierii UE spre oamenii devotati cauzei. Din fericire - pentru cei hotarati, din nefericire - pentru nehotarati, avem doar trei optiuni. Stindardele se vor diferite si nu prea sunt. Doar pe ici, pe colo sunt alti oameni. Va castiga cel ce va spune: ma lepad de Satana. Unii spun ca stim ce ne asteapta. Pentru ca stim cine numara voturile. Viitorilor - ca si actualilor- Mari Maestri nu le pasa. Un Nicola di Bari autohton (cu care ne-am petrecut copilaria, adolescenta) se intreba, in preziua plecarii sale pentru totdeauna, daca vor veni oameni la inmormantarea sa. Marii nostri politicieni - credinciosi, atei, liber-cugetatori - se gandesc la acea clipa? La inexistenta fantana din marginea satului, in calea calatorului obosit? Prin anii 70, aflandu-ma la specializare intr-un spital bucurestean, am asistat la o scena terifianta. Un batran cu baston, abia tarandu-se, ajunge la lift. Usa se deschide si este scoasa o targa pe care se afla - banuit prin cearceaf- un cadavru. Batranul se da inapoi, speriat. Scosul targii da cearceaful la o parte. Si atunci batranul cade in genunchi si, cu mainile impreunate, parca rugandu-se, baiguie printre lacrimi: asta e securistul care m-a schilodit, asta e neomul care mi-a distrus viata; exista un Dumnezeu! Un singur Dumnezeu!
Echipele reprezentative, folosind aceleasi lozinci cu bune intentii, au pornit impreuna, continua impreuna. Chiar daca ajung in iad.
Alexandru Ciocalteu
Vine o vreme cand trebuie spus lucrurilor pe nume. Cand cei care, acum-aici, asteptand acel maine, trebuie sa gandeasca indelung la scenariile care pot fi impuse poporului roman pe linia dreapta a aderarii la Uniunea Europeana. Cu ce plecam la drum? Cu o industrie ramasa la nivelul anilor 70. Sunt altii care produc mai ieftin si mai bun. Dupa 90 am exportat petrol, aluminiu, lemn - mai avem ceva? In acesti ultimi cincisprezece ani am epuizat toate rezervele. S-a dus pana si fierul vechi. Unii s-au pus sa demonteze sinele de cale ferata. In locul unui Vasinski occidental am avut parte de dirijori -alesi de noi, vezi Doamne! - care au contribuit profesionist la atingerea acestui moment al dezastrului. A cui a fost aceasta idee de aducere in sapa de lemn pentru a ne vinde pe nimic? Inca mult mai rau: pentru a ruga sa fim cumparati! Cei ce ne-au bagat in cusca ne-au folosit si nu putem fi - inca - eutanasiati. De unde a venit „numirea“ paznicilor nostri? De la acele Inalte Porti care acum ne arata cu degetul: sunteti infirmi, nu aveti fata comerciala pentru UE. Reprosul major pe care il fac multi gardienilor-liderilor „capitalisti“ este renuntarea la orice proiect national. Am fi putut sa ne imprumutam si sa facem noi autostrazi? Ce am fi transportat pentru a face rentabile respectivele autostrazi? Am fi primit un loc de munca stand cu mana intinsa pentru a fi globalizati? Ce am fi produs pentru a intra pe piata? Si cu cine? Cu fostii „dictatori proletari“, cu fostii „stapani ai mijloacelor de productie“ - vai de ei si de noi! - care veneau la serviciu doar ca sa se odihneasca si, desigur, sa fure ceva? Am putea sta de vorba despre acest popor cu frica lui Dumnezeu, popor azvarlit intr-o tragica experienta istorica, alungat din datina sa spre a intra in fabricile hiperpoluante, importate din Occident. Unde e granarul Europei, unde petrolul romanesc? Parca nici pamantul pe care-l calcam nu ne mai rabda. Avem aproape doua milioane de romani plecati sa slugareasca Occidentul; dar au plecat destui sa faca rele, sa ne faca de ras. Au si ramas destui care taie frunza la caini sau sunt subiecte pentru prima pagina a ziarelor. Fabrici din paleolitic, muncitori in asteptarea salariilor compensatorii, un aparat administrativ, corpul medical, cei din justitie si invatamant - prost platiti, deci coruptibili, subsolul gol pana la zece mii de metri, padurile-cioturi. Societatea romaneasca a inceput perioada postrevolutionara ca americanii dupa anii 20. Prohibitia (respectiv perioada postdecembrista) a permis aparitia marilor gangsteri, a marilor averi. Atunci-acum banii trebuie sa produca alti bani. Si in conditii de maxima siguranta. Atunci-acum gangsterii doresc statul de drept, cu institutii care sa le asigure o viata burgheza tihnita. Nomenclatura de rezerva s-a constituit intr-o echipa ce se vrea reprezentativa: o va lua Occidentul in brate? Si daca nu, pe cine? Puneti mana si cautati o recunoastere europeana, stimati sau nestimati burghezi! Noi am vrut schimbarea si libertatea. Nu stiam - la inceput - de ce o vreti si voi. Ati mediatizat destule exemplare scolite in Occident, dar marionetele nu stiu decat sa ia pozitia de drepti in fata celor care le-au propulsat in icoane de „salvatori ai neamului“, in „stindarde ale democratiei de tip occidental“. In acest an, cel al alegerilor, unii vor trage spre Est, altii spre Vest, dupa cum au foaia de drum si ordinul pe unitate. Doar acestia conteaza; ceilalti, cei multi, asista la spectacole pe care Nenea Iancu nici nu le-a visat. Productia de paiate, diversiuni, manipulari, inscenari, partide de buzunar, ziare personale, politicieni de cumetrie creste ca Fat Frumos. Oamenii necesari si devotati ca sa numere voturile nu pot fi decat cei cu dosarul plin cu „fapte frumoase“. Daca uita sa numere „conform“ li se arata pisica si sunt scosi si de pe listele celor care decid impartirea fondurilor comunitare. Vor veni multi bani de la Unitatea Europeana si cei care ii trimit au obligatia sa urmareasca modul in care sunt cheltuiti. Spectrul politic european actual evolueaza evident spre centru-dreapta. Poate este o incercare de raspuns la forta americana, la petrolul rusesc. Ce politicieni gasesc europenii pe pamantul nostru parjolit? Vom completa parlamentul european cu parlamentari social-democrati? Vor dori occidentalii sa colaboreze cu cei corupti? Si daca ar fi incoruptibili pe aici - cam cati sunt? Chiar are nevoie Occidentul de maini curate, sau dirijam atentia opiniei publice spre tot felul de camatari, hoti de buzunare? Se vor gasi mereu facatori de noi dosare, noi armaghedoane care sa indrepte consilierii UE spre oamenii devotati cauzei. Din fericire - pentru cei hotarati, din nefericire - pentru nehotarati, avem doar trei optiuni. Stindardele se vor diferite si nu prea sunt. Doar pe ici, pe colo sunt alti oameni. Va castiga cel ce va spune: ma lepad de Satana. Unii spun ca stim ce ne asteapta. Pentru ca stim cine numara voturile. Viitorilor - ca si actualilor- Mari Maestri nu le pasa. Un Nicola di Bari autohton (cu care ne-am petrecut copilaria, adolescenta) se intreba, in preziua plecarii sale pentru totdeauna, daca vor veni oameni la inmormantarea sa. Marii nostri politicieni - credinciosi, atei, liber-cugetatori - se gandesc la acea clipa? La inexistenta fantana din marginea satului, in calea calatorului obosit? Prin anii 70, aflandu-ma la specializare intr-un spital bucurestean, am asistat la o scena terifianta. Un batran cu baston, abia tarandu-se, ajunge la lift. Usa se deschide si este scoasa o targa pe care se afla - banuit prin cearceaf- un cadavru. Batranul se da inapoi, speriat. Scosul targii da cearceaful la o parte. Si atunci batranul cade in genunchi si, cu mainile impreunate, parca rugandu-se, baiguie printre lacrimi: asta e securistul care m-a schilodit, asta e neomul care mi-a distrus viata; exista un Dumnezeu! Un singur Dumnezeu!
Echipele reprezentative, folosind aceleasi lozinci cu bune intentii, au pornit impreuna, continua impreuna. Chiar daca ajung in iad.
Alexandru Ciocalteu
starea de fapt
Vei spune ca asta e viata si eu voi spune ca asta nu e viata/si mai apoi cat echilibru pe o sarma-n singuratate.../Pentru ca nu poate fi vorba despre iertarea crimelor/ci numai despre macul ingropat care se catara si plange...Virgil Mazilescu
Vine o vreme cand trebuie spus lucrurilor pe nume. Cand cei care, acum-aici, asteptand acel maine, trebuie sa gandeasca indelung la scenariile care pot fi impuse poporului roman pe linia dreapta a aderarii la Uniunea Europeana. Cu ce plecam la drum? Cu o industrie ramasa la nivelul anilor 70. Sunt altii care produc mai ieftin si mai bun. Dupa 90 am exportat petrol, aluminiu, lemn - mai avem ceva? In acesti ultimi cincisprezece ani am epuizat toate rezervele. S-a dus pana si fierul vechi. Unii s-au pus sa demonteze sinele de cale ferata. In locul unui Vasinski occidental am avut parte de dirijori -alesi de noi, vezi Doamne! - care au contribuit profesionist la atingerea acestui moment al dezastrului. A cui a fost aceasta idee de aducere in sapa de lemn pentru a ne vinde pe nimic? Inca mult mai rau: pentru a ruga sa fim cumparati! Cei ce ne-au bagat in cusca ne-au folosit si nu putem fi - inca - eutanasiati. De unde a venit „numirea“ paznicilor nostri? De la acele Inalte Porti care acum ne arata cu degetul: sunteti infirmi, nu aveti fata comerciala pentru UE. Reprosul major pe care il fac multi gardienilor-liderilor „capitalisti“ este renuntarea la orice proiect national. Am fi putut sa ne imprumutam si sa facem noi autostrazi? Ce am fi transportat pentru a face rentabile respectivele autostrazi? Am fi primit un loc de munca stand cu mana intinsa pentru a fi globalizati? Ce am fi produs pentru a intra pe piata? Si cu cine? Cu fostii „dictatori proletari“, cu fostii „stapani ai mijloacelor de productie“ - vai de ei si de noi! - care veneau la serviciu doar ca sa se odihneasca si, desigur, sa fure ceva? Am putea sta de vorba despre acest popor cu frica lui Dumnezeu, popor azvarlit intr-o tragica experienta istorica, alungat din datina sa spre a intra in fabricile hiperpoluante, importate din Occident. Unde e granarul Europei, unde petrolul romanesc? Parca nici pamantul pe care-l calcam nu ne mai rabda. Avem aproape doua milioane de romani plecati sa slugareasca Occidentul; dar au plecat destui sa faca rele, sa ne faca de ras. Au si ramas destui care taie frunza la caini sau sunt subiecte pentru prima pagina a ziarelor. Fabrici din paleolitic, muncitori in asteptarea salariilor compensatorii, un aparat administrativ, corpul medical, cei din justitie si invatamant - prost platiti, deci coruptibili, subsolul gol pana la zece mii de metri, padurile-cioturi. Societatea romaneasca a inceput perioada postrevolutionara ca americanii dupa anii 20. Prohibitia (respectiv perioada postdecembrista) a permis aparitia marilor gangsteri, a marilor averi. Atunci-acum banii trebuie sa produca alti bani. Si in conditii de maxima siguranta. Atunci-acum gangsterii doresc statul de drept, cu institutii care sa le asigure o viata burgheza tihnita. Nomenclatura de rezerva s-a constituit intr-o echipa ce se vrea reprezentativa: o va lua Occidentul in brate? Si daca nu, pe cine? Puneti mana si cautati o recunoastere europeana, stimati sau nestimati burghezi! Noi am vrut schimbarea si libertatea. Nu stiam - la inceput - de ce o vreti si voi. Ati mediatizat destule exemplare scolite in Occident, dar marionetele nu stiu decat sa ia pozitia de drepti in fata celor care le-au propulsat in icoane de „salvatori ai neamului“, in „stindarde ale democratiei de tip occidental“. In acest an, cel al alegerilor, unii vor trage spre Est, altii spre Vest, dupa cum au foaia de drum si ordinul pe unitate. Doar acestia conteaza; ceilalti, cei multi, asista la spectacole pe care Nenea Iancu nici nu le-a visat. Productia de paiate, diversiuni, manipulari, inscenari, partide de buzunar, ziare personale, politicieni de cumetrie creste ca Fat Frumos. Oamenii necesari si devotati ca sa numere voturile nu pot fi decat cei cu dosarul plin cu „fapte frumoase“. Daca uita sa numere „conform“ li se arata pisica si sunt scosi si de pe listele celor care decid impartirea fondurilor comunitare. Vor veni multi bani de la Unitatea Europeana si cei care ii trimit au obligatia sa urmareasca modul in care sunt cheltuiti. Spectrul politic european actual evolueaza evident spre centru-dreapta. Poate este o incercare de raspuns la forta americana, la petrolul rusesc. Ce politicieni gasesc europenii pe pamantul nostru parjolit? Vom completa parlamentul european cu parlamentari social-democrati? Vor dori occidentalii sa colaboreze cu cei corupti? Si daca ar fi incoruptibili pe aici - cam cati sunt? Chiar are nevoie Occidentul de maini curate, sau dirijam atentia opiniei publice spre tot felul de camatari, hoti de buzunare? Se vor gasi mereu facatori de noi dosare, noi armaghedoane care sa indrepte consilierii UE spre oamenii devotati cauzei. Din fericire - pentru cei hotarati, din nefericire - pentru nehotarati, avem doar trei optiuni. Stindardele se vor diferite si nu prea sunt. Doar pe ici, pe colo sunt alti oameni. Va castiga cel ce va spune: ma lepad de Satana. Unii spun ca stim ce ne asteapta. Pentru ca stim cine numara voturile. Viitorilor - ca si actualilor- Mari Maestri nu le pasa. Un Nicola di Bari autohton (cu care ne-am petrecut copilaria, adolescenta) se intreba, in preziua plecarii sale pentru totdeauna, daca vor veni oameni la inmormantarea sa. Marii nostri politicieni - credinciosi, atei, liber-cugetatori - se gandesc la acea clipa? La inexistenta fantana din marginea satului, in calea calatorului obosit? Prin anii 70, aflandu-ma la specializare intr-un spital bucurestean, am asistat la o scena terifianta. Un batran cu baston, abia tarandu-se, ajunge la lift. Usa se deschide si este scoasa o targa pe care se afla - banuit prin cearceaf- un cadavru. Batranul se da inapoi, speriat. Scosul targii da cearceaful la o parte. Si atunci batranul cade in genunchi si, cu mainile impreunate, parca rugandu-se, baiguie printre lacrimi: asta e securistul care m-a schilodit, asta e neomul care mi-a distrus viata; exista un Dumnezeu! Un singur Dumnezeu!
Echipele reprezentative, folosind aceleasi lozinci cu bune intentii, au pornit impreuna, continua impreuna. Chiar daca ajung in iad.
Alexandru Ciocalteu
Vine o vreme cand trebuie spus lucrurilor pe nume. Cand cei care, acum-aici, asteptand acel maine, trebuie sa gandeasca indelung la scenariile care pot fi impuse poporului roman pe linia dreapta a aderarii la Uniunea Europeana. Cu ce plecam la drum? Cu o industrie ramasa la nivelul anilor 70. Sunt altii care produc mai ieftin si mai bun. Dupa 90 am exportat petrol, aluminiu, lemn - mai avem ceva? In acesti ultimi cincisprezece ani am epuizat toate rezervele. S-a dus pana si fierul vechi. Unii s-au pus sa demonteze sinele de cale ferata. In locul unui Vasinski occidental am avut parte de dirijori -alesi de noi, vezi Doamne! - care au contribuit profesionist la atingerea acestui moment al dezastrului. A cui a fost aceasta idee de aducere in sapa de lemn pentru a ne vinde pe nimic? Inca mult mai rau: pentru a ruga sa fim cumparati! Cei ce ne-au bagat in cusca ne-au folosit si nu putem fi - inca - eutanasiati. De unde a venit „numirea“ paznicilor nostri? De la acele Inalte Porti care acum ne arata cu degetul: sunteti infirmi, nu aveti fata comerciala pentru UE. Reprosul major pe care il fac multi gardienilor-liderilor „capitalisti“ este renuntarea la orice proiect national. Am fi putut sa ne imprumutam si sa facem noi autostrazi? Ce am fi transportat pentru a face rentabile respectivele autostrazi? Am fi primit un loc de munca stand cu mana intinsa pentru a fi globalizati? Ce am fi produs pentru a intra pe piata? Si cu cine? Cu fostii „dictatori proletari“, cu fostii „stapani ai mijloacelor de productie“ - vai de ei si de noi! - care veneau la serviciu doar ca sa se odihneasca si, desigur, sa fure ceva? Am putea sta de vorba despre acest popor cu frica lui Dumnezeu, popor azvarlit intr-o tragica experienta istorica, alungat din datina sa spre a intra in fabricile hiperpoluante, importate din Occident. Unde e granarul Europei, unde petrolul romanesc? Parca nici pamantul pe care-l calcam nu ne mai rabda. Avem aproape doua milioane de romani plecati sa slugareasca Occidentul; dar au plecat destui sa faca rele, sa ne faca de ras. Au si ramas destui care taie frunza la caini sau sunt subiecte pentru prima pagina a ziarelor. Fabrici din paleolitic, muncitori in asteptarea salariilor compensatorii, un aparat administrativ, corpul medical, cei din justitie si invatamant - prost platiti, deci coruptibili, subsolul gol pana la zece mii de metri, padurile-cioturi. Societatea romaneasca a inceput perioada postrevolutionara ca americanii dupa anii 20. Prohibitia (respectiv perioada postdecembrista) a permis aparitia marilor gangsteri, a marilor averi. Atunci-acum banii trebuie sa produca alti bani. Si in conditii de maxima siguranta. Atunci-acum gangsterii doresc statul de drept, cu institutii care sa le asigure o viata burgheza tihnita. Nomenclatura de rezerva s-a constituit intr-o echipa ce se vrea reprezentativa: o va lua Occidentul in brate? Si daca nu, pe cine? Puneti mana si cautati o recunoastere europeana, stimati sau nestimati burghezi! Noi am vrut schimbarea si libertatea. Nu stiam - la inceput - de ce o vreti si voi. Ati mediatizat destule exemplare scolite in Occident, dar marionetele nu stiu decat sa ia pozitia de drepti in fata celor care le-au propulsat in icoane de „salvatori ai neamului“, in „stindarde ale democratiei de tip occidental“. In acest an, cel al alegerilor, unii vor trage spre Est, altii spre Vest, dupa cum au foaia de drum si ordinul pe unitate. Doar acestia conteaza; ceilalti, cei multi, asista la spectacole pe care Nenea Iancu nici nu le-a visat. Productia de paiate, diversiuni, manipulari, inscenari, partide de buzunar, ziare personale, politicieni de cumetrie creste ca Fat Frumos. Oamenii necesari si devotati ca sa numere voturile nu pot fi decat cei cu dosarul plin cu „fapte frumoase“. Daca uita sa numere „conform“ li se arata pisica si sunt scosi si de pe listele celor care decid impartirea fondurilor comunitare. Vor veni multi bani de la Unitatea Europeana si cei care ii trimit au obligatia sa urmareasca modul in care sunt cheltuiti. Spectrul politic european actual evolueaza evident spre centru-dreapta. Poate este o incercare de raspuns la forta americana, la petrolul rusesc. Ce politicieni gasesc europenii pe pamantul nostru parjolit? Vom completa parlamentul european cu parlamentari social-democrati? Vor dori occidentalii sa colaboreze cu cei corupti? Si daca ar fi incoruptibili pe aici - cam cati sunt? Chiar are nevoie Occidentul de maini curate, sau dirijam atentia opiniei publice spre tot felul de camatari, hoti de buzunare? Se vor gasi mereu facatori de noi dosare, noi armaghedoane care sa indrepte consilierii UE spre oamenii devotati cauzei. Din fericire - pentru cei hotarati, din nefericire - pentru nehotarati, avem doar trei optiuni. Stindardele se vor diferite si nu prea sunt. Doar pe ici, pe colo sunt alti oameni. Va castiga cel ce va spune: ma lepad de Satana. Unii spun ca stim ce ne asteapta. Pentru ca stim cine numara voturile. Viitorilor - ca si actualilor- Mari Maestri nu le pasa. Un Nicola di Bari autohton (cu care ne-am petrecut copilaria, adolescenta) se intreba, in preziua plecarii sale pentru totdeauna, daca vor veni oameni la inmormantarea sa. Marii nostri politicieni - credinciosi, atei, liber-cugetatori - se gandesc la acea clipa? La inexistenta fantana din marginea satului, in calea calatorului obosit? Prin anii 70, aflandu-ma la specializare intr-un spital bucurestean, am asistat la o scena terifianta. Un batran cu baston, abia tarandu-se, ajunge la lift. Usa se deschide si este scoasa o targa pe care se afla - banuit prin cearceaf- un cadavru. Batranul se da inapoi, speriat. Scosul targii da cearceaful la o parte. Si atunci batranul cade in genunchi si, cu mainile impreunate, parca rugandu-se, baiguie printre lacrimi: asta e securistul care m-a schilodit, asta e neomul care mi-a distrus viata; exista un Dumnezeu! Un singur Dumnezeu!
Echipele reprezentative, folosind aceleasi lozinci cu bune intentii, au pornit impreuna, continua impreuna. Chiar daca ajung in iad.
Alexandru Ciocalteu
vineri, septembrie 24, 2004
Lia Roberts is leaving
Presidency candidate Lia Roberts announced withdrawal yesterday evening. By press release she stated she came to "Westernize" Romania, but that the political system kept her away from electors. "I had no access to national TV channels, although such presence was very expensive. I have recently been turned down twice, while the candidates of major parties were on election campaign", specified the release. Still Lia Roberts stated her willingness to come back anytime to "the Romanian political stage", in case "the outcome of November elections showed that the Romanian people was determined to choose a way different than the one imposed by politicians at present".
ECONOMICS
Corruption and fiscality "sabotage" the business world
http://www.ziua.net/display.php?id=26661&data=2004-09-24The worrying level of corruption, high fiscality and labor regulation are the main difficulties that businessmen deal with in Romania, according to a FIAS (Foreign Investment Advisory Service) of the World Bank. The report was elaborated on the basis of the preliminary conclusions reached in a study on the evaluation of administrative obstacles for the Romanian business world. It was accomplished by FIAS and the Ministry of Economy and Commerce. The study includes the outcome of a statistics completed by IRSOP (The Romanian Institute for Public Opinion Research). The questions were answered by representatives of more than 720 companies. It also included a questionnaire set by the Economy Ministry and addressed to the leading boards of 9 public institutions having regulation role. FIAS says the answers given by the business community show the improvement of the perception on investment background, but that many problems have not been given solutions yet and continue to negatively influence the business world.
On the other hand, FIAS notices the Executives efforts to 'generally improve the business background and some measures adopted by authorities: the creation of the National Control Office, the implementing of tacit approval and of personal responsibility, the creation of a single control register and the simplification of procedures to register companies.
Romania is number 5 in the foreign investment top in Eastern Europe
This year Romania will attract direct foreign investments reaching about $ 2,4 billion (2 billion Euro), as in the first term of the year investments reached 1,1 billion Euro. The statement belongs to Alexandru Popa, President of the Romanian Agency of Foreign Investment. He stated this during a conference presenting the World Report on investment, elaborated by the United Nations Conference on Commerce and Development. According to the document, last year Romania was number 5 in Central and Eastern Europe, as direct foreign investment reached $1,56 billion. According to the Romanian official, t updated information from the central bank shows that in 2003 Romania attracted direct foreign investment reaching $ 1,83 billion, which makes it number 4 in Eastern Central Europe and number 1 in South Eastern Europe.
ECONOMICS
Corruption and fiscality "sabotage" the business world
http://www.ziua.net/display.php?id=26661&data=2004-09-24The worrying level of corruption, high fiscality and labor regulation are the main difficulties that businessmen deal with in Romania, according to a FIAS (Foreign Investment Advisory Service) of the World Bank. The report was elaborated on the basis of the preliminary conclusions reached in a study on the evaluation of administrative obstacles for the Romanian business world. It was accomplished by FIAS and the Ministry of Economy and Commerce. The study includes the outcome of a statistics completed by IRSOP (The Romanian Institute for Public Opinion Research). The questions were answered by representatives of more than 720 companies. It also included a questionnaire set by the Economy Ministry and addressed to the leading boards of 9 public institutions having regulation role. FIAS says the answers given by the business community show the improvement of the perception on investment background, but that many problems have not been given solutions yet and continue to negatively influence the business world.
On the other hand, FIAS notices the Executives efforts to 'generally improve the business background and some measures adopted by authorities: the creation of the National Control Office, the implementing of tacit approval and of personal responsibility, the creation of a single control register and the simplification of procedures to register companies.
Romania is number 5 in the foreign investment top in Eastern Europe
This year Romania will attract direct foreign investments reaching about $ 2,4 billion (2 billion Euro), as in the first term of the year investments reached 1,1 billion Euro. The statement belongs to Alexandru Popa, President of the Romanian Agency of Foreign Investment. He stated this during a conference presenting the World Report on investment, elaborated by the United Nations Conference on Commerce and Development. According to the document, last year Romania was number 5 in Central and Eastern Europe, as direct foreign investment reached $1,56 billion. According to the Romanian official, t updated information from the central bank shows that in 2003 Romania attracted direct foreign investment reaching $ 1,83 billion, which makes it number 4 in Eastern Central Europe and number 1 in South Eastern Europe.
Alburnus Maior, a Romanian NGO headquartered in Rosia Montana, Romania
Gold has been mined at Rosia Montana, in the Apuseni mountains of West-Central Romania, since pre-historic times. The area’s riches attracted several foreign powers including the Romans. These powers carried off the precious metals to Rome, Vienna, Budapest, Berlin but left behind what has become an historical and archaeological treasure of world class.
The seams of precious metals have long been worked out but gold and silver are still dispersed in microscopic quantities throughout the geology of the area.
The project proposal is that by blasting and pulverising the landscape, the invisible gold and silver could be exposed to hazardous cyanide compounds that would separate them from the rock.
The scenery would be devastated, hills transformed into massive craters in a toxic, sterile desert.
This is a populated area. The illegal process of forced resettlement has already begun.Will these unique historical and archaeological remains be obliterated and people forced to leave their homes?
The seams of precious metals have long been worked out but gold and silver are still dispersed in microscopic quantities throughout the geology of the area.
The project proposal is that by blasting and pulverising the landscape, the invisible gold and silver could be exposed to hazardous cyanide compounds that would separate them from the rock.
The scenery would be devastated, hills transformed into massive craters in a toxic, sterile desert.
This is a populated area. The illegal process of forced resettlement has already begun.Will these unique historical and archaeological remains be obliterated and people forced to leave their homes?
Si eu..cu cine Votez!?
Politica
Acuzatii dure la adresa politicienilor romani
Lia Roberts se retrage din cursa pentru Cotroceni
Sistemul politic din Romania este bolnav!
Poporul sufera de o maladie grava: saracia!
Prin retragerea candidaturii, Lia Roberts nu pierde nimic, dimpotriva, a castigat o experienta unica, aceea de a cunoaste situatia reala a Romaniei, direct, si nu din rapoarte si relatari.
Dar, s-a pierdut acea sansa unica de a revitaliza, energiza, reinvia, reconstrui, o Romanie a secolului 21 si de a aduce romanii la un nivel de gandire, acela al mileniului III, al acelei Europe in care doresc atat de mult sa fie acceptati, s-a pierdut ocazia venirii acelui « suflu nou » pe care numai eu puteam sa-l aduc.
Pentru ca nu este suficient sa fii impins intr-o lume noua tie, trebuie sa fii pregatit mental ca sa te adaptezi, sa supravietuiesti si sa fii productiv si competitiv in ea.
Doresc sa le multumesc celor multi, peste 300,000 de oameni care si-au manifestat dorinta pentru o schimbare radicala in Romania. (Strangerile de maini si solidaritatea noastra in gandire sunt ceva sfant si le voi purta in suflet pentru totdeauna). Din pacate, acestia nu suntem in numar suficient pentru a face o diferenta in noiembrie la alegeri.
Dumneavoastra, cei ce aveti o gandire de avangarda, aveti o munca grea de acum incolo si anume aceea de a-i lamuri pe ceilalti ca trebuie sa isi schimbe mentalitatea si sa paseasca in secolul 21 daca vor sa supravietuiasca atat moral cat si fizic intr-o Europa in care doresc sa fie acceptati.
...Am venit ca sa castig presedintia pentru dumneavoastra. Dar asa cum se arata lucrurile, va ramane ostateca unui partid sau altul cand, de fapt, conform Constitutiei tarii ar trebui sa fie deasupra lor, independenta. ...
Detin informatii certe ca anumiti oameni politici care controleaza institutii media au instituit un adevarat embargo mediatic la adresa mea.
Cat este de important pentru dumneavoastra daca presa este libera ?
Suntem tot la stadiul in care acceptam sa ni se spuna ce sa citim si ce sa ascultam ?
Prin acest refuz facut mie, este exact ce vi s-a intamplat dumneavoastra, ca si cum ati fi incapabili sa decideti singuri. De aceea, poate, se face un efort extraordinar sa se inventeze diverse moduri de a fura voturi, tot ca sa se decida pentru dumneavoastra !
In plus, noua Lege electorala care permite alegatorilor calificati din strainatate sa voteze doar la ambasade este un nou mod de a obstructiona alegatorii din diaspora sa-si exercite dreptul garantat de Constitutie si astfel sa limiteze accesul acestora la candidatura mea....
Sper ca data viitoare cand cineva sincer va dori sa ajute cu adevarat si dezinteresat tara asa cum doresc eu, si care va fi obstructionat la modul la care eu am fost impiedicata sa ajung la dumneavoastra, veti iesi in strada si va veti impune punctul de vedere in mod vehement pentru ca nepotii si copiii dumneavoastra sa nu mosteneasca un astfel de sistem.
..Dumnezeu sa aiba in paza Lui poporul roman!
Dumnezeu sa binecuvanteze Romania!
POST FACTUM:Sa pun si eu jar peste foc: mie mi-e foarte greu sa ma impac cu politicienii care au drept refren "voi nu ma meritati" (intelegeti/nu sunteti pregatiti. etc...) Cred ca meritul
conducatorului/comunicatorului sta in aceea de a se face inteles de
toata lumea.Ioana Avadani www.cji.ro
Chris Terhes scrie:
Intamplarea a facut ca dupa ce am vazut anumite postari publicate pe
acest grup referitoare la retragerea Liei Roberts din cursa
prezidentiala, sa urmaresc prin satelit - cu un decalaj de 12 ore
ce-i drept - emisiunea "Marius Tuca Show" la care a fost prezenta Lia Roberts si unde aceasta cauta sa dea o justificare actiunii sale de retragere din cursa. Comparand prestatia ei din aceasta emisiune cu cea de la inceputul anului din cadrul aceleiasi emisiuni (cand si-a aratat interesul pentru a candida la presedentia Romaniei), aceasta a fost de-a dreptul jenibila si dezgustatoare, marcata de o atitudine de indiferentism, raceala si de un aer de superioritate vis-a-vis de orice intrebare venita din partea lui Marius Tuca. Atitudinea domniei sale din cadrul acelei emisiuni s-a potrivit de minune cu cea a baronilor, maharilor si barosanilor din societatea romaneasca. Pentru un om politic, insa, o astfel de atitudinea este de nepermis. In America, daca un om politic s-ar fi prezentat intr-o emisiune televizata cu atitudinea pe care Lia Roberts a avut-o in emisiunea "Marius Tuca Show", cu siguranta aceea ar fi fost ultima sa aparitie televizata si, de asemenea, sfarsitul carierei politice.
Comportarea Liei Roberts din cadrul emisiunii "Marius Tuca Show"
dovdeste ptul ca ea nu a fost animata de intentii sincere in ceea ce priveste presedentia Romaniei, ci a fost pionul principal in discreditarea voita a oricarui posibil viitor candidat roman din
afara granitelor tarii la presedentia Romaniei. Acum, ca nici un roman din afara nu mai candideaza, "job"-ul ei pe scena politica romaneasca s-a terminat...
Chris.
Acuzatii dure la adresa politicienilor romani
Lia Roberts se retrage din cursa pentru Cotroceni
Sistemul politic din Romania este bolnav!
Poporul sufera de o maladie grava: saracia!
Prin retragerea candidaturii, Lia Roberts nu pierde nimic, dimpotriva, a castigat o experienta unica, aceea de a cunoaste situatia reala a Romaniei, direct, si nu din rapoarte si relatari.
Dar, s-a pierdut acea sansa unica de a revitaliza, energiza, reinvia, reconstrui, o Romanie a secolului 21 si de a aduce romanii la un nivel de gandire, acela al mileniului III, al acelei Europe in care doresc atat de mult sa fie acceptati, s-a pierdut ocazia venirii acelui « suflu nou » pe care numai eu puteam sa-l aduc.
Pentru ca nu este suficient sa fii impins intr-o lume noua tie, trebuie sa fii pregatit mental ca sa te adaptezi, sa supravietuiesti si sa fii productiv si competitiv in ea.
Doresc sa le multumesc celor multi, peste 300,000 de oameni care si-au manifestat dorinta pentru o schimbare radicala in Romania. (Strangerile de maini si solidaritatea noastra in gandire sunt ceva sfant si le voi purta in suflet pentru totdeauna). Din pacate, acestia nu suntem in numar suficient pentru a face o diferenta in noiembrie la alegeri.
Dumneavoastra, cei ce aveti o gandire de avangarda, aveti o munca grea de acum incolo si anume aceea de a-i lamuri pe ceilalti ca trebuie sa isi schimbe mentalitatea si sa paseasca in secolul 21 daca vor sa supravietuiasca atat moral cat si fizic intr-o Europa in care doresc sa fie acceptati.
...Am venit ca sa castig presedintia pentru dumneavoastra. Dar asa cum se arata lucrurile, va ramane ostateca unui partid sau altul cand, de fapt, conform Constitutiei tarii ar trebui sa fie deasupra lor, independenta. ...
Detin informatii certe ca anumiti oameni politici care controleaza institutii media au instituit un adevarat embargo mediatic la adresa mea.
Cat este de important pentru dumneavoastra daca presa este libera ?
Suntem tot la stadiul in care acceptam sa ni se spuna ce sa citim si ce sa ascultam ?
Prin acest refuz facut mie, este exact ce vi s-a intamplat dumneavoastra, ca si cum ati fi incapabili sa decideti singuri. De aceea, poate, se face un efort extraordinar sa se inventeze diverse moduri de a fura voturi, tot ca sa se decida pentru dumneavoastra !
In plus, noua Lege electorala care permite alegatorilor calificati din strainatate sa voteze doar la ambasade este un nou mod de a obstructiona alegatorii din diaspora sa-si exercite dreptul garantat de Constitutie si astfel sa limiteze accesul acestora la candidatura mea....
Sper ca data viitoare cand cineva sincer va dori sa ajute cu adevarat si dezinteresat tara asa cum doresc eu, si care va fi obstructionat la modul la care eu am fost impiedicata sa ajung la dumneavoastra, veti iesi in strada si va veti impune punctul de vedere in mod vehement pentru ca nepotii si copiii dumneavoastra sa nu mosteneasca un astfel de sistem.
..Dumnezeu sa aiba in paza Lui poporul roman!
Dumnezeu sa binecuvanteze Romania!
POST FACTUM:Sa pun si eu jar peste foc: mie mi-e foarte greu sa ma impac cu politicienii care au drept refren "voi nu ma meritati" (intelegeti/nu sunteti pregatiti. etc...) Cred ca meritul
conducatorului/comunicatorului sta in aceea de a se face inteles de
toata lumea.Ioana Avadani www.cji.ro
Chris Terhes scrie:
Intamplarea a facut ca dupa ce am vazut anumite postari publicate pe
acest grup referitoare la retragerea Liei Roberts din cursa
prezidentiala, sa urmaresc prin satelit - cu un decalaj de 12 ore
ce-i drept - emisiunea "Marius Tuca Show" la care a fost prezenta Lia Roberts si unde aceasta cauta sa dea o justificare actiunii sale de retragere din cursa. Comparand prestatia ei din aceasta emisiune cu cea de la inceputul anului din cadrul aceleiasi emisiuni (cand si-a aratat interesul pentru a candida la presedentia Romaniei), aceasta a fost de-a dreptul jenibila si dezgustatoare, marcata de o atitudine de indiferentism, raceala si de un aer de superioritate vis-a-vis de orice intrebare venita din partea lui Marius Tuca. Atitudinea domniei sale din cadrul acelei emisiuni s-a potrivit de minune cu cea a baronilor, maharilor si barosanilor din societatea romaneasca. Pentru un om politic, insa, o astfel de atitudinea este de nepermis. In America, daca un om politic s-ar fi prezentat intr-o emisiune televizata cu atitudinea pe care Lia Roberts a avut-o in emisiunea "Marius Tuca Show", cu siguranta aceea ar fi fost ultima sa aparitie televizata si, de asemenea, sfarsitul carierei politice.
Comportarea Liei Roberts din cadrul emisiunii "Marius Tuca Show"
dovdeste ptul ca ea nu a fost animata de intentii sincere in ceea ce priveste presedentia Romaniei, ci a fost pionul principal in discreditarea voita a oricarui posibil viitor candidat roman din
afara granitelor tarii la presedentia Romaniei. Acum, ca nici un roman din afara nu mai candideaza, "job"-ul ei pe scena politica romaneasca s-a terminat...
Chris.
Si eu..cu cine Votez!?
Politica
Acuzatii dure la adresa politicienilor romani
Lia Roberts se retrage din cursa pentru Cotroceni
Sistemul politic din Romania este bolnav!
Poporul sufera de o maladie grava: saracia!
Prin retragerea candidaturii, Lia Roberts nu pierde nimic, dimpotriva, a castigat o experienta unica, aceea de a cunoaste situatia reala a Romaniei, direct, si nu din rapoarte si relatari.
Dar, s-a pierdut acea sansa unica de a revitaliza, energiza, reinvia, reconstrui, o Romanie a secolului 21 si de a aduce romanii la un nivel de gandire, acela al mileniului III, al acelei Europe in care doresc atat de mult sa fie acceptati, s-a pierdut ocazia venirii acelui « suflu nou » pe care numai eu puteam sa-l aduc.
Pentru ca nu este suficient sa fii impins intr-o lume noua tie, trebuie sa fii pregatit mental ca sa te adaptezi, sa supravietuiesti si sa fii productiv si competitiv in ea.
Doresc sa le multumesc celor multi, peste 300,000 de oameni care si-au manifestat dorinta pentru o schimbare radicala in Romania. (Strangerile de maini si solidaritatea noastra in gandire sunt ceva sfant si le voi purta in suflet pentru totdeauna). Din pacate, acestia nu suntem in numar suficient pentru a face o diferenta in noiembrie la alegeri.
Dumneavoastra, cei ce aveti o gandire de avangarda, aveti o munca grea de acum incolo si anume aceea de a-i lamuri pe ceilalti ca trebuie sa isi schimbe mentalitatea si sa paseasca in secolul 21 daca vor sa supravietuiasca atat moral cat si fizic intr-o Europa in care doresc sa fie acceptati.
...Am venit ca sa castig presedintia pentru dumneavoastra. Dar asa cum se arata lucrurile, va ramane ostateca unui partid sau altul cand, de fapt, conform Constitutiei tarii ar trebui sa fie deasupra lor, independenta. ...
Detin informatii certe ca anumiti oameni politici care controleaza institutii media au instituit un adevarat embargo mediatic la adresa mea.
Cat este de important pentru dumneavoastra daca presa este libera ?
Suntem tot la stadiul in care acceptam sa ni se spuna ce sa citim si ce sa ascultam ?
Prin acest refuz facut mie, este exact ce vi s-a intamplat dumneavoastra, ca si cum ati fi incapabili sa decideti singuri. De aceea, poate, se face un efort extraordinar sa se inventeze diverse moduri de a fura voturi, tot ca sa se decida pentru dumneavoastra !
In plus, noua Lege electorala care permite alegatorilor calificati din strainatate sa voteze doar la ambasade este un nou mod de a obstructiona alegatorii din diaspora sa-si exercite dreptul garantat de Constitutie si astfel sa limiteze accesul acestora la candidatura mea....
Sper ca data viitoare cand cineva sincer va dori sa ajute cu adevarat si dezinteresat tara asa cum doresc eu, si care va fi obstructionat la modul la care eu am fost impiedicata sa ajung la dumneavoastra, veti iesi in strada si va veti impune punctul de vedere in mod vehement pentru ca nepotii si copiii dumneavoastra sa nu mosteneasca un astfel de sistem.
..Dumnezeu sa aiba in paza Lui poporul roman!
Dumnezeu sa binecuvanteze Romania!
POST FACTUM:Sa pun si eu jar peste foc: mie mi-e foarte greu sa ma impac cu politicienii care au drept refren "voi nu ma meritati" (intelegeti/nu sunteti pregatiti. etc...) Cred ca meritul
conducatorului/comunicatorului sta in aceea de a se face inteles de
toata lumea.Ioana Avadani www.cji.ro
Chris Terhes scrie:
Intamplarea a facut ca dupa ce am vazut anumite postari publicate pe
acest grup referitoare la retragerea Liei Roberts din cursa
prezidentiala, sa urmaresc prin satelit - cu un decalaj de 12 ore
ce-i drept - emisiunea "Marius Tuca Show" la care a fost prezenta Lia Roberts si unde aceasta cauta sa dea o justificare actiunii sale de retragere din cursa. Comparand prestatia ei din aceasta emisiune cu cea de la inceputul anului din cadrul aceleiasi emisiuni (cand si-a aratat interesul pentru a candida la presedentia Romaniei), aceasta a fost de-a dreptul jenibila si dezgustatoare, marcata de o atitudine de indiferentism, raceala si de un aer de superioritate vis-a-vis de orice intrebare venita din partea lui Marius Tuca. Atitudinea domniei sale din cadrul acelei emisiuni s-a potrivit de minune cu cea a baronilor, maharilor si barosanilor din societatea romaneasca. Pentru un om politic, insa, o astfel de atitudinea este de nepermis. In America, daca un om politic s-ar fi prezentat intr-o emisiune televizata cu atitudinea pe care Lia Roberts a avut-o in emisiunea "Marius Tuca Show", cu siguranta aceea ar fi fost ultima sa aparitie televizata si, de asemenea, sfarsitul carierei politice.
Comportarea Liei Roberts din cadrul emisiunii "Marius Tuca Show"
dovdeste ptul ca ea nu a fost animata de intentii sincere in ceea ce priveste presedentia Romaniei, ci a fost pionul principal in discreditarea voita a oricarui posibil viitor candidat roman din
afara granitelor tarii la presedentia Romaniei. Acum, ca nici un roman din afara nu mai candideaza, "job"-ul ei pe scena politica romaneasca s-a terminat...
Chris.
Acuzatii dure la adresa politicienilor romani
Lia Roberts se retrage din cursa pentru Cotroceni
Sistemul politic din Romania este bolnav!
Poporul sufera de o maladie grava: saracia!
Prin retragerea candidaturii, Lia Roberts nu pierde nimic, dimpotriva, a castigat o experienta unica, aceea de a cunoaste situatia reala a Romaniei, direct, si nu din rapoarte si relatari.
Dar, s-a pierdut acea sansa unica de a revitaliza, energiza, reinvia, reconstrui, o Romanie a secolului 21 si de a aduce romanii la un nivel de gandire, acela al mileniului III, al acelei Europe in care doresc atat de mult sa fie acceptati, s-a pierdut ocazia venirii acelui « suflu nou » pe care numai eu puteam sa-l aduc.
Pentru ca nu este suficient sa fii impins intr-o lume noua tie, trebuie sa fii pregatit mental ca sa te adaptezi, sa supravietuiesti si sa fii productiv si competitiv in ea.
Doresc sa le multumesc celor multi, peste 300,000 de oameni care si-au manifestat dorinta pentru o schimbare radicala in Romania. (Strangerile de maini si solidaritatea noastra in gandire sunt ceva sfant si le voi purta in suflet pentru totdeauna). Din pacate, acestia nu suntem in numar suficient pentru a face o diferenta in noiembrie la alegeri.
Dumneavoastra, cei ce aveti o gandire de avangarda, aveti o munca grea de acum incolo si anume aceea de a-i lamuri pe ceilalti ca trebuie sa isi schimbe mentalitatea si sa paseasca in secolul 21 daca vor sa supravietuiasca atat moral cat si fizic intr-o Europa in care doresc sa fie acceptati.
...Am venit ca sa castig presedintia pentru dumneavoastra. Dar asa cum se arata lucrurile, va ramane ostateca unui partid sau altul cand, de fapt, conform Constitutiei tarii ar trebui sa fie deasupra lor, independenta. ...
Detin informatii certe ca anumiti oameni politici care controleaza institutii media au instituit un adevarat embargo mediatic la adresa mea.
Cat este de important pentru dumneavoastra daca presa este libera ?
Suntem tot la stadiul in care acceptam sa ni se spuna ce sa citim si ce sa ascultam ?
Prin acest refuz facut mie, este exact ce vi s-a intamplat dumneavoastra, ca si cum ati fi incapabili sa decideti singuri. De aceea, poate, se face un efort extraordinar sa se inventeze diverse moduri de a fura voturi, tot ca sa se decida pentru dumneavoastra !
In plus, noua Lege electorala care permite alegatorilor calificati din strainatate sa voteze doar la ambasade este un nou mod de a obstructiona alegatorii din diaspora sa-si exercite dreptul garantat de Constitutie si astfel sa limiteze accesul acestora la candidatura mea....
Sper ca data viitoare cand cineva sincer va dori sa ajute cu adevarat si dezinteresat tara asa cum doresc eu, si care va fi obstructionat la modul la care eu am fost impiedicata sa ajung la dumneavoastra, veti iesi in strada si va veti impune punctul de vedere in mod vehement pentru ca nepotii si copiii dumneavoastra sa nu mosteneasca un astfel de sistem.
..Dumnezeu sa aiba in paza Lui poporul roman!
Dumnezeu sa binecuvanteze Romania!
POST FACTUM:Sa pun si eu jar peste foc: mie mi-e foarte greu sa ma impac cu politicienii care au drept refren "voi nu ma meritati" (intelegeti/nu sunteti pregatiti. etc...) Cred ca meritul
conducatorului/comunicatorului sta in aceea de a se face inteles de
toata lumea.Ioana Avadani www.cji.ro
Chris Terhes scrie:
Intamplarea a facut ca dupa ce am vazut anumite postari publicate pe
acest grup referitoare la retragerea Liei Roberts din cursa
prezidentiala, sa urmaresc prin satelit - cu un decalaj de 12 ore
ce-i drept - emisiunea "Marius Tuca Show" la care a fost prezenta Lia Roberts si unde aceasta cauta sa dea o justificare actiunii sale de retragere din cursa. Comparand prestatia ei din aceasta emisiune cu cea de la inceputul anului din cadrul aceleiasi emisiuni (cand si-a aratat interesul pentru a candida la presedentia Romaniei), aceasta a fost de-a dreptul jenibila si dezgustatoare, marcata de o atitudine de indiferentism, raceala si de un aer de superioritate vis-a-vis de orice intrebare venita din partea lui Marius Tuca. Atitudinea domniei sale din cadrul acelei emisiuni s-a potrivit de minune cu cea a baronilor, maharilor si barosanilor din societatea romaneasca. Pentru un om politic, insa, o astfel de atitudinea este de nepermis. In America, daca un om politic s-ar fi prezentat intr-o emisiune televizata cu atitudinea pe care Lia Roberts a avut-o in emisiunea "Marius Tuca Show", cu siguranta aceea ar fi fost ultima sa aparitie televizata si, de asemenea, sfarsitul carierei politice.
Comportarea Liei Roberts din cadrul emisiunii "Marius Tuca Show"
dovdeste ptul ca ea nu a fost animata de intentii sincere in ceea ce priveste presedentia Romaniei, ci a fost pionul principal in discreditarea voita a oricarui posibil viitor candidat roman din
afara granitelor tarii la presedentia Romaniei. Acum, ca nici un roman din afara nu mai candideaza, "job"-ul ei pe scena politica romaneasca s-a terminat...
Chris.
joi, septembrie 23, 2004
integrazione
ROMANIA, fiducia nell'adesione all'UeTiscali Europa - ItalyLa Romania è determinata a completare entro la fine dell'anno i negoziati con Bruxelles per l'ingresso nell'Unione europea. Questo ...Mostra tutti gli articoli su questo argomento
FAENZA: due libri sul gemellaggio con la RomaniaRomagnaoggi.it - Romagna,ItalyFAENZA Venerdì sera 24 settembre, alle ore 21.00, nella sala Bigari del palazzo municipale saranno presentate due monografie in lingua italiana di Timisoara ...
FAENZA: due libri sul gemellaggio con la RomaniaRomagnaoggi.it - Romagna,ItalyFAENZA Venerdì sera 24 settembre, alle ore 21.00, nella sala Bigari del palazzo municipale saranno presentate due monografie in lingua italiana di Timisoara ...
A inceput toamna si acum ma trezescL.M.A!ELENA
Intr-adevar la unele computere nu apare de loc optiunea de editare detaliata(cine face bloguri stie:)
tocmai vroia sa postez o legatura spre un site de discutii i'telectuale la o cafea ((ca e capuccino,macchiato,mocacino cu lapte sau cu orz depinde f. mult de participanti).
Timpul trece r.p.d. la stagiu acum,caci la inceput eram in prospectiuni;in pauze profit si comunic pe Yahoo Messenger cu ID-ul a_onaca de la 9 la 18 C.E.T.
Am cam asteptat bursa saptamana asta, facand ocoale cu buzul (ca am pana la bici,pe moment) spre banca,dar mi-am promis ca redirectionez banii spre card (ultimele doua).Acum ca clonatorii romani de carduri tot au fost prinsi...
In rest doar ca mai avem examene si cursuri de politica luna aceasta.Sunt cu gandul la un week-end spre Paris,la Diana si Fabien....poate dupa stagiu.
P.S. Nu stiu daca aveti deja setata optiunea din yahoo prin care putei face legaturi spre siteuri ca si aici pe weblog o atasez sa v-o instalati e f. practica la scrisori.(este in dreapta ca un glob pamantesc in lanturi!!:P si dupa click pe cuvantul dorit si click pe glob se deschide o fereastra pe care se poate da paste la o adresa ce are legatura cu cuvantul clickat initial.De ex. padova si apoi se introduce in fereastra linkul spre oras http://www.padovanet.it.inteles:)?
tocmai vroia sa postez o legatura spre un site de discutii i'telectuale la o cafea ((ca e capuccino,macchiato,mocacino cu lapte sau cu orz depinde f. mult de participanti).
Timpul trece r.p.d. la stagiu acum,caci la inceput eram in prospectiuni;in pauze profit si comunic pe Yahoo Messenger cu ID-ul a_onaca de la 9 la 18 C.E.T.
Am cam asteptat bursa saptamana asta, facand ocoale cu buzul (ca am pana la bici,pe moment) spre banca,dar mi-am promis ca redirectionez banii spre card (ultimele doua).Acum ca clonatorii romani de carduri tot au fost prinsi...
In rest doar ca mai avem examene si cursuri de politica luna aceasta.Sunt cu gandul la un week-end spre Paris,la Diana si Fabien....poate dupa stagiu.
P.S. Nu stiu daca aveti deja setata optiunea din yahoo prin care putei face legaturi spre siteuri ca si aici pe weblog o atasez sa v-o instalati e f. practica la scrisori.(este in dreapta ca un glob pamantesc in lanturi!!:P si dupa click pe cuvantul dorit si click pe glob se deschide o fereastra pe care se poate da paste la o adresa ce are legatura cu cuvantul clickat initial.De ex. padova si apoi se introduce in fereastra linkul spre oras http://www.padovanet.it.inteles:)?
A inceput toamna si acum ma trezescL.M.A!ELENA
Intr-adevar la unele computere nu apare de loc optiunea de editare detaliata(cine face bloguri stie:)
tocmai vroia sa postez o legatura spre un site de discutii i'telectuale la o cafea ((ca e capuccino,macchiato,mocacino cu lapte sau cu orz depinde f. mult de participanti).
Timpul trece r.p.d. la stagiu acum,caci la inceput eram in prospectiuni;in pauze profit si comunic pe Yahoo Messenger cu ID-ul a_onaca de la 9 la 18 C.E.T.
Am cam asteptat bursa saptamana asta, facand ocoale cu buzul (ca am pana la bici,pe moment) spre banca,dar mi-am promis ca redirectionez banii spre card (ultimele doua).Acum ca clonatorii romani de carduri tot au fost prinsi...
In rest doar ca mai avem examene si cursuri de politica luna aceasta.Sunt cu gandul la un week-end spre Paris,la Diana si Fabien....poate dupa stagiu.
P.S. Nu stiu daca aveti deja setata optiunea din yahoo prin care putei face legaturi spre siteuri ca si aici pe weblog o atasez sa v-o instalati e f. practica la scrisori.(este in dreapta ca un glob pamantesc in lanturi!!:P si dupa click pe cuvantul dorit si click pe glob se deschide o fereastra pe care se poate da paste la o adresa ce are legatura cu cuvantul clickat initial.De ex. padova si apoi se introduce in fereastra linkul spre oras http://www.padovanet.it.inteles:)?
tocmai vroia sa postez o legatura spre un site de discutii i'telectuale la o cafea ((ca e capuccino,macchiato,mocacino cu lapte sau cu orz depinde f. mult de participanti).
Timpul trece r.p.d. la stagiu acum,caci la inceput eram in prospectiuni;in pauze profit si comunic pe Yahoo Messenger cu ID-ul a_onaca de la 9 la 18 C.E.T.
Am cam asteptat bursa saptamana asta, facand ocoale cu buzul (ca am pana la bici,pe moment) spre banca,dar mi-am promis ca redirectionez banii spre card (ultimele doua).Acum ca clonatorii romani de carduri tot au fost prinsi...
In rest doar ca mai avem examene si cursuri de politica luna aceasta.Sunt cu gandul la un week-end spre Paris,la Diana si Fabien....poate dupa stagiu.
P.S. Nu stiu daca aveti deja setata optiunea din yahoo prin care putei face legaturi spre siteuri ca si aici pe weblog o atasez sa v-o instalati e f. practica la scrisori.(este in dreapta ca un glob pamantesc in lanturi!!:P si dupa click pe cuvantul dorit si click pe glob se deschide o fereastra pe care se poate da paste la o adresa ce are legatura cu cuvantul clickat initial.De ex. padova si apoi se introduce in fereastra linkul spre oras http://www.padovanet.it.inteles:)?
miercuri, septembrie 22, 2004
Romania eyes gold mine plan
Canadian project raises concerns
By BERTRAND MAROTTE
Monday, September 20, 2004 - Page B7
MONTREAL -- With its candidacy for membership in the European Union
on the line, Romania must be very careful to ensure there will be no
environmental fallout from a giant gold mine a Canadian company
wants to build in the cash-strapped country, Romanian President Ion
Iliescu says.
"From one point of view, I'm very interested in the presence of a
Canadian company and for the region where they're trying to develop
this mining activity," Mr. Iliescu said in an interview with The
Globe and Mail on the weekend.
"It is very important from the economic and social point of view,
but the question was raised concerning the environment," he said,
pointing out that meeting strict environmental standards is one of
the conditions for membership in the European Union.
Romania and its fellow Balkan countries have much work to do
catching up economically to their European cousins, but the country
cannot afford to risk breakneck progress at the expense of
environmental and social concerns, said Mr. Iliescu, who met briefly
with Prime Minister Paul Martin and Quebec Premier Jean Charest on
Friday as part of a whirlwind visit to Canada.
Romania hopes to conclude EU membership talks by the end of the
year, with an eye to joining the bloc in 2007."One of the requirements is the protection of the environment," he
said.
Toronto-based Gabriel Resources Ltd. has run into opposition from environmentalists, next-door neighbour Hungary, local rights groups
and even archeologists over plans to build a massive gold and silver
mine in the impoverished Transylvanian region of Rosia Montana.
The project would require the resettlement of about 2,000 people,
the digging of huge pits that would result in the destruction of two
valleys and two mountain peaks, as well as the use of a
controversial extraction process using cyanide.
The region has been a mining district for more than 2,000 years,
going back to Roman days, but protesters say Gabriel's project is
too destructive.
Gabriel owns 80 per cent of the project, which would create the
largest gold mining operation in Europe. The Romanian government
controls 19.3 per cent and three Romanian companies hold the
remaining 0.7 per cent.
Gabriel has stated that the site contains proven and probable
reserves of 10.6 million ounces of gold and 52.3 million ounces of
silver. The company had planned on starting production next year but
has postponed that date in the face of difficulties relocating
villagers and securing the necessary permits and environmental
consent.
Also clouding the gold project's future is this November's election
in Romania. Mr. Iliescu, 74, must step down after two terms as
President but Romanian legislators earlier this month amended the
election law to allow him to run for the Senate.
Mr. Iliescu also said his country is in talks with Hydro-Québec
about several energy projects, including small- and medium-sized
hydroelectric plants.
Romania, as well, is interested in talking to Canadian banks about
how to reform the country's antiquated and underdeveloped financial
system, he added.
"After a long period of difficulties we're working to establish a
normal course of development," he said.
By BERTRAND MAROTTE
Monday, September 20, 2004 - Page B7
MONTREAL -- With its candidacy for membership in the European Union
on the line, Romania must be very careful to ensure there will be no
environmental fallout from a giant gold mine a Canadian company
wants to build in the cash-strapped country, Romanian President Ion
Iliescu says.
"From one point of view, I'm very interested in the presence of a
Canadian company and for the region where they're trying to develop
this mining activity," Mr. Iliescu said in an interview with The
Globe and Mail on the weekend.
"It is very important from the economic and social point of view,
but the question was raised concerning the environment," he said,
pointing out that meeting strict environmental standards is one of
the conditions for membership in the European Union.
Romania and its fellow Balkan countries have much work to do
catching up economically to their European cousins, but the country
cannot afford to risk breakneck progress at the expense of
environmental and social concerns, said Mr. Iliescu, who met briefly
with Prime Minister Paul Martin and Quebec Premier Jean Charest on
Friday as part of a whirlwind visit to Canada.
Romania hopes to conclude EU membership talks by the end of the
year, with an eye to joining the bloc in 2007."One of the requirements is the protection of the environment," he
said.
Toronto-based Gabriel Resources Ltd. has run into opposition from environmentalists, next-door neighbour Hungary, local rights groups
and even archeologists over plans to build a massive gold and silver
mine in the impoverished Transylvanian region of Rosia Montana.
The project would require the resettlement of about 2,000 people,
the digging of huge pits that would result in the destruction of two
valleys and two mountain peaks, as well as the use of a
controversial extraction process using cyanide.
The region has been a mining district for more than 2,000 years,
going back to Roman days, but protesters say Gabriel's project is
too destructive.
Gabriel owns 80 per cent of the project, which would create the
largest gold mining operation in Europe. The Romanian government
controls 19.3 per cent and three Romanian companies hold the
remaining 0.7 per cent.
Gabriel has stated that the site contains proven and probable
reserves of 10.6 million ounces of gold and 52.3 million ounces of
silver. The company had planned on starting production next year but
has postponed that date in the face of difficulties relocating
villagers and securing the necessary permits and environmental
consent.
Also clouding the gold project's future is this November's election
in Romania. Mr. Iliescu, 74, must step down after two terms as
President but Romanian legislators earlier this month amended the
election law to allow him to run for the Senate.
Mr. Iliescu also said his country is in talks with Hydro-Québec
about several energy projects, including small- and medium-sized
hydroelectric plants.
Romania, as well, is interested in talking to Canadian banks about
how to reform the country's antiquated and underdeveloped financial
system, he added.
"After a long period of difficulties we're working to establish a
normal course of development," he said.
Letter from Ion Iliescu
Yesterday, The Chigaco Times Newspaper published a letter from Ion
Iliescu,
president of Romania, in the Letters from the Editors section.
Personnaly, I have a strong doubt regarding the veridicity of the
actual sender of this letter, but I will publish it anyways and I invite you to comment on it.@
More than a decade ago, our part of the world was called Eastern Europe not merely because of our geography but because Cold War divisions left us on the Eastern side of the Iron Curtain. I have consistently been one of the strongest advocates of redefining our regional identity. Our cultural heritage -- derived from ancient Greece and Rome -- is European.
During the second half of the 20th century, the Soviet occupation
cruelly diverted the Central European countries from their natural evolution.
Thankfully, Central Europe has now returned to its original European
destiny. Through two successive enlargement rounds, full NATO
membership has resolved the security dilemma that plagued our region for generations.
The path to a total integration into the European Union is set with 10 new members and two more scheduled to join in 2007.
Two years ago in Bucharest's Revolution Square, President George W.
Bush noted Romanians and other Central Europeans value freedom because we lived without it. Our commitment to promoting democracy is borne of our gratitude for the chance of being able to practice it.
We have a special sympathy for Americans of Central European origin,
especially in the Midwest. Chicago, Illinois and its neighboring states have become homes for many Romanians who help enhance the ties between our countries. On our side, we are taking responsibilities as strategic allies and growing business partners. Romania has committed 500 troops to Afghanistan and 800 military personnel in Iraq. As a nonpermanent member of
the U.N. Security Council, Romania co-sponsored Resolution 1546, which returned full sovereignty to an independent Iraq. Romanian Foreign Minister Mircea Geoana was the first foreign government official to visit Baghdad after the restoration of sovereignty to the new Iraqi government. Prime Minister Adrian Nastase presided over a U.N. special session on post-conflict reconstruction. In a few days, I will be addressing the U.N.General Assembly, stressing our support for the Iraqi interim authorities aimed at paving the way to democratic elections and ensuring security and stability of Iraq.
Economically, my country offers significant business opportunities, and Romanian-U.S. economic relations have steadily expanded. After years of recession, Romania's economy has grown since 2000 at 5 percent per year.Inflation has eased substantially and investments are expanding. Today,more than 70 percent of the gross domestic product is provided by the private sector, compared with only 1 percent in 1989. This success has resulted in renewed interest of U.S. companies in Romania's investment opportunities. I am honored to be able to address the World Trade Center Association of Chicago to reiterate our desire for a strong American economic presence in
Romania as an essential component of our overall relationship.
The Midwest symbolizes American values, ethnic diversity and economic
dynamism. Central Europe and Romania are springboards for promoting
democracy, successful and robust free-market economies and full of
promising business opportunities. We have a natural partnership with the heartland of America in expanding freedom, increasing prosperity and meeting the challenges of the 21st century together.
Ion Iliescu,president of Romania
Iliescu,
president of Romania, in the Letters from the Editors section.
Personnaly, I have a strong doubt regarding the veridicity of the
actual sender of this letter, but I will publish it anyways and I invite you to comment on it.@
More than a decade ago, our part of the world was called Eastern Europe not merely because of our geography but because Cold War divisions left us on the Eastern side of the Iron Curtain. I have consistently been one of the strongest advocates of redefining our regional identity. Our cultural heritage -- derived from ancient Greece and Rome -- is European.
During the second half of the 20th century, the Soviet occupation
cruelly diverted the Central European countries from their natural evolution.
Thankfully, Central Europe has now returned to its original European
destiny. Through two successive enlargement rounds, full NATO
membership has resolved the security dilemma that plagued our region for generations.
The path to a total integration into the European Union is set with 10 new members and two more scheduled to join in 2007.
Two years ago in Bucharest's Revolution Square, President George W.
Bush noted Romanians and other Central Europeans value freedom because we lived without it. Our commitment to promoting democracy is borne of our gratitude for the chance of being able to practice it.
We have a special sympathy for Americans of Central European origin,
especially in the Midwest. Chicago, Illinois and its neighboring states have become homes for many Romanians who help enhance the ties between our countries. On our side, we are taking responsibilities as strategic allies and growing business partners. Romania has committed 500 troops to Afghanistan and 800 military personnel in Iraq. As a nonpermanent member of
the U.N. Security Council, Romania co-sponsored Resolution 1546, which returned full sovereignty to an independent Iraq. Romanian Foreign Minister Mircea Geoana was the first foreign government official to visit Baghdad after the restoration of sovereignty to the new Iraqi government. Prime Minister Adrian Nastase presided over a U.N. special session on post-conflict reconstruction. In a few days, I will be addressing the U.N.General Assembly, stressing our support for the Iraqi interim authorities aimed at paving the way to democratic elections and ensuring security and stability of Iraq.
Economically, my country offers significant business opportunities, and Romanian-U.S. economic relations have steadily expanded. After years of recession, Romania's economy has grown since 2000 at 5 percent per year.Inflation has eased substantially and investments are expanding. Today,more than 70 percent of the gross domestic product is provided by the private sector, compared with only 1 percent in 1989. This success has resulted in renewed interest of U.S. companies in Romania's investment opportunities. I am honored to be able to address the World Trade Center Association of Chicago to reiterate our desire for a strong American economic presence in
Romania as an essential component of our overall relationship.
The Midwest symbolizes American values, ethnic diversity and economic
dynamism. Central Europe and Romania are springboards for promoting
democracy, successful and robust free-market economies and full of
promising business opportunities. We have a natural partnership with the heartland of America in expanding freedom, increasing prosperity and meeting the challenges of the 21st century together.
Ion Iliescu,president of Romania
To Join the EU,Romania faces many hurdles
Graft and Rights Issues
Make Outcome Uncertain;
Warnings Rattle Optimists
By DAN BILEFSKY
Staff Reporter of THE WALL STREET JOURNAL
September 20, 2004; Page A19
BUCHAREST -- Romania is so impatient to join the European Union that
the EU's blue flag already is seen throughout the capital and inside the imposing Senate building, the site where thousands of protesters helped overthrow Nicolae Ceaucescu's communist dictatorship in 1989.
No less eager are big multinationals such as Microsoft Corp. and
Siemens AG. They join other foreign investors in watching for the European Commission to decide on Oct. 6 whether Romania's overhauls suffice to finish entry negotiations by the end of this year, allowing Romania to join the EU along with Bulgaria in 2007.
The outcome is still uncertain: Unlike Bulgaria, which has speeded
through required reforms, Romania risks being left behind unless it
satisfies EU demands to better fight corruption, overhaul its judiciary, improve its business environment and respect press freedom and human rights.
The reformist party of Adrian Nastase, Romania's prime minister, could find it harder to win the November general election if the EU
negotiations stall. This could present a new risk for the thousands of foreign companies that have invested a total of nearly $10 billion in the country during the past six years.
Most foreign direct investments have flowed into Romania in the hope
that it would be next in line for EU membership. Another draw is its pool
of talented workers and monthly wages of only about $200 -- about a
quarter of an EU average already sharply reduced by earlier EU entrants
from Eastern Europe.
Romanian officials publicly are optimistic. Viorel Ardeleanu, a
Brussels-based Romanian diplomat working for Romania's EU entry, sees the challenges. "But we're confident we'll get there," he said.
Yet recent warnings from EU headquarters in Brussels have rattled even the most ardent optimists. The EU is suffering from expansion fatigue as it struggles to come to terms with the recent increase in membership to 25 countries from 15.
Jean-Christophe Filori, spokesman for EU Enlargement Commissioner
Günter Verheugen, said: "The EU is exhausted after the last big enlargement in May. In the case of Romania, there are still big challenges in the areas of corruption, governance and the rules of law."
EU and Romanian officials alike say graft and corruption are the
biggest challenges the country must overcome.
Last year, the government investigated nearly 1,100 teachers, doctors and others for taking bribes in return for such things as issuing fake exam results and distributing medicine, according to the Romanian government.
To crack down on corruption among high government officials, the
government two years ago created an anti-corruption prosecutor's office.
Since then, four government ministers, four state secretaries, seven judges and prosecutors, 23 court bailiffs, 10 mayors, 18 customs officials, three generals and 167 police officers have come under criminal investigation.
Some foreign companies complain that the country suffers from vestiges of the communist era's old command economy.
When Romania joined the North Atlantic Treaty Organization in April,
Bucharest announced abruptly that the occasion would be marked with a state holiday. U.S. contract manufacturing firm Solectron Corp., which operates its factory seven days a week, said it was forced to pay its workers double time, or lose hundreds of thousands of dollars if the factory was left idle. It was fined EUR1,200 ($1,460) by local authorities for ignoring the holiday.
"The people running this country still behave like the old communist
regime," said Liana Brasaveanu, Solectron head of human resources in
Romania.
Romania has been praised for introducing a unified tax code for foreign and Romanian companies and for phasing out tax amnesties for Romanian companies.
But foreign investors still believe they are under tighter tax scrutiny to make up for tax relief given to Romanian companies. Gilbert Wood, an American who is president of the Foreign Investors Council in Bucharest and has dozens of foreign companies as clients, said that "tax harassment" of Western firms is common.
Meanwhile, not everyone here is convinced that EU membership is that
desirable, and some Romanians grumble about feeling Brussels' heavy
regulatory hand even before entry into the EU.
Varujan Pambuccian, a member of the Romanian parliament, who has been a key architect of the country's information-technology policy said: "We already have lived under a dictatorship in this country -- and joining the EU will just mean replacing one totalitarian regime with another."
Write to Dan Bilefsky at dan.bilefsky@wsj.com
Make Outcome Uncertain;
Warnings Rattle Optimists
By DAN BILEFSKY
Staff Reporter of THE WALL STREET JOURNAL
September 20, 2004; Page A19
BUCHAREST -- Romania is so impatient to join the European Union that
the EU's blue flag already is seen throughout the capital and inside the imposing Senate building, the site where thousands of protesters helped overthrow Nicolae Ceaucescu's communist dictatorship in 1989.
No less eager are big multinationals such as Microsoft Corp. and
Siemens AG. They join other foreign investors in watching for the European Commission to decide on Oct. 6 whether Romania's overhauls suffice to finish entry negotiations by the end of this year, allowing Romania to join the EU along with Bulgaria in 2007.
The outcome is still uncertain: Unlike Bulgaria, which has speeded
through required reforms, Romania risks being left behind unless it
satisfies EU demands to better fight corruption, overhaul its judiciary, improve its business environment and respect press freedom and human rights.
The reformist party of Adrian Nastase, Romania's prime minister, could find it harder to win the November general election if the EU
negotiations stall. This could present a new risk for the thousands of foreign companies that have invested a total of nearly $10 billion in the country during the past six years.
Most foreign direct investments have flowed into Romania in the hope
that it would be next in line for EU membership. Another draw is its pool
of talented workers and monthly wages of only about $200 -- about a
quarter of an EU average already sharply reduced by earlier EU entrants
from Eastern Europe.
Romanian officials publicly are optimistic. Viorel Ardeleanu, a
Brussels-based Romanian diplomat working for Romania's EU entry, sees the challenges. "But we're confident we'll get there," he said.
Yet recent warnings from EU headquarters in Brussels have rattled even the most ardent optimists. The EU is suffering from expansion fatigue as it struggles to come to terms with the recent increase in membership to 25 countries from 15.
Jean-Christophe Filori, spokesman for EU Enlargement Commissioner
Günter Verheugen, said: "The EU is exhausted after the last big enlargement in May. In the case of Romania, there are still big challenges in the areas of corruption, governance and the rules of law."
EU and Romanian officials alike say graft and corruption are the
biggest challenges the country must overcome.
Last year, the government investigated nearly 1,100 teachers, doctors and others for taking bribes in return for such things as issuing fake exam results and distributing medicine, according to the Romanian government.
To crack down on corruption among high government officials, the
government two years ago created an anti-corruption prosecutor's office.
Since then, four government ministers, four state secretaries, seven judges and prosecutors, 23 court bailiffs, 10 mayors, 18 customs officials, three generals and 167 police officers have come under criminal investigation.
Some foreign companies complain that the country suffers from vestiges of the communist era's old command economy.
When Romania joined the North Atlantic Treaty Organization in April,
Bucharest announced abruptly that the occasion would be marked with a state holiday. U.S. contract manufacturing firm Solectron Corp., which operates its factory seven days a week, said it was forced to pay its workers double time, or lose hundreds of thousands of dollars if the factory was left idle. It was fined EUR1,200 ($1,460) by local authorities for ignoring the holiday.
"The people running this country still behave like the old communist
regime," said Liana Brasaveanu, Solectron head of human resources in
Romania.
Romania has been praised for introducing a unified tax code for foreign and Romanian companies and for phasing out tax amnesties for Romanian companies.
But foreign investors still believe they are under tighter tax scrutiny to make up for tax relief given to Romanian companies. Gilbert Wood, an American who is president of the Foreign Investors Council in Bucharest and has dozens of foreign companies as clients, said that "tax harassment" of Western firms is common.
Meanwhile, not everyone here is convinced that EU membership is that
desirable, and some Romanians grumble about feeling Brussels' heavy
regulatory hand even before entry into the EU.
Varujan Pambuccian, a member of the Romanian parliament, who has been a key architect of the country's information-technology policy said: "We already have lived under a dictatorship in this country -- and joining the EU will just mean replacing one totalitarian regime with another."
Write to Dan Bilefsky at dan.bilefsky@wsj.com
logan
Logan Surpassed Predicted Sales
18,000 Units May Be Sold This Year
The success the new Dacia model, Logan, had on the market since its official launching made the Dacia – Renault officials revise the sale estimations for the year, from 11,000 to 18,000 units sold.
“We are very careful with the figures and predictions. It is true that the number of clients choosing the new model is above our expectations, but we don’t get high on this success”, said Constantin Stroe, Automobile Dacia vice president.
During the first day of its existence on the Romanian market (September 9) Logan received 568 firm orders, while 271 solicitors paid the full earnest money.
More than 7,500 persons tested Logan, also in the first day, say the company representatives. After just one day, on September 10, there were 12,225 orders for Logan. 64% of them referred to the 1.4 liters engine, while the rest were for the 1.6 liters model.
The Laureate version counted for 40% of the orders, Preference attracted 27%, while the top model of the line, Ambition, was chosen by some 19% of the clients.
Capital, 22 sep 2004
for Italian version click on title
18,000 Units May Be Sold This Year
The success the new Dacia model, Logan, had on the market since its official launching made the Dacia – Renault officials revise the sale estimations for the year, from 11,000 to 18,000 units sold.
“We are very careful with the figures and predictions. It is true that the number of clients choosing the new model is above our expectations, but we don’t get high on this success”, said Constantin Stroe, Automobile Dacia vice president.
During the first day of its existence on the Romanian market (September 9) Logan received 568 firm orders, while 271 solicitors paid the full earnest money.
More than 7,500 persons tested Logan, also in the first day, say the company representatives. After just one day, on September 10, there were 12,225 orders for Logan. 64% of them referred to the 1.4 liters engine, while the rest were for the 1.6 liters model.
The Laureate version counted for 40% of the orders, Preference attracted 27%, while the top model of the line, Ambition, was chosen by some 19% of the clients.
Capital, 22 sep 2004
for Italian version click on title
Sophia Loren, legenda filmului italian, a implinit 70 de ani
yesShowbiz & Fun
Lumea filmului i-a adus un omagiu celebrei actrite Sophia Loren, care a implinit 70 de ani. Frumoasa italianca a fost unul dintre sex-simbolurile secolului XX. Intr-o cariera desfasurata pe parcursul a catorva decenii, artista a cucerit inimile a milioane de cinefili din intreaga lume.
Sophia Loren s-a nascut la 20 septembrie 1934, la Roma. Inca din tinerete, italianca a atras privirile prin frumusetea ei si a devenit in scurt timp un model de succes. Nici concursurile de frumusete nu i-au fost straine, Sophia castigand numeroase premii.
De mica, italianca a fost fascinata de lumea teatrului si a filmului si petrecea ore in sir urmarind spectacole, cu speranta ca va ajunge candva la Hollywood. Norocul i-a suras frumoasei italience. In timp ce asista la un concurs de frumusete, Sophia a fost remarcata de celebrul regizor Carlo Ponti, care i-a propus sa vina la probe pentru un film.
Eforturile Sophiei de a-si realiza visul au fost ingreunate insa de criticile primite din partea echipelor de filmare, care o gaseau prea grasa si rebela pentru a juca in filme. Insa, surprinzator, tocmai caracterul Sophiei i-a adus in timp consacrarea ca diva a marelui ecran. De-a lungul carierei, Sophia Loren a jucat in peste 100 de filme si a primit de doua ori Premiul Oscar.
Ultimul film in care a jucat, "Between Strangers", a fost lansat anul trecut. Sophia Loren participa frecvent la evenimentele legate de lumea filmului. Ultima aparitie a avut loc la Festivalul de la Venetia, unde venerabila doamna a marelui ecran a atras, si de data aceasta, privirile admirative ale fanilor, dar si ale mult mai tinerilor ei colegi.
Romania Libera, 22 sep 2004
Lumea filmului i-a adus un omagiu celebrei actrite Sophia Loren, care a implinit 70 de ani. Frumoasa italianca a fost unul dintre sex-simbolurile secolului XX. Intr-o cariera desfasurata pe parcursul a catorva decenii, artista a cucerit inimile a milioane de cinefili din intreaga lume.
Sophia Loren s-a nascut la 20 septembrie 1934, la Roma. Inca din tinerete, italianca a atras privirile prin frumusetea ei si a devenit in scurt timp un model de succes. Nici concursurile de frumusete nu i-au fost straine, Sophia castigand numeroase premii.
De mica, italianca a fost fascinata de lumea teatrului si a filmului si petrecea ore in sir urmarind spectacole, cu speranta ca va ajunge candva la Hollywood. Norocul i-a suras frumoasei italience. In timp ce asista la un concurs de frumusete, Sophia a fost remarcata de celebrul regizor Carlo Ponti, care i-a propus sa vina la probe pentru un film.
Eforturile Sophiei de a-si realiza visul au fost ingreunate insa de criticile primite din partea echipelor de filmare, care o gaseau prea grasa si rebela pentru a juca in filme. Insa, surprinzator, tocmai caracterul Sophiei i-a adus in timp consacrarea ca diva a marelui ecran. De-a lungul carierei, Sophia Loren a jucat in peste 100 de filme si a primit de doua ori Premiul Oscar.
Ultimul film in care a jucat, "Between Strangers", a fost lansat anul trecut. Sophia Loren participa frecvent la evenimentele legate de lumea filmului. Ultima aparitie a avut loc la Festivalul de la Venetia, unde venerabila doamna a marelui ecran a atras, si de data aceasta, privirile admirative ale fanilor, dar si ale mult mai tinerilor ei colegi.
Romania Libera, 22 sep 2004
Sophia Loren, legenda filmului italian, a implinit 70 de ani
yesShowbiz & Fun
Lumea filmului i-a adus un omagiu celebrei actrite Sophia Loren, care a implinit 70 de ani. Frumoasa italianca a fost unul dintre sex-simbolurile secolului XX. Intr-o cariera desfasurata pe parcursul a catorva decenii, artista a cucerit inimile a milioane de cinefili din intreaga lume.
Sophia Loren s-a nascut la 20 septembrie 1934, la Roma. Inca din tinerete, italianca a atras privirile prin frumusetea ei si a devenit in scurt timp un model de succes. Nici concursurile de frumusete nu i-au fost straine, Sophia castigand numeroase premii.
De mica, italianca a fost fascinata de lumea teatrului si a filmului si petrecea ore in sir urmarind spectacole, cu speranta ca va ajunge candva la Hollywood. Norocul i-a suras frumoasei italience. In timp ce asista la un concurs de frumusete, Sophia a fost remarcata de celebrul regizor Carlo Ponti, care i-a propus sa vina la probe pentru un film.
Eforturile Sophiei de a-si realiza visul au fost ingreunate insa de criticile primite din partea echipelor de filmare, care o gaseau prea grasa si rebela pentru a juca in filme. Insa, surprinzator, tocmai caracterul Sophiei i-a adus in timp consacrarea ca diva a marelui ecran. De-a lungul carierei, Sophia Loren a jucat in peste 100 de filme si a primit de doua ori Premiul Oscar.
Ultimul film in care a jucat, "Between Strangers", a fost lansat anul trecut. Sophia Loren participa frecvent la evenimentele legate de lumea filmului. Ultima aparitie a avut loc la Festivalul de la Venetia, unde venerabila doamna a marelui ecran a atras, si de data aceasta, privirile admirative ale fanilor, dar si ale mult mai tinerilor ei colegi.
Romania Libera, 22 sep 2004
Lumea filmului i-a adus un omagiu celebrei actrite Sophia Loren, care a implinit 70 de ani. Frumoasa italianca a fost unul dintre sex-simbolurile secolului XX. Intr-o cariera desfasurata pe parcursul a catorva decenii, artista a cucerit inimile a milioane de cinefili din intreaga lume.
Sophia Loren s-a nascut la 20 septembrie 1934, la Roma. Inca din tinerete, italianca a atras privirile prin frumusetea ei si a devenit in scurt timp un model de succes. Nici concursurile de frumusete nu i-au fost straine, Sophia castigand numeroase premii.
De mica, italianca a fost fascinata de lumea teatrului si a filmului si petrecea ore in sir urmarind spectacole, cu speranta ca va ajunge candva la Hollywood. Norocul i-a suras frumoasei italience. In timp ce asista la un concurs de frumusete, Sophia a fost remarcata de celebrul regizor Carlo Ponti, care i-a propus sa vina la probe pentru un film.
Eforturile Sophiei de a-si realiza visul au fost ingreunate insa de criticile primite din partea echipelor de filmare, care o gaseau prea grasa si rebela pentru a juca in filme. Insa, surprinzator, tocmai caracterul Sophiei i-a adus in timp consacrarea ca diva a marelui ecran. De-a lungul carierei, Sophia Loren a jucat in peste 100 de filme si a primit de doua ori Premiul Oscar.
Ultimul film in care a jucat, "Between Strangers", a fost lansat anul trecut. Sophia Loren participa frecvent la evenimentele legate de lumea filmului. Ultima aparitie a avut loc la Festivalul de la Venetia, unde venerabila doamna a marelui ecran a atras, si de data aceasta, privirile admirative ale fanilor, dar si ale mult mai tinerilor ei colegi.
Romania Libera, 22 sep 2004
marți, septembrie 21, 2004
la taifas cu daniel daianu
unde -s urechiusele si compose ca nu mai vad padurea de atata net....:(
Eveniment
Chat cu Daniel Daianu
Marti, 21 septembrie, Daniel Daianu a discutat cu cei interesati despre "Romania - o economie de piata functionala?"
Cititi mai jos transcrierera chatului.
http://www.infoeuropa.ro/docs/Transcrierea_sesiunii_de_chat_cu_dl_Daniel_Daianu.pdf
Daniel Daianu : "O democratie tanara si destul de stramba..."
28 Septembrie 2004
Daniel Daianu a raspuns in cadrul chatului "Romania-o economie de piata functionala?" la intrebari legate de macroeconomie si consecintele aderarii.
Chatul a fost organizat de Centrul de Informare al Delegatiei Comisiei Europene in Romania.
Referitor la distinctia intre economie de piata functionala si economie competitiva, Daniel Daianu a inceput chat-ul prin a spune:
Eu consider ca si "notiunea de economie de piata functionala" este terminologic destul de stranie - vedeti ca in engleza se spune "functioning market economy". Intr-un sens profund economia Romaniei este de piata, adica are institutiile de baza ale economiei de piata ca si mecansimele. Este adevarat insa ca are slabiciuni si poate vom face referiri la ele. Comisia UE, cand spune "functioning market economy" judeca o asemenea stare de fapt. Dar cum se stie, economiile de piata, in spatiul mondial, au performante diferite, care au originea in contexte institutionale nu identice. Si de aici putem comenta daca Romania are o economie de piata competitiva, care poate suporta presiunile concurentiale dinauntrul UE... Voi reveni asupra chestiunii...
Daniel Daianu: Intr-o formulare foarte teoretica o economie de piata competitiva este cea care poate creste ramanand o entitate deschisa. Mai exact, este vorba de asigurarea unei cresteri economice durabile, care, mai departe, implica finantare fara probleme a dezechilibrelor externe, stare solida a finantelor publice. Daca intram mai adanc in "corpul economic", este nevoie ca formarea bruta a capitalului ("investitiile interne") sa fie la un nivel adecvat, care sa asigure refacerea stocului de capital uman si fizic in conditii de competitivitate. Facand o analogie, sa ne gandim la Agenda Lisabona a UE. Vedem cum, la alta scara, si UE are o problematica de competitivitate... Voi reveni
Razvan Alex: Din cate stiam, pentru ca o economie de piata sa fie functionala, este necesar ca aceste institutii de baza si mecanisme sa si functioneze corect. Si in ziua de astazi numai asta nu se vehiculeaza.
Daniel Daianu: Observatia Dlui Razvan Alexandru este corecta in largirea cadrului dezbaterii la calitatea institutiilor. Dar sa nu omitem ca aceasta esdte o zona foarte soft de analiza... Este mult mai facil sa descrii un progres economic prin dezinflatie, starea sistemului bancar, dimensiune a deficitului bugetr etc, decat prin calitatea institutiilor. veti dreptate ca noi stam rau la functionarea administratiei publice, justitie... etc.
Sorin Cotorceanu: Pai da. Ca de obicei, reusim admirabil sa zgariem doar suprafata lucrurilor. Asta apropos de randurile de mai sus, cu Bassel, criterii. Cifrele exista pentru ca trebuie sa existe, pentru ca fac parte dintrun sistem care functioneaza pe baza de simptome, asemeni celui medical. Dar atunci cand sunt in moarte clinica nu am nevoie de un doctor sa-mi spuna acest lucru. El poate, eventual, sa-i previna pe ceilalti.
Sorin Cotorceanu: Si chiar asta face. Functioning market economy este o sintagma care tine la distanta oamenii cu bani de zone in care ar putea sa-si piarda banii pe nepusa masa. Iar Romania EXACT asta este. Mass-media si-a pierdut de mult calitatea de observator impartial al fenomenului. Existenta economiei de piata o simte fiecare pe propria piele. Sau, mai precis, inexistenta ei.
Daniel Daianu: Domnul Sorin Cotorceanu face referire la la fiziologia economiei noastre; si este corect din partea noastra sa admitem existenta mecanismelor defectuoase. Dar a afirma ca se "zgarie numai suprafata" este o exagerare...
Michaela Turk: agricultura va deveni o baza a economiei RO?
Daniel Daianu: Doamna Michaela Turk abordeaza o chestiune care poate fi examinata din mai multe perspective. Una este legata chiar de ceea ce numim competitivitate: daca economia nu este competitiva, evident ca implicatiile de natura financiara sunt defavorabile. O alta perspectiva priveste bugetul public si al intreprinderilor. Aderarea la UE implica costuri ale aplicarii Acquisului, care nu sunt modice. Si firmele au de asimilat tehnologii si de respectat reguli care au efecte in bilanturile lor - unele firme nu vor rezista. Nu intamplator se discuta despre importanta capitolului privind concurenta...
DANIELA BRATOSIN: bancile iti acorda credit numai daca demonstrezi ca nu ai nevoie de el, spune azi un articol de presa. absolut corect! Nici o banca nu ofera credit pentru societati nou infiintate, indiferent de planul de afaceri. Se poate schimba aceasta optica?
Daniel Daianu: Doamna Daniela Bratosin: In general bancile europene (fata de cele din SUA) cer garantii, mizeaza mai putin pe viabilitatea proiectului de afaceri. Dar chiar si asa, apetitul baniclor comerciale din Romania pentru creditare de productie este mic...Expansiunea din ultimii ani a creditului neguvernamental a fost legata strans de consum...
DANIELA BRATOSIN: Are BNR posibilitatea de a influenta bancile? Daca nu, cine si cum? In caz ca "oferta" se mentine cea care este in prezent, ce sanse are micul intreprinzator roman dupa 2007?
Daniel Daianu: Acum si Comisia UE va aprecia ca avem un astfel de "animal". Sa revin la o intrebare anterioara. Daca s-ar aplica foarte sever criteriile economice cateva tari care au intrat la 1 mai 2004 in UE nu ar fi meritat sa o faca. Deci asemenea calificative imbina criterii economice cu considerente politice. Ce ramane de subliniat insa este ca mai avem o cale buna de parcurs pentru a pretinde ca avem o economie competititiva...
Corjaautanu Constantin: Va rog sa raspundeti daca piata de capital functioneaza ?
Daniel Daianu: Piata de capital la noi a luat ceva avant in ultimii doi ani, pe fondul dezinflatiei si cresterii probabilitatii ca Romania sa fie admisa in UE. Capitalizarea Bursei a crescut considerabil in acesti doi ani.
Daca judecam insa functionarea Bursei la noi cu ce vedem in Europa Centrala, in tarile cu economii asezate, este corect sa spunem ca avem o piata de capital inca imatura...Pe de alta parte sa nu ne adsteptam ca piata de capital in Romania sa joace rolul de intermediere financiara pe care il observam in SUA. La noi sistemul bancar va ramane baza sistemului financiar...
Platona Iulia: Domnule Daianu, ma intereseaza daca crederti ca ar fi potrivit sa pastram o banca competitiva cu capital majoritar de stat in Romania.
Daniel Daianu: Doamnei Iulia Platona: Basel II inaspreste conditiile de creditare in economie si cele mai lovite vor fi IMM-urile; aceasta se observa si in tarile UE...
Claudia Koncsag: Considerati ca ar mai fi posibil in acest moment ca inflatia sa scape din nou de sub control, in conditiile in care nu vor aparea evenimente politice majore neasteptate?
Daniel Daianu: Inflatia nu poate scapa de sub control intrucat BNR are suficienta expertiza si rutina pozitiva pentru a controla lichiditatea...Chiar o explozie a pretului titeiului (catre 80$ barilul) nu ar scoate dezinflatia din coridorul actual; ar provoca o deviatie temporara...
Motoarele politicii publice de reforme
Daniel Daianu: O politica publica de reforme este actionata de mai multe motoare; exista o logica interna a reformelor (de pilda, nimeni nu poate contesta ca privatizarea a avansat - nu discut cum...); exista presiuni ale partenerilor institutionali (IFIs si Comisia UE); exista presiuni ale mediului extern. Sa nu omitem ca economie romaneasca este deschisa, ca tara are angajamente fata de numeroase organizatii internationale (ex: Organizatia Mondiala a Comertului)...Nu cred ca alegerile pot deraia mersul...
Madalina Barbu: Exista opinii diferite in ceea ce priveste aderarea in 2007 si reducerea decalajelor. Credeti ca vom putea face fata mai bine concurentei impuse de piata unica daca vom adera eventual in 2009? Cresterea economica a Romaniei se va realiza mai rapid in afara sau inauntrul Uniunii? Multumesc.
Daniel Daianu: Doamna Madalina Barbu pune o intrebare care ma obsedeaza de mult timp. Ce cred, este ca, a fi inauntrul UE este o sansa istorica pentru Romania de a invinge capcanele inapoierii. Romania nu poate repeta experiente de succes (de miracol economic) din Asia si alte parti. "Jocul" in Europa este admiterea in UE. Cred ca nu este preferabil sa amanam aderarea (admitand ca depinde de voina noastra...). Ce cred insa, si aici imbratisez teama unora, este ca trebuie sa cautam sa negociem conditii de aderare cat mai bune...Daca este prea tarziu asta numai viata va arata...Va rog cititi un articol al meu din Jurnalul National (intrari pe site...).
Aurelian: Considerati ca odata cu liberalizarea pietei societatile cu capital integral roman nu vor mai face fata concurentei si vor disparea. Ma refer la mari institutii financiare ca QBE, AXA etc?
Corjaautanu Constantin: Daca dumnevoastra constderati ca in RO avem in prezent o piata de capital, care sunt sansele ca cei peste 17 milioane de initiali capitalisti (PPM-isti) sa poata tranzactiona certificatele lor de actionari di societatile lichidate de sistemul bancar in mod fraudulos ?
Aurelian: Tintirea inflatiei in cadrul reorientarii politicilor BNR: daca acest indicator macro este pentru analiza financiar-bancara, considerat a fi de 12.5% pentru anul acesta si pt CNS de doar 9%. Cum mai ramane cu increderea plasarii de capitaluri in economia romaneasca daca acestea sunt totusi amenintate de o continua eroziune (si nu doar nominal), contul curent este la un nivel de deficit istoric. Intrebarea de baza ramane daca economia functionala nu este ultimamente o sintagma care da bine la alt fel de politica...
Daniel Daianu: Eu pledez pentru ca sa avem capital romanesc in actionariatul bancilor si altor instutii financiare, din ratiuni care sunt foarte pragmatice. Sa invatam de la colegii din Europa Centrala. Domnul Aurelian pune o alta intrebare tulburatoare in privinta capitalului autohton. Ar fi bine sa avem firme cu capital autohton viguroase, competitive. Dar va fi foarte greu... Stiti ca o regula a vietii (a biologiei), a economiei, este ca cei mari inghit pe cei mici....
Nicolaie Moldovan: Seful Delegatiei Comisiei Europene in Romania, D-l Ambasador Jonathan SCHEELE, aprecia ieri intr-o declaratie de presa ca Romania nu a avut in 2004 o economie de piata functionala capabila sa faca fata presiunilor concurentiale ale pietei unice. Personal, considera ca Domnia sa are dreptate. D-le Daianu, luand in calcul ritmul actual de evolutie al economiei romanesti, se poate preciza un orizont de timp cand Romania poate fi recunoscuta ca o economie de piata functionala compatibila cu mecanismele economice si concurentiale europene ?
Daniel Daianu: Domnule Molodovan: Romania, sub nici o forma, nu va putea avea o economie "impecabila" in 2007 si daca vom intra, aceasta se va face si pentru ca principalele cancelarii europene decid ca Romania are locul in UE din 2007. Marea provocare pentru clasa guvernanta din Romania este sa inteleaga ca, in anumite privinte, noi nu ne-am facut temele - adica ceea ce depinde strict de noi. Va dau un exemplu: noi nu avem nici in prezent o programare bugetara multianuala, care sa examineze toate implicatii financiare ale reformei sistemului de asigurari sociale, costurile aplicarii Acquis-ului comunitar, costurile asa numitelor parteneriate public-private (care vor fi suportate cel mai adesea de buget), nevoia de a aloca mai multi bani pentru educatie etc....Ce ne facem cu agricultura, unde nu exista mecansieme de finantare viabile. Ar trebui, de exemplu, ca programul SAPARD sa se ocupe serios de aceasta insufienta mare...Si mai sunt si altele...
Avem probleme cu absorbtia fondurilor
Daniel Daianu: avem o mare problema in privinta capacitatii de absorbtie; vedeti situatia cu fondurile pentru modernizarea agriculturii. Cred ca modernizarea rurala ar trebui sa includa cateva proiecte mari, mai usor de gestionat si care sa elimine (atat cat se poate) din "scurgeri" nemeritate... Oricum, chestiunea absorbtiei trebuie sa fie in top-ul agendei viitorului guvern... Ar fi aiurea ca, daca intram in 2007, sa ne trezim tara donatoare (avem de platit 800 milioane euro la bugetul UE...). Nu cred ca vom ajunge intr-o asemenea situatie dar este bine sa meditam...
Dezinflatia va continua
Daniel Daianu: dezinflatia va continua si eu cred ca vom ajunge la 6-7% in cca doi ani. Acum intra mult capital in Romania, estre drept si de natura speculativa --intrucat dobanzile sunt ridicate...
Daniel Daianu: Doamnei Iulia Platona: avem un sector IT in expansiune. Exista si experienta exemplara a Indiei in acest domeniu. Dar pentru a beneficia cat mai mult de "relocalizare (outsourcing si off-shoring) trebuie sa avem grija de scoala, de invatamantul superior. Romania cheltuieste putin in acest domeniu. Si firmele din Romania trebuie sa incerce sa foloseasca mai mult noile tehnologii informationale si comunicationale...
Economia Romaniei in UE va fi mai putin libera
Daniel Daianu: Ce nu inteleg multi este ca functionarea Romaniei in UE priveaza politica economica de unele grade de libertate, pe care le are acum. De exemplu, se reduce mult din potenta politicii monetare (in fapt, daca se adopta euro, politica monetara dispare), ca si a cursului de schimb - ca instrumente de ajustare la socuri externe potrivnice. De aceea vorbim despre nevoia de a avea o economie de piata competitiva. Cehia, Ungaria, Polonia au acum crize de ordin fiscal (cu deficite de peste 5% din PIB)...Acestea sunt indicii privind ceea ce ne asteapta si chiar mai rau daca nu vom fi bine pregatiti. Pe de alta parte, nici nu trebuie sa dramatizam si sa tragem concluzia, eu cred ca gresita, ca mai bine sa fim in afara UE. Trebuie sa facem treaba mai buna acasa...
O administratie publica vetusta...
Daniel Daianu: Miza intrarii in UE este si modernizarea unei administratii publice vetuste, care nu ajuta reducerea decalajelor...
Daniel Daianu: Euro s-a apreciat masiv fata de USD in ultimii doi ani datorita deficitelor mari (comercial si bugetar) din SUA. Nu vad o revenire la paritate in urmatorii ani...decat daca s-ar produce evenimente exceptionale...
Fructele integrarii...
Daniel Daianu: Cetatenii Romaniei vor simti fructele integrarii atunci cand veniturile celor mai multi dintre ei vor progresa in mod durabil (ceea ce nu inseamna cifre fantasmagorice, asa cum vad enuntate de unii politicieni...), cand infrastructura tarii va fi similara cu cea care este standard in Europa, cand respectul fata de lege va domina viata publica si individuala...sa nu asteptam insa schimbari radicale, peste noapte... Dar sa avem incredere, mai ales ca traim intr-o democratie, chiar daca este tanara si destul de stramba...
Sursa: Centrul de Informare al Delegatiei Comisiei Europene in Romania
http://www.euractiv.ro/index.html/section|readStory?stID=4&pT=interviuri&pID=46
Eveniment
Chat cu Daniel Daianu
Marti, 21 septembrie, Daniel Daianu a discutat cu cei interesati despre "Romania - o economie de piata functionala?"
Cititi mai jos transcrierera chatului.
http://www.infoeuropa.ro/docs/Transcrierea_sesiunii_de_chat_cu_dl_Daniel_Daianu.pdf
Daniel Daianu : "O democratie tanara si destul de stramba..."
28 Septembrie 2004
Daniel Daianu a raspuns in cadrul chatului "Romania-o economie de piata functionala?" la intrebari legate de macroeconomie si consecintele aderarii.
Chatul a fost organizat de Centrul de Informare al Delegatiei Comisiei Europene in Romania.
Referitor la distinctia intre economie de piata functionala si economie competitiva, Daniel Daianu a inceput chat-ul prin a spune:
Eu consider ca si "notiunea de economie de piata functionala" este terminologic destul de stranie - vedeti ca in engleza se spune "functioning market economy". Intr-un sens profund economia Romaniei este de piata, adica are institutiile de baza ale economiei de piata ca si mecansimele. Este adevarat insa ca are slabiciuni si poate vom face referiri la ele. Comisia UE, cand spune "functioning market economy" judeca o asemenea stare de fapt. Dar cum se stie, economiile de piata, in spatiul mondial, au performante diferite, care au originea in contexte institutionale nu identice. Si de aici putem comenta daca Romania are o economie de piata competitiva, care poate suporta presiunile concurentiale dinauntrul UE... Voi reveni asupra chestiunii...
Daniel Daianu: Intr-o formulare foarte teoretica o economie de piata competitiva este cea care poate creste ramanand o entitate deschisa. Mai exact, este vorba de asigurarea unei cresteri economice durabile, care, mai departe, implica finantare fara probleme a dezechilibrelor externe, stare solida a finantelor publice. Daca intram mai adanc in "corpul economic", este nevoie ca formarea bruta a capitalului ("investitiile interne") sa fie la un nivel adecvat, care sa asigure refacerea stocului de capital uman si fizic in conditii de competitivitate. Facand o analogie, sa ne gandim la Agenda Lisabona a UE. Vedem cum, la alta scara, si UE are o problematica de competitivitate... Voi reveni
Razvan Alex: Din cate stiam, pentru ca o economie de piata sa fie functionala, este necesar ca aceste institutii de baza si mecanisme sa si functioneze corect. Si in ziua de astazi numai asta nu se vehiculeaza.
Daniel Daianu: Observatia Dlui Razvan Alexandru este corecta in largirea cadrului dezbaterii la calitatea institutiilor. Dar sa nu omitem ca aceasta esdte o zona foarte soft de analiza... Este mult mai facil sa descrii un progres economic prin dezinflatie, starea sistemului bancar, dimensiune a deficitului bugetr etc, decat prin calitatea institutiilor. veti dreptate ca noi stam rau la functionarea administratiei publice, justitie... etc.
Sorin Cotorceanu: Pai da. Ca de obicei, reusim admirabil sa zgariem doar suprafata lucrurilor. Asta apropos de randurile de mai sus, cu Bassel, criterii. Cifrele exista pentru ca trebuie sa existe, pentru ca fac parte dintrun sistem care functioneaza pe baza de simptome, asemeni celui medical. Dar atunci cand sunt in moarte clinica nu am nevoie de un doctor sa-mi spuna acest lucru. El poate, eventual, sa-i previna pe ceilalti.
Sorin Cotorceanu: Si chiar asta face. Functioning market economy este o sintagma care tine la distanta oamenii cu bani de zone in care ar putea sa-si piarda banii pe nepusa masa. Iar Romania EXACT asta este. Mass-media si-a pierdut de mult calitatea de observator impartial al fenomenului. Existenta economiei de piata o simte fiecare pe propria piele. Sau, mai precis, inexistenta ei.
Daniel Daianu: Domnul Sorin Cotorceanu face referire la la fiziologia economiei noastre; si este corect din partea noastra sa admitem existenta mecanismelor defectuoase. Dar a afirma ca se "zgarie numai suprafata" este o exagerare...
Michaela Turk: agricultura va deveni o baza a economiei RO?
Daniel Daianu: Doamna Michaela Turk abordeaza o chestiune care poate fi examinata din mai multe perspective. Una este legata chiar de ceea ce numim competitivitate: daca economia nu este competitiva, evident ca implicatiile de natura financiara sunt defavorabile. O alta perspectiva priveste bugetul public si al intreprinderilor. Aderarea la UE implica costuri ale aplicarii Acquisului, care nu sunt modice. Si firmele au de asimilat tehnologii si de respectat reguli care au efecte in bilanturile lor - unele firme nu vor rezista. Nu intamplator se discuta despre importanta capitolului privind concurenta...
DANIELA BRATOSIN: bancile iti acorda credit numai daca demonstrezi ca nu ai nevoie de el, spune azi un articol de presa. absolut corect! Nici o banca nu ofera credit pentru societati nou infiintate, indiferent de planul de afaceri. Se poate schimba aceasta optica?
Daniel Daianu: Doamna Daniela Bratosin: In general bancile europene (fata de cele din SUA) cer garantii, mizeaza mai putin pe viabilitatea proiectului de afaceri. Dar chiar si asa, apetitul baniclor comerciale din Romania pentru creditare de productie este mic...Expansiunea din ultimii ani a creditului neguvernamental a fost legata strans de consum...
DANIELA BRATOSIN: Are BNR posibilitatea de a influenta bancile? Daca nu, cine si cum? In caz ca "oferta" se mentine cea care este in prezent, ce sanse are micul intreprinzator roman dupa 2007?
Daniel Daianu: Acum si Comisia UE va aprecia ca avem un astfel de "animal". Sa revin la o intrebare anterioara. Daca s-ar aplica foarte sever criteriile economice cateva tari care au intrat la 1 mai 2004 in UE nu ar fi meritat sa o faca. Deci asemenea calificative imbina criterii economice cu considerente politice. Ce ramane de subliniat insa este ca mai avem o cale buna de parcurs pentru a pretinde ca avem o economie competititiva...
Corjaautanu Constantin: Va rog sa raspundeti daca piata de capital functioneaza ?
Daniel Daianu: Piata de capital la noi a luat ceva avant in ultimii doi ani, pe fondul dezinflatiei si cresterii probabilitatii ca Romania sa fie admisa in UE. Capitalizarea Bursei a crescut considerabil in acesti doi ani.
Daca judecam insa functionarea Bursei la noi cu ce vedem in Europa Centrala, in tarile cu economii asezate, este corect sa spunem ca avem o piata de capital inca imatura...Pe de alta parte sa nu ne adsteptam ca piata de capital in Romania sa joace rolul de intermediere financiara pe care il observam in SUA. La noi sistemul bancar va ramane baza sistemului financiar...
Platona Iulia: Domnule Daianu, ma intereseaza daca crederti ca ar fi potrivit sa pastram o banca competitiva cu capital majoritar de stat in Romania.
Daniel Daianu: Doamnei Iulia Platona: Basel II inaspreste conditiile de creditare in economie si cele mai lovite vor fi IMM-urile; aceasta se observa si in tarile UE...
Claudia Koncsag: Considerati ca ar mai fi posibil in acest moment ca inflatia sa scape din nou de sub control, in conditiile in care nu vor aparea evenimente politice majore neasteptate?
Daniel Daianu: Inflatia nu poate scapa de sub control intrucat BNR are suficienta expertiza si rutina pozitiva pentru a controla lichiditatea...Chiar o explozie a pretului titeiului (catre 80$ barilul) nu ar scoate dezinflatia din coridorul actual; ar provoca o deviatie temporara...
Motoarele politicii publice de reforme
Daniel Daianu: O politica publica de reforme este actionata de mai multe motoare; exista o logica interna a reformelor (de pilda, nimeni nu poate contesta ca privatizarea a avansat - nu discut cum...); exista presiuni ale partenerilor institutionali (IFIs si Comisia UE); exista presiuni ale mediului extern. Sa nu omitem ca economie romaneasca este deschisa, ca tara are angajamente fata de numeroase organizatii internationale (ex: Organizatia Mondiala a Comertului)...Nu cred ca alegerile pot deraia mersul...
Madalina Barbu: Exista opinii diferite in ceea ce priveste aderarea in 2007 si reducerea decalajelor. Credeti ca vom putea face fata mai bine concurentei impuse de piata unica daca vom adera eventual in 2009? Cresterea economica a Romaniei se va realiza mai rapid in afara sau inauntrul Uniunii? Multumesc.
Daniel Daianu: Doamna Madalina Barbu pune o intrebare care ma obsedeaza de mult timp. Ce cred, este ca, a fi inauntrul UE este o sansa istorica pentru Romania de a invinge capcanele inapoierii. Romania nu poate repeta experiente de succes (de miracol economic) din Asia si alte parti. "Jocul" in Europa este admiterea in UE. Cred ca nu este preferabil sa amanam aderarea (admitand ca depinde de voina noastra...). Ce cred insa, si aici imbratisez teama unora, este ca trebuie sa cautam sa negociem conditii de aderare cat mai bune...Daca este prea tarziu asta numai viata va arata...Va rog cititi un articol al meu din Jurnalul National (intrari pe site...).
Aurelian: Considerati ca odata cu liberalizarea pietei societatile cu capital integral roman nu vor mai face fata concurentei si vor disparea. Ma refer la mari institutii financiare ca QBE, AXA etc?
Corjaautanu Constantin: Daca dumnevoastra constderati ca in RO avem in prezent o piata de capital, care sunt sansele ca cei peste 17 milioane de initiali capitalisti (PPM-isti) sa poata tranzactiona certificatele lor de actionari di societatile lichidate de sistemul bancar in mod fraudulos ?
Aurelian: Tintirea inflatiei in cadrul reorientarii politicilor BNR: daca acest indicator macro este pentru analiza financiar-bancara, considerat a fi de 12.5% pentru anul acesta si pt CNS de doar 9%. Cum mai ramane cu increderea plasarii de capitaluri in economia romaneasca daca acestea sunt totusi amenintate de o continua eroziune (si nu doar nominal), contul curent este la un nivel de deficit istoric. Intrebarea de baza ramane daca economia functionala nu este ultimamente o sintagma care da bine la alt fel de politica...
Daniel Daianu: Eu pledez pentru ca sa avem capital romanesc in actionariatul bancilor si altor instutii financiare, din ratiuni care sunt foarte pragmatice. Sa invatam de la colegii din Europa Centrala. Domnul Aurelian pune o alta intrebare tulburatoare in privinta capitalului autohton. Ar fi bine sa avem firme cu capital autohton viguroase, competitive. Dar va fi foarte greu... Stiti ca o regula a vietii (a biologiei), a economiei, este ca cei mari inghit pe cei mici....
Nicolaie Moldovan: Seful Delegatiei Comisiei Europene in Romania, D-l Ambasador Jonathan SCHEELE, aprecia ieri intr-o declaratie de presa ca Romania nu a avut in 2004 o economie de piata functionala capabila sa faca fata presiunilor concurentiale ale pietei unice. Personal, considera ca Domnia sa are dreptate. D-le Daianu, luand in calcul ritmul actual de evolutie al economiei romanesti, se poate preciza un orizont de timp cand Romania poate fi recunoscuta ca o economie de piata functionala compatibila cu mecanismele economice si concurentiale europene ?
Daniel Daianu: Domnule Molodovan: Romania, sub nici o forma, nu va putea avea o economie "impecabila" in 2007 si daca vom intra, aceasta se va face si pentru ca principalele cancelarii europene decid ca Romania are locul in UE din 2007. Marea provocare pentru clasa guvernanta din Romania este sa inteleaga ca, in anumite privinte, noi nu ne-am facut temele - adica ceea ce depinde strict de noi. Va dau un exemplu: noi nu avem nici in prezent o programare bugetara multianuala, care sa examineze toate implicatii financiare ale reformei sistemului de asigurari sociale, costurile aplicarii Acquis-ului comunitar, costurile asa numitelor parteneriate public-private (care vor fi suportate cel mai adesea de buget), nevoia de a aloca mai multi bani pentru educatie etc....Ce ne facem cu agricultura, unde nu exista mecansieme de finantare viabile. Ar trebui, de exemplu, ca programul SAPARD sa se ocupe serios de aceasta insufienta mare...Si mai sunt si altele...
Avem probleme cu absorbtia fondurilor
Daniel Daianu: avem o mare problema in privinta capacitatii de absorbtie; vedeti situatia cu fondurile pentru modernizarea agriculturii. Cred ca modernizarea rurala ar trebui sa includa cateva proiecte mari, mai usor de gestionat si care sa elimine (atat cat se poate) din "scurgeri" nemeritate... Oricum, chestiunea absorbtiei trebuie sa fie in top-ul agendei viitorului guvern... Ar fi aiurea ca, daca intram in 2007, sa ne trezim tara donatoare (avem de platit 800 milioane euro la bugetul UE...). Nu cred ca vom ajunge intr-o asemenea situatie dar este bine sa meditam...
Dezinflatia va continua
Daniel Daianu: dezinflatia va continua si eu cred ca vom ajunge la 6-7% in cca doi ani. Acum intra mult capital in Romania, estre drept si de natura speculativa --intrucat dobanzile sunt ridicate...
Daniel Daianu: Doamnei Iulia Platona: avem un sector IT in expansiune. Exista si experienta exemplara a Indiei in acest domeniu. Dar pentru a beneficia cat mai mult de "relocalizare (outsourcing si off-shoring) trebuie sa avem grija de scoala, de invatamantul superior. Romania cheltuieste putin in acest domeniu. Si firmele din Romania trebuie sa incerce sa foloseasca mai mult noile tehnologii informationale si comunicationale...
Economia Romaniei in UE va fi mai putin libera
Daniel Daianu: Ce nu inteleg multi este ca functionarea Romaniei in UE priveaza politica economica de unele grade de libertate, pe care le are acum. De exemplu, se reduce mult din potenta politicii monetare (in fapt, daca se adopta euro, politica monetara dispare), ca si a cursului de schimb - ca instrumente de ajustare la socuri externe potrivnice. De aceea vorbim despre nevoia de a avea o economie de piata competitiva. Cehia, Ungaria, Polonia au acum crize de ordin fiscal (cu deficite de peste 5% din PIB)...Acestea sunt indicii privind ceea ce ne asteapta si chiar mai rau daca nu vom fi bine pregatiti. Pe de alta parte, nici nu trebuie sa dramatizam si sa tragem concluzia, eu cred ca gresita, ca mai bine sa fim in afara UE. Trebuie sa facem treaba mai buna acasa...
O administratie publica vetusta...
Daniel Daianu: Miza intrarii in UE este si modernizarea unei administratii publice vetuste, care nu ajuta reducerea decalajelor...
Daniel Daianu: Euro s-a apreciat masiv fata de USD in ultimii doi ani datorita deficitelor mari (comercial si bugetar) din SUA. Nu vad o revenire la paritate in urmatorii ani...decat daca s-ar produce evenimente exceptionale...
Fructele integrarii...
Daniel Daianu: Cetatenii Romaniei vor simti fructele integrarii atunci cand veniturile celor mai multi dintre ei vor progresa in mod durabil (ceea ce nu inseamna cifre fantasmagorice, asa cum vad enuntate de unii politicieni...), cand infrastructura tarii va fi similara cu cea care este standard in Europa, cand respectul fata de lege va domina viata publica si individuala...sa nu asteptam insa schimbari radicale, peste noapte... Dar sa avem incredere, mai ales ca traim intr-o democratie, chiar daca este tanara si destul de stramba...
Sursa: Centrul de Informare al Delegatiei Comisiei Europene in Romania
http://www.euractiv.ro/index.html/section|readStory?stID=4&pT=interviuri&pID=46
la taifas cu daniel daianu
unde -s urechiusele si compose ca nu mai vad padurea de atata net....:(
Eveniment
Chat cu Daniel Daianu
Marti, 21 septembrie, Daniel Daianu a discutat cu cei interesati despre "Romania - o economie de piata functionala?"
Cititi mai jos transcrierera chatului.
http://www.infoeuropa.ro/docs/Transcrierea_sesiunii_de_chat_cu_dl_Daniel_Daianu.pdf
Daniel Daianu : "O democratie tanara si destul de stramba..."
28 Septembrie 2004
Daniel Daianu a raspuns in cadrul chatului "Romania-o economie de piata functionala?" la intrebari legate de macroeconomie si consecintele aderarii.
Chatul a fost organizat de Centrul de Informare al Delegatiei Comisiei Europene in Romania.
Referitor la distinctia intre economie de piata functionala si economie competitiva, Daniel Daianu a inceput chat-ul prin a spune:
Eu consider ca si "notiunea de economie de piata functionala" este terminologic destul de stranie - vedeti ca in engleza se spune "functioning market economy". Intr-un sens profund economia Romaniei este de piata, adica are institutiile de baza ale economiei de piata ca si mecansimele. Este adevarat insa ca are slabiciuni si poate vom face referiri la ele. Comisia UE, cand spune "functioning market economy" judeca o asemenea stare de fapt. Dar cum se stie, economiile de piata, in spatiul mondial, au performante diferite, care au originea in contexte institutionale nu identice. Si de aici putem comenta daca Romania are o economie de piata competitiva, care poate suporta presiunile concurentiale dinauntrul UE... Voi reveni asupra chestiunii...
Daniel Daianu: Intr-o formulare foarte teoretica o economie de piata competitiva este cea care poate creste ramanand o entitate deschisa. Mai exact, este vorba de asigurarea unei cresteri economice durabile, care, mai departe, implica finantare fara probleme a dezechilibrelor externe, stare solida a finantelor publice. Daca intram mai adanc in "corpul economic", este nevoie ca formarea bruta a capitalului ("investitiile interne") sa fie la un nivel adecvat, care sa asigure refacerea stocului de capital uman si fizic in conditii de competitivitate. Facand o analogie, sa ne gandim la Agenda Lisabona a UE. Vedem cum, la alta scara, si UE are o problematica de competitivitate... Voi reveni
Razvan Alex: Din cate stiam, pentru ca o economie de piata sa fie functionala, este necesar ca aceste institutii de baza si mecanisme sa si functioneze corect. Si in ziua de astazi numai asta nu se vehiculeaza.
Daniel Daianu: Observatia Dlui Razvan Alexandru este corecta in largirea cadrului dezbaterii la calitatea institutiilor. Dar sa nu omitem ca aceasta esdte o zona foarte soft de analiza... Este mult mai facil sa descrii un progres economic prin dezinflatie, starea sistemului bancar, dimensiune a deficitului bugetr etc, decat prin calitatea institutiilor. veti dreptate ca noi stam rau la functionarea administratiei publice, justitie... etc.
Sorin Cotorceanu: Pai da. Ca de obicei, reusim admirabil sa zgariem doar suprafata lucrurilor. Asta apropos de randurile de mai sus, cu Bassel, criterii. Cifrele exista pentru ca trebuie sa existe, pentru ca fac parte dintrun sistem care functioneaza pe baza de simptome, asemeni celui medical. Dar atunci cand sunt in moarte clinica nu am nevoie de un doctor sa-mi spuna acest lucru. El poate, eventual, sa-i previna pe ceilalti.
Sorin Cotorceanu: Si chiar asta face. Functioning market economy este o sintagma care tine la distanta oamenii cu bani de zone in care ar putea sa-si piarda banii pe nepusa masa. Iar Romania EXACT asta este. Mass-media si-a pierdut de mult calitatea de observator impartial al fenomenului. Existenta economiei de piata o simte fiecare pe propria piele. Sau, mai precis, inexistenta ei.
Daniel Daianu: Domnul Sorin Cotorceanu face referire la la fiziologia economiei noastre; si este corect din partea noastra sa admitem existenta mecanismelor defectuoase. Dar a afirma ca se "zgarie numai suprafata" este o exagerare...
Michaela Turk: agricultura va deveni o baza a economiei RO?
Daniel Daianu: Doamna Michaela Turk abordeaza o chestiune care poate fi examinata din mai multe perspective. Una este legata chiar de ceea ce numim competitivitate: daca economia nu este competitiva, evident ca implicatiile de natura financiara sunt defavorabile. O alta perspectiva priveste bugetul public si al intreprinderilor. Aderarea la UE implica costuri ale aplicarii Acquisului, care nu sunt modice. Si firmele au de asimilat tehnologii si de respectat reguli care au efecte in bilanturile lor - unele firme nu vor rezista. Nu intamplator se discuta despre importanta capitolului privind concurenta...
DANIELA BRATOSIN: bancile iti acorda credit numai daca demonstrezi ca nu ai nevoie de el, spune azi un articol de presa. absolut corect! Nici o banca nu ofera credit pentru societati nou infiintate, indiferent de planul de afaceri. Se poate schimba aceasta optica?
Daniel Daianu: Doamna Daniela Bratosin: In general bancile europene (fata de cele din SUA) cer garantii, mizeaza mai putin pe viabilitatea proiectului de afaceri. Dar chiar si asa, apetitul baniclor comerciale din Romania pentru creditare de productie este mic...Expansiunea din ultimii ani a creditului neguvernamental a fost legata strans de consum...
DANIELA BRATOSIN: Are BNR posibilitatea de a influenta bancile? Daca nu, cine si cum? In caz ca "oferta" se mentine cea care este in prezent, ce sanse are micul intreprinzator roman dupa 2007?
Daniel Daianu: Acum si Comisia UE va aprecia ca avem un astfel de "animal". Sa revin la o intrebare anterioara. Daca s-ar aplica foarte sever criteriile economice cateva tari care au intrat la 1 mai 2004 in UE nu ar fi meritat sa o faca. Deci asemenea calificative imbina criterii economice cu considerente politice. Ce ramane de subliniat insa este ca mai avem o cale buna de parcurs pentru a pretinde ca avem o economie competititiva...
Corjaautanu Constantin: Va rog sa raspundeti daca piata de capital functioneaza ?
Daniel Daianu: Piata de capital la noi a luat ceva avant in ultimii doi ani, pe fondul dezinflatiei si cresterii probabilitatii ca Romania sa fie admisa in UE. Capitalizarea Bursei a crescut considerabil in acesti doi ani.
Daca judecam insa functionarea Bursei la noi cu ce vedem in Europa Centrala, in tarile cu economii asezate, este corect sa spunem ca avem o piata de capital inca imatura...Pe de alta parte sa nu ne adsteptam ca piata de capital in Romania sa joace rolul de intermediere financiara pe care il observam in SUA. La noi sistemul bancar va ramane baza sistemului financiar...
Platona Iulia: Domnule Daianu, ma intereseaza daca crederti ca ar fi potrivit sa pastram o banca competitiva cu capital majoritar de stat in Romania.
Daniel Daianu: Doamnei Iulia Platona: Basel II inaspreste conditiile de creditare in economie si cele mai lovite vor fi IMM-urile; aceasta se observa si in tarile UE...
Claudia Koncsag: Considerati ca ar mai fi posibil in acest moment ca inflatia sa scape din nou de sub control, in conditiile in care nu vor aparea evenimente politice majore neasteptate?
Daniel Daianu: Inflatia nu poate scapa de sub control intrucat BNR are suficienta expertiza si rutina pozitiva pentru a controla lichiditatea...Chiar o explozie a pretului titeiului (catre 80$ barilul) nu ar scoate dezinflatia din coridorul actual; ar provoca o deviatie temporara...
Motoarele politicii publice de reforme
Daniel Daianu: O politica publica de reforme este actionata de mai multe motoare; exista o logica interna a reformelor (de pilda, nimeni nu poate contesta ca privatizarea a avansat - nu discut cum...); exista presiuni ale partenerilor institutionali (IFIs si Comisia UE); exista presiuni ale mediului extern. Sa nu omitem ca economie romaneasca este deschisa, ca tara are angajamente fata de numeroase organizatii internationale (ex: Organizatia Mondiala a Comertului)...Nu cred ca alegerile pot deraia mersul...
Madalina Barbu: Exista opinii diferite in ceea ce priveste aderarea in 2007 si reducerea decalajelor. Credeti ca vom putea face fata mai bine concurentei impuse de piata unica daca vom adera eventual in 2009? Cresterea economica a Romaniei se va realiza mai rapid in afara sau inauntrul Uniunii? Multumesc.
Daniel Daianu: Doamna Madalina Barbu pune o intrebare care ma obsedeaza de mult timp. Ce cred, este ca, a fi inauntrul UE este o sansa istorica pentru Romania de a invinge capcanele inapoierii. Romania nu poate repeta experiente de succes (de miracol economic) din Asia si alte parti. "Jocul" in Europa este admiterea in UE. Cred ca nu este preferabil sa amanam aderarea (admitand ca depinde de voina noastra...). Ce cred insa, si aici imbratisez teama unora, este ca trebuie sa cautam sa negociem conditii de aderare cat mai bune...Daca este prea tarziu asta numai viata va arata...Va rog cititi un articol al meu din Jurnalul National (intrari pe site...).
Aurelian: Considerati ca odata cu liberalizarea pietei societatile cu capital integral roman nu vor mai face fata concurentei si vor disparea. Ma refer la mari institutii financiare ca QBE, AXA etc?
Corjaautanu Constantin: Daca dumnevoastra constderati ca in RO avem in prezent o piata de capital, care sunt sansele ca cei peste 17 milioane de initiali capitalisti (PPM-isti) sa poata tranzactiona certificatele lor de actionari di societatile lichidate de sistemul bancar in mod fraudulos ?
Aurelian: Tintirea inflatiei in cadrul reorientarii politicilor BNR: daca acest indicator macro este pentru analiza financiar-bancara, considerat a fi de 12.5% pentru anul acesta si pt CNS de doar 9%. Cum mai ramane cu increderea plasarii de capitaluri in economia romaneasca daca acestea sunt totusi amenintate de o continua eroziune (si nu doar nominal), contul curent este la un nivel de deficit istoric. Intrebarea de baza ramane daca economia functionala nu este ultimamente o sintagma care da bine la alt fel de politica...
Daniel Daianu: Eu pledez pentru ca sa avem capital romanesc in actionariatul bancilor si altor instutii financiare, din ratiuni care sunt foarte pragmatice. Sa invatam de la colegii din Europa Centrala. Domnul Aurelian pune o alta intrebare tulburatoare in privinta capitalului autohton. Ar fi bine sa avem firme cu capital autohton viguroase, competitive. Dar va fi foarte greu... Stiti ca o regula a vietii (a biologiei), a economiei, este ca cei mari inghit pe cei mici....
Nicolaie Moldovan: Seful Delegatiei Comisiei Europene in Romania, D-l Ambasador Jonathan SCHEELE, aprecia ieri intr-o declaratie de presa ca Romania nu a avut in 2004 o economie de piata functionala capabila sa faca fata presiunilor concurentiale ale pietei unice. Personal, considera ca Domnia sa are dreptate. D-le Daianu, luand in calcul ritmul actual de evolutie al economiei romanesti, se poate preciza un orizont de timp cand Romania poate fi recunoscuta ca o economie de piata functionala compatibila cu mecanismele economice si concurentiale europene ?
Daniel Daianu: Domnule Molodovan: Romania, sub nici o forma, nu va putea avea o economie "impecabila" in 2007 si daca vom intra, aceasta se va face si pentru ca principalele cancelarii europene decid ca Romania are locul in UE din 2007. Marea provocare pentru clasa guvernanta din Romania este sa inteleaga ca, in anumite privinte, noi nu ne-am facut temele - adica ceea ce depinde strict de noi. Va dau un exemplu: noi nu avem nici in prezent o programare bugetara multianuala, care sa examineze toate implicatii financiare ale reformei sistemului de asigurari sociale, costurile aplicarii Acquis-ului comunitar, costurile asa numitelor parteneriate public-private (care vor fi suportate cel mai adesea de buget), nevoia de a aloca mai multi bani pentru educatie etc....Ce ne facem cu agricultura, unde nu exista mecansieme de finantare viabile. Ar trebui, de exemplu, ca programul SAPARD sa se ocupe serios de aceasta insufienta mare...Si mai sunt si altele...
Avem probleme cu absorbtia fondurilor
Daniel Daianu: avem o mare problema in privinta capacitatii de absorbtie; vedeti situatia cu fondurile pentru modernizarea agriculturii. Cred ca modernizarea rurala ar trebui sa includa cateva proiecte mari, mai usor de gestionat si care sa elimine (atat cat se poate) din "scurgeri" nemeritate... Oricum, chestiunea absorbtiei trebuie sa fie in top-ul agendei viitorului guvern... Ar fi aiurea ca, daca intram in 2007, sa ne trezim tara donatoare (avem de platit 800 milioane euro la bugetul UE...). Nu cred ca vom ajunge intr-o asemenea situatie dar este bine sa meditam...
Dezinflatia va continua
Daniel Daianu: dezinflatia va continua si eu cred ca vom ajunge la 6-7% in cca doi ani. Acum intra mult capital in Romania, estre drept si de natura speculativa --intrucat dobanzile sunt ridicate...
Daniel Daianu: Doamnei Iulia Platona: avem un sector IT in expansiune. Exista si experienta exemplara a Indiei in acest domeniu. Dar pentru a beneficia cat mai mult de "relocalizare (outsourcing si off-shoring) trebuie sa avem grija de scoala, de invatamantul superior. Romania cheltuieste putin in acest domeniu. Si firmele din Romania trebuie sa incerce sa foloseasca mai mult noile tehnologii informationale si comunicationale...
Economia Romaniei in UE va fi mai putin libera
Daniel Daianu: Ce nu inteleg multi este ca functionarea Romaniei in UE priveaza politica economica de unele grade de libertate, pe care le are acum. De exemplu, se reduce mult din potenta politicii monetare (in fapt, daca se adopta euro, politica monetara dispare), ca si a cursului de schimb - ca instrumente de ajustare la socuri externe potrivnice. De aceea vorbim despre nevoia de a avea o economie de piata competitiva. Cehia, Ungaria, Polonia au acum crize de ordin fiscal (cu deficite de peste 5% din PIB)...Acestea sunt indicii privind ceea ce ne asteapta si chiar mai rau daca nu vom fi bine pregatiti. Pe de alta parte, nici nu trebuie sa dramatizam si sa tragem concluzia, eu cred ca gresita, ca mai bine sa fim in afara UE. Trebuie sa facem treaba mai buna acasa...
O administratie publica vetusta...
Daniel Daianu: Miza intrarii in UE este si modernizarea unei administratii publice vetuste, care nu ajuta reducerea decalajelor...
Daniel Daianu: Euro s-a apreciat masiv fata de USD in ultimii doi ani datorita deficitelor mari (comercial si bugetar) din SUA. Nu vad o revenire la paritate in urmatorii ani...decat daca s-ar produce evenimente exceptionale...
Fructele integrarii...
Daniel Daianu: Cetatenii Romaniei vor simti fructele integrarii atunci cand veniturile celor mai multi dintre ei vor progresa in mod durabil (ceea ce nu inseamna cifre fantasmagorice, asa cum vad enuntate de unii politicieni...), cand infrastructura tarii va fi similara cu cea care este standard in Europa, cand respectul fata de lege va domina viata publica si individuala...sa nu asteptam insa schimbari radicale, peste noapte... Dar sa avem incredere, mai ales ca traim intr-o democratie, chiar daca este tanara si destul de stramba...
Sursa: Centrul de Informare al Delegatiei Comisiei Europene in Romania
http://www.euractiv.ro/index.html/section|readStory?stID=4&pT=interviuri&pID=46
Eveniment
Chat cu Daniel Daianu
Marti, 21 septembrie, Daniel Daianu a discutat cu cei interesati despre "Romania - o economie de piata functionala?"
Cititi mai jos transcrierera chatului.
http://www.infoeuropa.ro/docs/Transcrierea_sesiunii_de_chat_cu_dl_Daniel_Daianu.pdf
Daniel Daianu : "O democratie tanara si destul de stramba..."
28 Septembrie 2004
Daniel Daianu a raspuns in cadrul chatului "Romania-o economie de piata functionala?" la intrebari legate de macroeconomie si consecintele aderarii.
Chatul a fost organizat de Centrul de Informare al Delegatiei Comisiei Europene in Romania.
Referitor la distinctia intre economie de piata functionala si economie competitiva, Daniel Daianu a inceput chat-ul prin a spune:
Eu consider ca si "notiunea de economie de piata functionala" este terminologic destul de stranie - vedeti ca in engleza se spune "functioning market economy". Intr-un sens profund economia Romaniei este de piata, adica are institutiile de baza ale economiei de piata ca si mecansimele. Este adevarat insa ca are slabiciuni si poate vom face referiri la ele. Comisia UE, cand spune "functioning market economy" judeca o asemenea stare de fapt. Dar cum se stie, economiile de piata, in spatiul mondial, au performante diferite, care au originea in contexte institutionale nu identice. Si de aici putem comenta daca Romania are o economie de piata competitiva, care poate suporta presiunile concurentiale dinauntrul UE... Voi reveni asupra chestiunii...
Daniel Daianu: Intr-o formulare foarte teoretica o economie de piata competitiva este cea care poate creste ramanand o entitate deschisa. Mai exact, este vorba de asigurarea unei cresteri economice durabile, care, mai departe, implica finantare fara probleme a dezechilibrelor externe, stare solida a finantelor publice. Daca intram mai adanc in "corpul economic", este nevoie ca formarea bruta a capitalului ("investitiile interne") sa fie la un nivel adecvat, care sa asigure refacerea stocului de capital uman si fizic in conditii de competitivitate. Facand o analogie, sa ne gandim la Agenda Lisabona a UE. Vedem cum, la alta scara, si UE are o problematica de competitivitate... Voi reveni
Razvan Alex: Din cate stiam, pentru ca o economie de piata sa fie functionala, este necesar ca aceste institutii de baza si mecanisme sa si functioneze corect. Si in ziua de astazi numai asta nu se vehiculeaza.
Daniel Daianu: Observatia Dlui Razvan Alexandru este corecta in largirea cadrului dezbaterii la calitatea institutiilor. Dar sa nu omitem ca aceasta esdte o zona foarte soft de analiza... Este mult mai facil sa descrii un progres economic prin dezinflatie, starea sistemului bancar, dimensiune a deficitului bugetr etc, decat prin calitatea institutiilor. veti dreptate ca noi stam rau la functionarea administratiei publice, justitie... etc.
Sorin Cotorceanu: Pai da. Ca de obicei, reusim admirabil sa zgariem doar suprafata lucrurilor. Asta apropos de randurile de mai sus, cu Bassel, criterii. Cifrele exista pentru ca trebuie sa existe, pentru ca fac parte dintrun sistem care functioneaza pe baza de simptome, asemeni celui medical. Dar atunci cand sunt in moarte clinica nu am nevoie de un doctor sa-mi spuna acest lucru. El poate, eventual, sa-i previna pe ceilalti.
Sorin Cotorceanu: Si chiar asta face. Functioning market economy este o sintagma care tine la distanta oamenii cu bani de zone in care ar putea sa-si piarda banii pe nepusa masa. Iar Romania EXACT asta este. Mass-media si-a pierdut de mult calitatea de observator impartial al fenomenului. Existenta economiei de piata o simte fiecare pe propria piele. Sau, mai precis, inexistenta ei.
Daniel Daianu: Domnul Sorin Cotorceanu face referire la la fiziologia economiei noastre; si este corect din partea noastra sa admitem existenta mecanismelor defectuoase. Dar a afirma ca se "zgarie numai suprafata" este o exagerare...
Michaela Turk: agricultura va deveni o baza a economiei RO?
Daniel Daianu: Doamna Michaela Turk abordeaza o chestiune care poate fi examinata din mai multe perspective. Una este legata chiar de ceea ce numim competitivitate: daca economia nu este competitiva, evident ca implicatiile de natura financiara sunt defavorabile. O alta perspectiva priveste bugetul public si al intreprinderilor. Aderarea la UE implica costuri ale aplicarii Acquisului, care nu sunt modice. Si firmele au de asimilat tehnologii si de respectat reguli care au efecte in bilanturile lor - unele firme nu vor rezista. Nu intamplator se discuta despre importanta capitolului privind concurenta...
DANIELA BRATOSIN: bancile iti acorda credit numai daca demonstrezi ca nu ai nevoie de el, spune azi un articol de presa. absolut corect! Nici o banca nu ofera credit pentru societati nou infiintate, indiferent de planul de afaceri. Se poate schimba aceasta optica?
Daniel Daianu: Doamna Daniela Bratosin: In general bancile europene (fata de cele din SUA) cer garantii, mizeaza mai putin pe viabilitatea proiectului de afaceri. Dar chiar si asa, apetitul baniclor comerciale din Romania pentru creditare de productie este mic...Expansiunea din ultimii ani a creditului neguvernamental a fost legata strans de consum...
DANIELA BRATOSIN: Are BNR posibilitatea de a influenta bancile? Daca nu, cine si cum? In caz ca "oferta" se mentine cea care este in prezent, ce sanse are micul intreprinzator roman dupa 2007?
Daniel Daianu: Acum si Comisia UE va aprecia ca avem un astfel de "animal". Sa revin la o intrebare anterioara. Daca s-ar aplica foarte sever criteriile economice cateva tari care au intrat la 1 mai 2004 in UE nu ar fi meritat sa o faca. Deci asemenea calificative imbina criterii economice cu considerente politice. Ce ramane de subliniat insa este ca mai avem o cale buna de parcurs pentru a pretinde ca avem o economie competititiva...
Corjaautanu Constantin: Va rog sa raspundeti daca piata de capital functioneaza ?
Daniel Daianu: Piata de capital la noi a luat ceva avant in ultimii doi ani, pe fondul dezinflatiei si cresterii probabilitatii ca Romania sa fie admisa in UE. Capitalizarea Bursei a crescut considerabil in acesti doi ani.
Daca judecam insa functionarea Bursei la noi cu ce vedem in Europa Centrala, in tarile cu economii asezate, este corect sa spunem ca avem o piata de capital inca imatura...Pe de alta parte sa nu ne adsteptam ca piata de capital in Romania sa joace rolul de intermediere financiara pe care il observam in SUA. La noi sistemul bancar va ramane baza sistemului financiar...
Platona Iulia: Domnule Daianu, ma intereseaza daca crederti ca ar fi potrivit sa pastram o banca competitiva cu capital majoritar de stat in Romania.
Daniel Daianu: Doamnei Iulia Platona: Basel II inaspreste conditiile de creditare in economie si cele mai lovite vor fi IMM-urile; aceasta se observa si in tarile UE...
Claudia Koncsag: Considerati ca ar mai fi posibil in acest moment ca inflatia sa scape din nou de sub control, in conditiile in care nu vor aparea evenimente politice majore neasteptate?
Daniel Daianu: Inflatia nu poate scapa de sub control intrucat BNR are suficienta expertiza si rutina pozitiva pentru a controla lichiditatea...Chiar o explozie a pretului titeiului (catre 80$ barilul) nu ar scoate dezinflatia din coridorul actual; ar provoca o deviatie temporara...
Motoarele politicii publice de reforme
Daniel Daianu: O politica publica de reforme este actionata de mai multe motoare; exista o logica interna a reformelor (de pilda, nimeni nu poate contesta ca privatizarea a avansat - nu discut cum...); exista presiuni ale partenerilor institutionali (IFIs si Comisia UE); exista presiuni ale mediului extern. Sa nu omitem ca economie romaneasca este deschisa, ca tara are angajamente fata de numeroase organizatii internationale (ex: Organizatia Mondiala a Comertului)...Nu cred ca alegerile pot deraia mersul...
Madalina Barbu: Exista opinii diferite in ceea ce priveste aderarea in 2007 si reducerea decalajelor. Credeti ca vom putea face fata mai bine concurentei impuse de piata unica daca vom adera eventual in 2009? Cresterea economica a Romaniei se va realiza mai rapid in afara sau inauntrul Uniunii? Multumesc.
Daniel Daianu: Doamna Madalina Barbu pune o intrebare care ma obsedeaza de mult timp. Ce cred, este ca, a fi inauntrul UE este o sansa istorica pentru Romania de a invinge capcanele inapoierii. Romania nu poate repeta experiente de succes (de miracol economic) din Asia si alte parti. "Jocul" in Europa este admiterea in UE. Cred ca nu este preferabil sa amanam aderarea (admitand ca depinde de voina noastra...). Ce cred insa, si aici imbratisez teama unora, este ca trebuie sa cautam sa negociem conditii de aderare cat mai bune...Daca este prea tarziu asta numai viata va arata...Va rog cititi un articol al meu din Jurnalul National (intrari pe site...).
Aurelian: Considerati ca odata cu liberalizarea pietei societatile cu capital integral roman nu vor mai face fata concurentei si vor disparea. Ma refer la mari institutii financiare ca QBE, AXA etc?
Corjaautanu Constantin: Daca dumnevoastra constderati ca in RO avem in prezent o piata de capital, care sunt sansele ca cei peste 17 milioane de initiali capitalisti (PPM-isti) sa poata tranzactiona certificatele lor de actionari di societatile lichidate de sistemul bancar in mod fraudulos ?
Aurelian: Tintirea inflatiei in cadrul reorientarii politicilor BNR: daca acest indicator macro este pentru analiza financiar-bancara, considerat a fi de 12.5% pentru anul acesta si pt CNS de doar 9%. Cum mai ramane cu increderea plasarii de capitaluri in economia romaneasca daca acestea sunt totusi amenintate de o continua eroziune (si nu doar nominal), contul curent este la un nivel de deficit istoric. Intrebarea de baza ramane daca economia functionala nu este ultimamente o sintagma care da bine la alt fel de politica...
Daniel Daianu: Eu pledez pentru ca sa avem capital romanesc in actionariatul bancilor si altor instutii financiare, din ratiuni care sunt foarte pragmatice. Sa invatam de la colegii din Europa Centrala. Domnul Aurelian pune o alta intrebare tulburatoare in privinta capitalului autohton. Ar fi bine sa avem firme cu capital autohton viguroase, competitive. Dar va fi foarte greu... Stiti ca o regula a vietii (a biologiei), a economiei, este ca cei mari inghit pe cei mici....
Nicolaie Moldovan: Seful Delegatiei Comisiei Europene in Romania, D-l Ambasador Jonathan SCHEELE, aprecia ieri intr-o declaratie de presa ca Romania nu a avut in 2004 o economie de piata functionala capabila sa faca fata presiunilor concurentiale ale pietei unice. Personal, considera ca Domnia sa are dreptate. D-le Daianu, luand in calcul ritmul actual de evolutie al economiei romanesti, se poate preciza un orizont de timp cand Romania poate fi recunoscuta ca o economie de piata functionala compatibila cu mecanismele economice si concurentiale europene ?
Daniel Daianu: Domnule Molodovan: Romania, sub nici o forma, nu va putea avea o economie "impecabila" in 2007 si daca vom intra, aceasta se va face si pentru ca principalele cancelarii europene decid ca Romania are locul in UE din 2007. Marea provocare pentru clasa guvernanta din Romania este sa inteleaga ca, in anumite privinte, noi nu ne-am facut temele - adica ceea ce depinde strict de noi. Va dau un exemplu: noi nu avem nici in prezent o programare bugetara multianuala, care sa examineze toate implicatii financiare ale reformei sistemului de asigurari sociale, costurile aplicarii Acquis-ului comunitar, costurile asa numitelor parteneriate public-private (care vor fi suportate cel mai adesea de buget), nevoia de a aloca mai multi bani pentru educatie etc....Ce ne facem cu agricultura, unde nu exista mecansieme de finantare viabile. Ar trebui, de exemplu, ca programul SAPARD sa se ocupe serios de aceasta insufienta mare...Si mai sunt si altele...
Avem probleme cu absorbtia fondurilor
Daniel Daianu: avem o mare problema in privinta capacitatii de absorbtie; vedeti situatia cu fondurile pentru modernizarea agriculturii. Cred ca modernizarea rurala ar trebui sa includa cateva proiecte mari, mai usor de gestionat si care sa elimine (atat cat se poate) din "scurgeri" nemeritate... Oricum, chestiunea absorbtiei trebuie sa fie in top-ul agendei viitorului guvern... Ar fi aiurea ca, daca intram in 2007, sa ne trezim tara donatoare (avem de platit 800 milioane euro la bugetul UE...). Nu cred ca vom ajunge intr-o asemenea situatie dar este bine sa meditam...
Dezinflatia va continua
Daniel Daianu: dezinflatia va continua si eu cred ca vom ajunge la 6-7% in cca doi ani. Acum intra mult capital in Romania, estre drept si de natura speculativa --intrucat dobanzile sunt ridicate...
Daniel Daianu: Doamnei Iulia Platona: avem un sector IT in expansiune. Exista si experienta exemplara a Indiei in acest domeniu. Dar pentru a beneficia cat mai mult de "relocalizare (outsourcing si off-shoring) trebuie sa avem grija de scoala, de invatamantul superior. Romania cheltuieste putin in acest domeniu. Si firmele din Romania trebuie sa incerce sa foloseasca mai mult noile tehnologii informationale si comunicationale...
Economia Romaniei in UE va fi mai putin libera
Daniel Daianu: Ce nu inteleg multi este ca functionarea Romaniei in UE priveaza politica economica de unele grade de libertate, pe care le are acum. De exemplu, se reduce mult din potenta politicii monetare (in fapt, daca se adopta euro, politica monetara dispare), ca si a cursului de schimb - ca instrumente de ajustare la socuri externe potrivnice. De aceea vorbim despre nevoia de a avea o economie de piata competitiva. Cehia, Ungaria, Polonia au acum crize de ordin fiscal (cu deficite de peste 5% din PIB)...Acestea sunt indicii privind ceea ce ne asteapta si chiar mai rau daca nu vom fi bine pregatiti. Pe de alta parte, nici nu trebuie sa dramatizam si sa tragem concluzia, eu cred ca gresita, ca mai bine sa fim in afara UE. Trebuie sa facem treaba mai buna acasa...
O administratie publica vetusta...
Daniel Daianu: Miza intrarii in UE este si modernizarea unei administratii publice vetuste, care nu ajuta reducerea decalajelor...
Daniel Daianu: Euro s-a apreciat masiv fata de USD in ultimii doi ani datorita deficitelor mari (comercial si bugetar) din SUA. Nu vad o revenire la paritate in urmatorii ani...decat daca s-ar produce evenimente exceptionale...
Fructele integrarii...
Daniel Daianu: Cetatenii Romaniei vor simti fructele integrarii atunci cand veniturile celor mai multi dintre ei vor progresa in mod durabil (ceea ce nu inseamna cifre fantasmagorice, asa cum vad enuntate de unii politicieni...), cand infrastructura tarii va fi similara cu cea care este standard in Europa, cand respectul fata de lege va domina viata publica si individuala...sa nu asteptam insa schimbari radicale, peste noapte... Dar sa avem incredere, mai ales ca traim intr-o democratie, chiar daca este tanara si destul de stramba...
Sursa: Centrul de Informare al Delegatiei Comisiei Europene in Romania
http://www.euractiv.ro/index.html/section|readStory?stID=4&pT=interviuri&pID=46
miercuri, septembrie 15, 2004
about democracy in romania
Building Democracy in Romania: Internal Shortcomings and External Neglect
Tom Gallagher
Communist rule ended violently and abruptly in Romania in 1989, but in the 1990s a protracted and incomplete transition from that social system has occurred. Romania thus stands apart from Central European states with whom it prefers to be grouped and even with several in South-East Europe (SEE) or the Balkans, the geographical category into which international observers and many ordinary Romanian citizens feel Romania best fits.
1 Until the 1996 election victory of centre-right reformers, Romania experienced a transition from communist rule controlled by second-ranking members of the old regime; until the mid-1990s, when at last it appeared possible that they could be peacefully substituted in office, they were widely seen as reluctant democrats wedded to illiberal practices, with a near-monopolistic approach to political power.
The situation appeared recognizable to scholars familiar with Romania's long-term political evolution. In the past imported ideologies have been modified and drained of their reformist content to suit local elite requirements.2 This has led to huge discrepancies between constitutional forms and actual practices. Since Romanian independence in 1881, rhetoric about reform has often been a screen enabling a narrow oligarchy, whether aristocratic, mercantile, communist, or post-communist to pursue self-serving policies
end p.383
that produce a dangerous gulf between state and society. A legacy of foreign occupation stretching over centuries, and sharp internal cleavages—economic, cultural, and above all ethnic—retarded the progress of democratization.
From 1881 to 1938 Romania enjoyed over fifty years of stable constitutional rule which distinguished it from all other states in SEE, but institutions and civic culture were not democratic (nor are they today according to one of Romania's foremost political scientists).3 The inability of a poorly institutionalized state to integrate new territories with large minority populations acquired after 1918 led to the collapse of democracy twenty years later. For the next sixty years indigenous forms of development were pursued in turn by right-wing populists and national communists, following an interlude of communist rule shaped by internationalist (i.e. pro-Soviet) norms.
The self-image of Romania as 'a Latin country which has always believed itself to be an extension of the west towards the East', helps to explain why it has often differentiated itself from its neighbours.4 It may share the Orthodox religion with its Slav neighbours, but it stays aloof from most of them, especially Russia, which is seen as a long-term foe of Romanian independence. Along with Hungary, Romania is the only non-Slavic nation-state in the Danubian basin, but cooperation has been thwarted by the debilitating quarrel over Transylvania, part of Romania since 1918, but mainly Hungarian-ruled for hundreds of years before that. Even with its long-standing Romanian majority, this province has undeniable Central European characteristics. Thus Romania finds itself crossed by important cultural fault-lines. The pre-1918 state shaped by Byzantine culture and proximity to Ottoman power coexists with relatively new territories where the Romanian majority has been exposed to German influence and where minorities enjoyed influence greater than their numbers. The great powers exploited such internal cleavages and Romania suffered devastating invasions in both world wars (never recovering Bessarabia and North Bukovina seized by the Soviet Union in 1940). It is hardly surprising that recently acquired independence and dire threats to territorial integrity have allowed nationalism to occupy a salient role in political culture. Nor is it any more surprising that, often
end p.384
against a background of misrule, rulers have consistently sought legitimacy from citizens by invoking nationalism and portraying themselves as executors of 'the national mission'.
In this chapter I argue that the process of building democracy in Romania is dependent on a favourable external environment and active backing from abroad. The communist regime's determination to retain absolute control over politics and society and oppose any liberal initiatives in economics blocked off the possibility of a democratic transition largely resourced and driven from within. However, at least until 1999 Western interest in Romania and concern for the success of its democratic experiment has been weak, with most involvement coming from NGOs and international economic bodies whose influence over Western policy towards Romania is relatively limited. The difficulties in the way of Romania consolidating a fragile democracy by pursuing a strategy dependent on successful integration with Western economic and security organizations are spelt out. Instead, the case is made for a new approach to democracy-building from domestic reformers and international organizations that recognizes Romania's special problems, one that is not based around unrealistic targets which the country is unable to meet for the foreseeable future.
Fluctuating International Influence
Romania today is the second largest of the former Soviet satellites in Eastern Europe (EE) and there has been intermittent interaction with the West (even though the importation of Western political values is of debatable significance). Independence was acquired through the skill of Romanian politicians in dealing with the Western powers, ensuring that Ottoman overlordship was not substituted by Russian control. After 1960, the West enjoyed a wider range of diplomatic and commercial contacts with Romania than with any other Warsaw Pact state, despite the unyielding character of a Marxist-Leninist regime soon to be infused with 1930s-style ultranationalism. The bid by Nicolae Ceauşescu, general secretary of the Romanian Communist Party (PCR) from 1965 to 1989, to acquire autonomy from the Soviet Union made him seem a weak link in Soviet power and thus a leader apparently worth cultivating.5 Prestigious state visits from General De Gaulle and US President Nixon occurred in 1968 and 1969. In 1972 Romania was invited to join both the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund (IMF). It obtained preferential trading status from the European Union (EU) in 1973 and was awarded Most Favoured Nation trading status in 1974, the only EE state enjoying such a distinction.6 Moreover, in 1967 Romania was the first communist state to recognize the Federal Republic of Germany.7
The West indirectly contributed to the chain of events that led to the violent collapse of the Ceauşescu regime in 1989. While it preferred to overlook systematic human rights abuses until the last years of the dictatorship, it made available massive loans to Ceauşescu that were used to finance ill-conceived industrialization schemes that resulted in massive policy failures. At considerable cost to his people, Ceauşescu set out to repay these loans by 1990, but in December 1989 popular protests and a rebellion by second-ranking communists brought about his downfall.
Numerous conspiracy theories seek to explain the sequence of events leading to the overthrow and execution by his underlings of a previously unchallenged communist dictator. One that has enjoyed unusual staying-power despite the absence of corroborating evidence is that Presidents Bush and Gorbachev at their Malta summit in November 1989 worked out the details of Ceauşescu's removal and his substitution by communist reformers who would not disturb the balance of power in the area.8 In 1990 one of the most common chants of protestors angry at Western inaction as the political vacuum was filled by men with roots in the communist regime was 'Malta Yalta', indicating their belief that the democracies were ready to abandon Romania to Russian captivity for a second time.9
But, however unpalatable, Western passivity as coup leaders led by Ion Iliescu moved quickly to confirm their authority by holding
end p.386
elections in May 1990 before their competitors had the chance to organize themselves, probably has a more mundane explanation. No Western country saw Romania as being in its zone of influence. Neither Germany nor France had obvious economic or strategic interests there. Unlike Poland or Hungary, Romania lacked a large and vocal émigré community in the USA able to persuade politicians to adopt a vigilant approach to events in their former homeland.
Initially, there was relief in western capitals that Iliescu was able to co-opt the party and state bureaucracy which recognized that this paternalistic ex-communist was in a good position to safeguard their interests in troubled times. Anxiety built up, however, following Romanian-Hungarian clashes in the city of Tirgu Mures in March 1990 in which official complicity, at least at lower levels, seemed apparent.10 Analysts were already advising Western policy makers that the politics of ethnicity had the potential to sabotage the transition to open politics being attempted in EE.11 Anxiety gave way to displeasure when the state used violence against its political opponents. In May 1990 the US ambassador was recalled to Washington for consultations regarding violence and intimidation in the election campaign.12 In June when the government used vigilante workers to beat up opposition protestors in the capital, there was widespread outrage. The EU froze agreements with Romania and the US government condemned 'in the strongest possible terms, the Romanian government's brutal suppression . . . of legitimate forms of dissent and public protest'.13
But the West was disinclined to take punitive action against ex-communists seemingly turning Romania into a façade democracy. As events in Yugoslavia would demonstrate only too clearly, policy makers are reluctant to act as organizers, leaders, or peacemakers in a region where there are serious doubts about the potentialities of local elites and their populations to aspire to good government and modern forms of political conduct. Besides, the undeniable winner in May 1990 was Iliescu and his National Salvation Front (FSN).
end p.387
The Front's denial of state assets to a fragmented opposition made its victory a runaway one. But Iliescu was genuinely popular on account of relaxing the savage austerity of the Ceauşescu era and collectivized villagers, elderly citizens, and heavy industrial workers, all with reason to feel insecure about the future, found noisy electoral competition unsettling and were more comfortable with socialist paternalism.14
Little noticed as Western governments averted their gaze from Romania was the voluntary help provided by thousands of ordinary citizens and trained professional people from across Western Europe who were moved by the television footage from Romania at the end of 1989 to seek to help rebuild that shattered society. Such efforts reveal the existence of an international civil society capable of surmounting political and geographical barriers often more effectively than powerful and well-financed governmental and multilateral organizations.15 Private assistance meant to offer relief from the multiple hardships millions of Romanians were facing was soon followed by attempts to promote democracy and free institutions from private foundations, not least the Open Society Foundation, which was the brainchild of millionaire George Soros. These non-governmental initiatives are often ignored when drawing up a balance-sheet of external intervention in post-communist states, but there is no shortage of evidence to suggest that in Romania they may have been crucial in sustaining democratic values in the first half of the 1990s.16
NGOs played an active role in promoting free media, in monitoring local elections and then presidential and parliamentary elections in 1992, and in encouraging the government to show greater respect for human rights. The Iliescu regime was susceptible to international pressure in these areas. It felt it could give ground without undermining the basis of its rule. Indeed external monitoring of elections did not prevent widespread allegations of vote-rigging from domestic sources in the national polls of 1992.17 As will be seen, it was far less happy about accepting advice from Western
end p.388
creditors concerning how to introduce market mechanisms into a state-led economy. Nor did the electoral arithmetic after 1992 when it was dependent on ultranationalist parties for its parliamentary majority allow it to respond positively to requests from the Council of Europe, the European Parliament, and the OSCE that it provide better safeguards for its ethnic minorities. Nor until Romania formally applied to join the EU in 1995 and NATO in 1996 was there external scrutiny of key state institutions and laws and the degree to which they were compatible with the standards required by these organizations. In the early 1990s the ruling FSN had been able to draw up a new Constitution and restructure on its own terms, or leave relatively unaltered, institutions such as the judiciary, the intelligence services, and the armed forces.18
Following the outbreak of warfare in ex-Yugoslavia, Romania began to be seen, rather unexpectedly, as an island of stability in the Balkan maelstrom. The restoration of Most Favoured Nation trading status by the US Congress in October 1992 was followed by the signing on 17 November of an association agreement with the EU, the first major diplomatic successes obtained by Romania since 1990. Statements by US officials in 1993-4 that the presence of extreme nationalists in the government was a Romanian affair seemed to confirm that Iliescu could pursue an idiosyncratic approach to democracy building without incurring severe penalties.19 Of particular satisfaction was Romania's admission to the Council of Europe in October 1993. Membership was then seen as a gateway to wider European integration and Romania could claim that its human rights record was beyond serious reproach now that it could gain entry to such a prestigious body. But, soon afterwards, by admitting Croatia and Russia despite appalling human rights records, membership of the Council of Europe began to lose its lustre and ratings Romania received from human rights monitors such as Freedom House and the US government's Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor would place it near the bottom of the European league until well into the 1990s.
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When, in 1995, the minimalist Western approach to the Bosnian conflict was replaced by NATO-led military intervention, the repercussions were not long being felt in Romania. Following the Dayton peace accord of November 1995, there was growing interest in the stability of the former communist states bordering ex-Yugoslavia, especially among US officials. The need to isolate nationalist hard-liners in Bosnia and promote moderate forces capable of arranging compromises across the various ethnic divides, was at the centre of the strategy identified with Richard Holbrooke, a former US assistant secretary of state. The architect of the Dayton accord realized that the success or failure of the initiative depended, in part, on efforts to delegitimize conflictual nationalism in SEE.20 It is probably no coincidence that the criticism made by US Ambassador Alfred Moses on 22 February 1996 about the presence of ultranationalists in the Romanian government came not long after a visit to Bucharest by Holbrooke to discuss with Romanian officials the aims behind his Bosnia peace plan.21
With NATO prepared to include the former communist states of SEE inside a common European security umbrella provided they met a daunting range of civil and military conditions, far more attention began to be paid to the Romanian situation. US pressure contributed to a breakthrough in Romanian-Hungarian state relations in 1996 and the signing of a bilateral treaty between the two states on 14 September.22 Iliescu was unable to exploit the treaty for electoral advantage. The tone of the messages of congratulation from Western leaders was noticeably cooler than the ones sent to Bucharest in 1997 as Romanian-Hungarian relations dramatically improved under a very different administration and it was not without significance that in October 1995 France had awarded the Legion d'Honneur to Corneliu Copusu, a veteran survivor of communist prisons who had stitched together an opposition electoral alliance which would shortly challenge Iliescu's hold on power.
In the November 1996 presidential and parliamentary elections, voters opted for a new president and for parties that were felt to have more credibility in Western capitals. The industrial workers who had kept Iliescu in power since 1990 rejected him because his poorly institutionalized regime with a daunting record of incompetence was seen as jeopardizing their interests.23 With 95 per cent of Romanians endorsing NATO entry, foreign policy issues played a not insignificant role in securing what amounted to a peaceful change of regime.24 The choices Iliescu had been forced to make about the degree to which he was serious about integrating with the West undermined the cohesion of his regime and may have signalled to Romanians who took an interest in foreign affairs that the new times required new and untarnished people at the helm.
Thus despite Romanian events being a low priority for the West, external forces at different moments have played an influential role in strengthening weak democratic institutions and preventing a slide into post-communist autocracy. The strongly authoritarian instincts of the 1990-6 Iliescu regime were checked by the willingness of multilateral bodies like the EU and NATO to link financial and diplomatic backing with active respect for human and minority rights. Arguably, the victory of opposition reformers in the 1996 elections was enhanced by signs that the West was at last prepared to offer security guarantees to South-East Europe and envisage integrating countries making progress with democratization and economic reforms into pan-European institutions (though at a slower pace than Central European states).
Romanian Responses to the Outside World 1990-1996
Romania's perception of international events also influenced the progress of democratization after 1989. For a while, in 1990 the ruling FSN's attention was directed inwards as it sought to consolidate its authority in a society badly traumatized by an iron-fisted dictatorship and the violent nature of its demise. Little thought seems to have been given to how the West was likely to view the human rights abuses that occurred as the new regime took shape. The appointment as ambassadors to major Western capitals of Moscow-trained holdover from the communist era or else low-grade backers of the FSN, suggests that foreign relations were accorded
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a low priority.25 Emil Constantinescu, the liberal academic who became head of state in 1996, vividly described the form of post-communism emerging in Romania and how inimical it was to core Western values:
We are not talking about classic communism . . . but rather of a form that is both old since it awakens latent nationalism and new because of its goal, which is to preserve all that can be preserved, both in men and structures, of the old regime: as many as possible of the large enterprises, as many monopolies as possible, especially in the areas of energy and agriculture, as many of the political and economic leaders as possible, and as much as possible of an isolationist and anti-Western mythology, ready to halt all openings towards Europe and the rest of the world.26
Perhaps Iliescu hoped that, as in the communist era, cosmetic changes would be sufficient to allow Western financial and diplomatic support to buttress his rule. In April 1991, when France's President Mitterand became the first Western leader to pay Iliescu an official visit, it suggested that such a devious strategy might indeed be worth pursuing. Evidence that Iliescu was still far from certain about whether to align with the West even in an opportunistic way was provided in the same month when Romania became the only former Moscow satellite to sign a comprehensive treaty with the Soviet Union. The April 1991 treaty of friendship gave Moscow an effective right of veto over any Romanian alliance with a Western country. If it had not been abrogated by the collapse of the Soviet Union six months later, it might have placed Romania more firmly in the Soviet sphere of influence than it had been before 1989; and thereafter, senior officials remained anxious to appease Russian sensibilities. In July 1993, General Dumitru Cioflina, the chief of the army, stated that Romania was not going to enjoy closer relations with NATO than the ones it already had with Russia.27 While on a visit to Moscow in July 1995, Prime Minister Nicolae Vacaroiu declared that he was ready to realign the Romanian economy with Russia's because Western economic support had been so disappointing.28
Iliescu may have had reasons to keep relations with Moscow in good repair (such as access to cheap energy supplies) but isolation,
end p.392
or alignment with an internally exhausted Russia, were not realistic objectives for post-communist Romania.29 Besides, it is clear Iliescu hoped that Romania could benefit from Western economic and diplomatic support while being able to shape its own internal approach to democracy. Admission to European institutions, generous aid, official visits, and cordial interstate relations gradually became key goals. If accomplished, they could increase political stability and undermine opposition charges that Romania remained a pariah state under Ceauşescu's successors.
The first indication that Iliescu was not going to challenge Western interests as Slobodan Milosevic, the post-communist leader of Serbia was doing in 1991-3, came in the second half of 1990 during the Gulf Crisis. Romania held the presidency of the UN Security Council when Saddam Hussein invaded Kuwait and the necessity of her backing for the US-led action against Iraq was more important than it would normally have been.30 It was extended willingly by Iliescu even though Romania lost up to $3 billion because of the embargo imposed on what had been one her most important trading partners.31
The UN embargo imposed on rump Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) in 1992 was even more damaging to the Romanian economy, leading to estimated losses of $7 billion as a result of the disruption of trade.32 An admission in 1998 by Virgil Magureanu, the former head of the Romanian intelligence service that Romania had not wholly abided by the sanctions confirmed what a number of Western analysts had long suspected.33 The decision to allow large supplies of oil to be shipped to Serbia came from President Iliescu himself, according to his top aide.34 It was also to Serbia that Iliescu made his first official visit abroad in 1990 and Miloševih was
end p.393
received in Bucharest in 1994 with all due ceremony when he was still widely seen as an international pariah.35
Attitudes to Moscow and Belgrade at specific moments showed how real was the temptation for some neo-communist backsliding. The Vacaroiu government's willingness to take Western credits but spend them for political purposes that were inimical to reform (resulting in the suspension of the IMF's agreement with Romania in late 1995) was probably the most daring example of bogus change. But Iliescu and his entourage lacked the vision and the energy to follow the maverick path and look for yet another indigenous solution to Romania's daunting handicaps in the economic sphere. They were essentially mediocre politicians looking for some sort of modus vivendi with the West in the hope they could still enjoy the autonomy to pursue a semi-authoritarian course in Romania.36 This option became unrealistic as soon as Romania began to look seriously at integration into Euro-Atlantic security structures.
In January 1994, when NATO announced a cooperation programme with prospective new members called the Partnership for Peace, Romania was actually the first former Soviet bloc state to join. A process of reforming the Romanian military and bringing it closer to the model of armies in long-established democracies was established. Greater civilian control was asserted, several hundred hard-line nationalist officers were retired in 1995, and professional competence was given a higher priority than in other branches of the state. By early 1996 invitations had been extended to former Warsaw Pact states to join NATO and Romania applied in April of that year. The leading states in NATO seem to have concluded that SEE could not be left in a security vacuum after the war in the former Yugoslavia.
NATO made it clear that a candidate nation's chances of joining the Western military alliance depended on its performance in democratizing its society, reforming its economy, settling differences with adjacent states, and restructuring its military, in accordance with Western democratic standards. Romania's credentials for NATO membership were weaker than those of most other applicants. The country's political system, though pluralist, was displaying growing oligarchic tendencies. The transition from communism was proving painful and slow in the economic realm. Above all,
end p.394
the failure of bilateral treaty negotiations with Hungary and the Ukraine, and the delay in normalizing relations with Moldova, suggested to many NATO planners that Romania might be a consumer of security rather than a provider of it. Reviewing Iliescu's record, one local analyst concluded that 'the outcome of the disjunction between declaration and behaviour was the marginalization of Romania [and] the grave weakening of its international political position'.37
But Romania's gradual entry into a liberal international system limited his room to manœuvre. The external monitoring of human rights and governmental practices which he allowed meant the façade democracy that perhaps he would have been most comfortable with slowly gave way to a competitive system with enough genuine elements to secure his peaceful removal from office.
Dimensions of the Post-1996 Reform Push
In the euphoria of the moment, the unexpected transfer of power to the opposition alliance known as the Romanian Democratic Convention (CDR) following elections in November 1996 was hailed as a relaunch of the revolution stalled since 1990. But it was a repudiation of the incompetent Iliescu regime rather than a positive endorsement for the opposition. No blueprint for economic reform had been worked out in advance by the Christian Democrat and National Peasant Party (PNTCD), the dominant force in the victorious alliance and the only major party of pre-war vintage in the region to be restored to government in the 1990s. To form a viable government, the PNTCD swallowed its reservations and formed a coalition with the Democratic Party (PD) which had broken away from the Iliescu camp in 1992. It was a marriage of convenience between an ill-matched couple, inveterate anti-communists and reform-minded junior ex-communists. For such a coalition to honour its promise to relaunch a moribund economy and halt tumbling living standards, a culture of compromise would need to replace the partisanship which had disfigured Romanian politics since 1989.
In 1995 a rare degree of consensus had been exhibited by all the major parties when unanimous backing was given in parliament for Romania's application for EU entry. So popular was the desire to 'return to Europe' among the Romanian public that similar
endorsement was given to Romania's NATO bid even from extreme nationalist parties. Under President Constantinescu, a post-nationalist agenda of fence-mending with neighbours and reconciliation with minorities was emphasized. The new head of state argued that the chief threats to Romanian security were internal in origin rather than external, which was a fresh departure in Romanian politics.38 He emphasized the moral danger and subversion of democratic values posed by corruption, the danger of the penetration of criminal organizations into the very heart of government; and the need to switch from a parasitic and exploitative capitalism to a growth-generating one which did not forget its responsibility for contributing to the public good.39 In 1997 corrupt officials were removed from different branches of the state. But lack of enthusiasm for the anti-corruption drive from the courts and the prosecution service soon blunted its effectiveness. A cigarette smuggling scandal involving senior members of the president's military entourage in 1998 showed how hard it was for the president to rely on trusted personnel who shared his aim of creating a law-based state where there was equality for all before the courts.40
The president has important mediating powers rather than executive ones, so the brunt of the reform challenge was faced by the government headed by Victor Ciorbea. This upright and economically literate premier soon discovered how great was the shortage of loyal and competent officials willing to launch a shock therapy programme under which Romania implemented reforms that Central European states had dragged out over 7-8 years. An unholy alliance of anti-reform bureaucrats and managers of loss-making state firms was hard to dislodge even in the absence of its former political patrons. But popular enthusiasm about the ability of the state to protect the common good gave the Ciorbea government the breathing-space to challenge the sacred cow that the state must rule in the name of the ethnic majority alone. Ministers from the UDMR, the Hungarian minority party, were appointed to the new government, even though they were not essential for its survival. Proposed changes to the law gave Hungarians the right to be schooled in their own mother tongue at all levels of education, as well as the right to use their language in courts of law and the local administration. A cautious entente
end p.396
with Hungary blossomed and what leaders from both states described as a strategic regional partnership began to emerge. Measures to strengthen bilateral economic and military cooperation were agreed in top-level visits.41 Ciorbea openly stated in 1997 that he wished Romania to benefit from Hungarian investment and its greater experience of market economics so as to help relaunch the Romanian economy.42 The previous government had portrayed such investment as tantamount to the recolonization of the country.
The new post-nationalist agenda of interethnic and interstate cooperation rightly earned Romania numerous plaudits from world leaders as its relations with Hungary moved from being a subject of occasional international concern to a positive example for resolving a thorny ethnic problem. Notice was also taken of the breakthrough in relations with the Ukraine that includes territory lost by Romania to the Soviet Union in 1940. A bilateral treaty on 2 June 1997 recognized that the borders between the two states were 'inviolable' and paved the way for practical measures of regional cooperation that will determine whether treaties with formerly suspicious neighbours are empty formulae or else augur a new era of partnership.43 Progress in regularizing ties with Russia was much slower. No longer did Russia share a land frontier with Romania, but Russia was helping to shore up the self-styled breakaway Republic of Transnistria on the right bank of the river Dniester which, with the support of the Russian 14th Army, had refused to become part of the new state of Moldova that had declared independence from Moscow in 1991. With Moldova negotiations were long in train for a bilateral treaty. Bucharest wished for a document that 'contains nuances demonstrating the special nature of relations between the two states', their historic affinities based on common language and the fact that historically the territory comprising the state of Moldova is viewed by most Romanians as part of their traditional homeland, while the Chisinau authorities preferred the classic form of treaty between two sovereign states.44 The signing of a bilateral treaty with Russia, scheduled for 27 April 1996, was postponed at the last minute by the Iliescu government owing to a storm of protest raised by the then
end p.397
opposition at the fact that condemnation of the 1939 Molotov-Ribbentrop pact (paving the way for the Soviet annexation of the Romanian province of Bessarabia in 1940) was not in the main treaty, but placed in a separate annexe.45
Romania's image as a stabilizing force in a disorderly Balkan neighbourhood won it high-level support in NATO, especially from Latin members with France in the vanguard. But it was not enough to overcome scepticism about Romania's abilities to cure its economic ills and not be a financial drain on the organization. Lingering doubts also remained that Romania would be a consumer rather than a provider of security. The rebuff delivered after the NATO summit in Madrid on 12 July 1997 had no adverse effects on public opinion and did not generate the nationalist backlash feared in some quarters. An opinion poll in late May showed that 29 per cent of voters blamed Iliescu's PDSR for any failure of Romania's NATO bid compared with 16 per cent holding the Ciorbea government responsible.46 There was little noticeable public anger that Hungary had been selected and Romania spurned. Nor had there been a public outcry over the government's liberal minority policy, because it was widely seen as helping to end Romania's international isolation. The Romanian electorate showed patience and even maturity though it was hard not to disguise the fact that the government was using a foreign policy goal symbolizing 'the return to Europe' to extract more moral sacrifices from a hard-pressed population.47
But the government parties were unable to promote a culture of cooperation that would enable the coalition to survive in difficult times. Disputes over patronage between the PNTCD and the PD meant that reform plans hastily worked out in the winter of 1996-7 were never really implemented. Government came to a standstill in the first quarter of 1998 as the PD refused to support the budget
end p.398
or other important bills until the PNTCD replaced Ciorbea with a more acceptable premier. Infighting among the ruling centre parties at a time of mass social hardship benefited the ugly nationalist fringe of Romanian politics whose poll ratings rose in 1997-8.
The widespread verdict of the sixteen-month Ciorbea government was that it had been in office but not in power. The power of the managers of state firms remained as strong as ever as did the capacity of these loss-making operations to swallow up huge amounts of public funds. While price controls had been lifted in 1997 and the currency freed, there had been minimal progress in restructuring the unproductive state-led economy. The failure of the Ciorbea government to match rhetoric with action had a demoralizing effect at home and eroded foreign confidence in the ability of Romania to throw aside a totalitarian legacy and catch up with its neighbours.
International Perspectives on Romanian Reform 1996-2000
South-East Europe was already a growing security concern for the West thanks to the Bosnia crisis when the dramatic results of the 1996 Romanian election occurred. The outcome suggested that there were parts of the Balkans where democracy could sink native roots in unpromising conditions. In a few months Romania went from being 'a no hope' outsider for NATO entry to being a serious contender. However irresolute he might sometimes have been in domestic politics, President Constantinescu soon acquired the reputation of being one of the most eloquent champions of reform to have emerged in EE since 1989. By contrast with his predecessor who had received few invitations to prestigious Western states, Constantinescu was soon enjoying a high profile in the West. There was no shortage of commentators ready to pronounce that Romanian political life was beginning to outgrow the Balkan stereotypes dominated by images of partisanship, collectivist values, and nationalism. On several occasions in 1997, US president Clinton expressed his admiration for the Romanian-Hungarian entente, claiming that it was a model for resolving intractable interethnic disputes.48
end p.399
Public statements emanating from NATO in 1996-7 indicated that it was efforts to bring the Romanian military into line with the armed forces capability of member states that most impressed NATO planners. In promoting its case for first-wave entry, Bucharest described the Romanian military as a stabilizing force both internally and in the regional context. There was no praetorian tradition in Romania, the armed forces had not been integrated into the Warsaw Pact (although Romania was a member), and 80 per cent of military equipment was produced at home.49 The Foreign Ministry's White Book on Romania and NATO emphasized that:
Defence policy is made by civilian authorities. The military do not decide what are the national security risks, nor do they make the decisions on the ways and means to counteract them. Under the current legislation, the Armed Forces cannot impose their point of view with regard to any particular problem of interest to the society as a whole.50
In 1998 the military's image was tarnished owing to the involvement of senior elements in corruption and to the determination of top commanders to secure an amnesty for officers who had given the orders to fire on unarmed civilians in December 1989.51 These events suggested that there was still a long way to go before the malign influence of the Ceauşescu era could be eradicated from the armed forces. But of greater concern to the West was the existence of no less than nine intelligence services that at different times have enjoyed considerable freedom of action from their nominal political masters.52 Iliescu had created parallel structures in this sphere as in the domain of law enforcement in order to prevent his authority being challenged.53 The existence of state bodies with near identical functions that often sought to neutralize each other's effectiveness impeded the efforts of reformers to dismantle the communist legacy in many areas of state activity.54 At least the Romanian Information Service (SRI), the chief domestic intelligence service and successor to the Securitate (in some eyes the chief power in the land before Ceauşescu's overthrow) had undergone a process of reform.55 But the SRI's capacity to distort or even derail the democratization process was still regarded as considerable. In January 1999, following the narrow failure of an uprising by miners from the Jiu Valley protesting against IMF-backed plans to trim their industry, a rueful president admitted that he had learnt far more about what was happening from the media than from the intelligence services.56
Virgil Magureanu, who remained in charge of the SRI until April 1997, was one of the chief architects of the 1990-6 Iliescu regime and had been heavily implicated in the coup that toppled Ceauşescu.57 His resignation as head of SRI in that month was widely seen as an attempt to assuage fears in the Western intelligence community about including as a NATO member a state where the security services had, until recently, played an omnipotent role in national affairs.58
Overlapping authority, poor management, and inability to define priorities were aspects of the Romanian administrative culture that left negative impressions on external officials vetting Romanian credentials for Euro-Atlantic integration.59 The gap between the government announcing a decision and its actual implementation is greater in Romania than in many other countries. Western creditors, represented by the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank, grew increasingly exasperated during the death agonies of the Ciorbea government about the incapacity of the ruling parties to renounce politicking in order to pass a budget, never mind tackle structural reform. In May 1998 the World Bank suspended an accord designed to achieve the latter aim. Shortly beforehand, its Bucharest representative, Francois Ettori had warned that the marathon crisis had 'opened up a widening gap
end p.401
between Romania and other countries of Eastern Europe . . . Also threatened were Romania's chances of entering the European Union along with other countries.'60
In July 1997 the European Commission had recommended that Romania, along with five other states, be left out of the accession process getting underway at the end of the year because they appeared to be far from meeting the criteria from EU entry, something Premier Ciorbea admitted himself.61 The economic gap not only between Romania and EU states but between Romania and successful EU aspirants from Eastern Europe such as Poland and Hungary was immense. The volume of foreign investment per head of population in Romania between 1989 and 1996 and the volume of exports per head from Romania in 1996 were both lower than for all other former communist states in Eastern Europe.62 But in December 1997 the gloom was lifted somewhat at the Luxembourg summit of EU heads of government, when it was decided to extend simultaneous invitations to all eleven aspirant members, but to proceed at a slow pace with countries like Romania which clearly fell far short of entry requirements. Further encouragement for Romania was offered in March 1998 when the EU decided that the pre-accession states least prepared for entry would receive a disproportionately large share of funds from the EU so as to catch up with the fast-track candidates.63 In the year 2000 Romania was due to receive 650 million Euro to help it meet EU standards on a wide range of indicators.
In October 1999 Gunter Verheugen, the EU Commissioner for Enlargement, obtained the agreement of the Romanian government (headed by Radu Vasile since April 1998) that the EU would play an active role in supervising the formulation and implementation of the country's medium-term economic strategy between 2000 and 2004. Inevitably, Romanian sovereignty is infringed under such an arrangement. But the government had come to recognize that its failure to reach key policy targets vital in order to keep alive its EU integration hopes (not least the restructuring of loss-making state industries) stemmed from the post-communist state's limited administrative capacity.
In December 1999 EU pressure resulted in the passage of a law meant to depoliticize the top bands of the civil service, improve
end p.402
coordination between ministries, and regularize appointment procedures. Instilling a public service ethos in a bureaucracy with Romania's legacy of misrule will not happen overnight, but such a law may encourage competent and motivated officials to stay in the public service rather than move to the better-paid private sector.
At the Helsinki summit in the same month, the EU formally invited Romania to take part in talks for full membership. Romano Prodi, the EU Commission president was hopeful that Romania's application was bound to succeed when he was in Bucharest in January 2000 for talks with the new Romanian premier Mugur Isarescu, the former state bank governor at the head of the same four-party coalition in office since 1996.
Romania's bid to join NATO has failed to generate the momentum of its EU application despite President Clinton declaring on a visit to Bucharest on 11 July 1997, after the Madrid summit, that 'the door to NATO is open, will stay open, and we will help you pass through it'.64 If nothing else, this visit showed that Washington felt it important to provide top-level support to Romania's reformers, perhaps out of a belief that their success could have a stabilizing influence in South-Eastern Europe as a whole.65 But Romanians took most comfort from the official NATO statement issued at the end of the Madrid summit, negotiated between Secretary of State Madeleine Albright and her French counterpart Hubert Vedrine which in diplomatic language mentioned that Romania was at the forefront of countries due to join NATO in a second wave of expansion.66 However, the attention span of the West towards the problems of South-East Europe has always been limited unless unrest threatens the security of the wider European theatre.
Kosovo: A Catalyst?
The 1998-9 Kosovo crisis, culminating in NATO's military campaign against Serbia that began on 24 March 1999 transformed Romania from a Balkan backwater to a 'front-line state'. NATO required
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military facilities from Romania as well as Bulgaria in its drive to force Slobodan Milosevic to give meaningful autonomy to the Albanian majority in Kosovo and to halt ethnic cleansing. The strategic importance of Romania increased as an aerial war got underway and plans for a ground invasion of Kosovo were hastily drawn up. The importance of the South-East European flank to NATO's security, something that most NATO planners had underestimated, seemed vindicated by the Kosovo war.
On 22 April the Romanian parliament approved NATO's demand for an unlimited use of Romanian airspace. On 18 April Romania had denied Russia use of its airspace to fly humanitarian aid to Belgrade. When it came to choosing between religious and historical ties with Serbia and persisting, in dangerous circumstances, with a pro-Western foreign policy that hitherto had enjoyed massive popular backing, the Romanian government quickly concluded that it had no alternative but to align with NATO.
The pro-NATO stance of a previously fractured government was impressive, especially in light of the fact that public opinion, under the influence of a nationalist media, was turning against NATO. The government was encouraged by a string of declarations, such as that of President Clinton on 12 April that the West 'should try to do for Southeastern Europe what we helped to do for western Europe after World War II and for Central Europe after the Cold War'.67
On 10 June 1999 the German foreign minister Joschka Fischer formally launched a stabilization plan for the Balkans that involved the EU being the main source of funds for a project designed to prevent future conflict and integrate the region with the rest of Europe. But Romania was disappointed when Fischer, on a visit to Bucharest on 8 July, said that the Stability Pact should not be understood as a means of granting material and financial rewards for economic losses, its aim being to promote 'economic development opportunities in the region on a long-term basis'.68 German caution contrasted with the declaration of US Secretary of State Madeleine Albright on 10 June that 'Europe has to pay for the reconstruction of the Balkans', the US having assumed much of the military burden.69
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When the fiftieth anniversary NATO summit passed in April 1999 with no progress in Romania's application, President Constantinescu complained that 'an admission date [to NATO] some time before 2002 is an unjust and faraway prospect for our countries which have assumed the same risks as other NATO countries'.70 The liberal president's patience seemed to snap when he declared on 13 July that 'Every day personalities from NATO and the EU come to Bucharest and tell us that during the conflict we behaved like member states of NATO. But nobody offers us security guarantees or speaks about recovering our losses in respect of the embargo [on trade with Yugoslavia] . . . While we are patted on the back and congratulated, our losses mount day by day.'71
Romania was left with two concrete assurances from NATO delivered presumably because of its highly supportive stance in the Kosovo crisis. During the conflict, high-level support for its EU membership bid emanated from Britain and Germany, hitherto unenthusiastic about the prospect of Romanian entry.72 Romania (along with other multiethnic states in the region) was also promised that no change of boundaries was planned in Yugoslavia as part of an eventual peace settlement, a reassurance designed to dampen the claims of nationalists who were arguing that Kosovo offered a precedent which might lead to the detachment of Transylvania from Romania.73
During the Kosovo crisis while Romania found itself courted by Western powers, it also watched as NATO went to elaborate lengths to mollify the Russian authorities in order to obtain at least their reluctant acquiescence for its actions in Kosovo. Despite statements from Blair, Prodi, and Albright identifying Romania with the Western family of nations, fears remained that Western countries might do a deal with Russia which would place a country like Romania in the Russian sphere of influence in return for NATO expansion elsewhere. In 1994, Ion Mircea Pascu, shortly to become deputy defence minister, actually expressed the view that Germany and Russia had reached a secret understanding to that effect in the early 1990s.74 In 1997 Russia was increasingly adamant, through the pronouncements of its then foreign minister, Evgheni Primakov, that 'the extension of NATO has already reached its maximum point and that the interests of European stability require a stop to be imposed in the process'.75 At the same time, Moscow reportedly offered Romania security guarantees and economic incentives in return for abandoning its bid to join NATO.76
More than in most former communist states, the success of the democratic transition in Romania depends on the supportive external environment. Poorly institutionalized parties lacking clear-cut ideologies or governing programmes, authoritarian power-structures, the weakness of civil society, and declining living and health standards, do not offer a propitious domestic environment. Without clearly focused and long-term Western help, the prospects of success for what is an audacious experiment in fostering pluralism in a society ravaged by totalitarianism (after fifty years of relatively democratic rule) are slim. Indeed as the range and scale of Romania's problems became evident after 1996 along with the incapacity of domestic reformers to deal adequately with them, constructive outside engagement began to appear a sine qua non in order to sustain a feeble reform process, particularly in the economic sphere.
It is unclear what will be the long-term fate of a developmental strategy for Romania partly crafted and supervised by the EU, especially if the PDSR (well ahead in the polls since 1999) returns to power in elections due at the end of 2000. Previously, the issue of decriminalizing homosexuality was the one that produced the most frequent interventions from elected officials in the European Parliament and the Council of Europe.77 But the government was unable to persuade its own parliament that liberal European values were superior to conservative ones, as championed by the Orthodox Church, the main opponent of law reform in this area.
Indignation has long been expressed in the Bucharest press that the West has imposed strict conditions on the treatment of a range of minorities while itself continuing to discriminate against Romania as a whole.78 Romania's inclusion in a EU blockade of
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countries for which strict visa requirements need to be met has become a cause célèbre. It makes obtaining a visa to travel to EU states extremely difficult for most Romanians and it was only in early 2000 that the EU signalled its willingness to take Romania off the list of European countries from whom visas are required. Many Romanians contrast the fact that tariff barriers have been lowered (in line with Romania's EU agreement), allowing West European goods to flood the country, thus jeopardizing local agriculture and industry) while Romanian citizens are effectively blockaded from travelling westwards.79
In the EU, fear of unwelcome immigrants from countries like Romania and Bulgaria (with the mobile Roma minority at the top of the list) outweighs concern that nations involuntarily severed from the rest of Europe during the Cold War, still lack easy access to the West. When President Constantinescu raised the issue of visas on a visit to Germany in March 1998, he got an unavailing response from his hosts. Indeed, it appears that to justify their approach, the Bonn authorities leaked to the press the results of an investigation that accused staff in the Romanian embassy of accepting bribes from suspected Romanian criminals in return for granting forged visas.80
There was general goodwill for Romania after it ditched rulers widely seen as neo-communist in 1996. But the degree of attention has been uneven and optimism in the West about its potential for switching to the fast-track of economic and institutional reform was soon dashed by the political turbulence of 1998. Only countries with cultural links to Romania have shown a real interest in its fate. France, and to a lesser degree the other South European states are the main examples.81 Despite being the EU state with the biggest interest in stabilizing the former communist states to its east, Germany, under Chancellor Helmut Kohl, made it clear to Romania that progress with its NATO and EU bids largely depended on its own efforts to speed up reform at home.82 Accordingly, hopes that Germany's ruling Christian Democrats might warm to the
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Romanian cause because Christian Democrats were the majority force in Romania's ruling coalition proved illusory.
The United States lacks the organic links with Romania that large émigré communities provide. Romania may have become a greater priority for Britain as a result of the Kosovo crisis, but it is unclear how long this will last. Russia still regards Romania as its backyard despite no longer sharing a land-frontier with the Danubian state, a cause of real, and perhaps not unjustified, apprehension in Bucharest.
Policy Drift Encourages Nationalism
Lack of progress with foreign policy goals seen as crucial for strengthening democracy has seen the return of a quasi-nationalist discourse even from the pro-Western government. In May 1998, the new prime minister, Radu Vasile proclaimed that the new budget was '100% Romanian', having observed that his predecessor might well have been called 'IMF', given the leverage the latter had enjoyed over economic policy in 1997.83 In June 1998, Vasile seemed to reject the president's thesis that the major threat to Romania came from its internal debility not from external threats when he predicted that foreign intelligence agencies interested in destabilizing Romania were likely to intensify their activities in the period before NATO's April 1999 summit.84 It came as no surprise for some that when ejected from the premiership and expelled from the PNTCD at the end of 1999 Vasile and his supporters looked for a new political home in a small ultranationalist party.
In an increasingly introspective atmosphere, much of the enthusiasm for Romanian-Hungarian détente also evaporated. Elements in both the PNTCD and the PD started to adopt intransigent attitudes towards the Hungarian minority as the need to appeal to a home audience took precedence over adhering to European norms on minority rights. Christian Tudor Popescu, the influential chief editor of Adevarul, was arguing in mid-June 1998 for the need to redefine Romanian politics by abandoning the obsession with Euro-Atlantic integration and concentrating on avoiding economic collapse, so as 'to avoid at any price the disintegration of the unitary Romanian state'.85 An increasingly populist media (private television being to the fore) has influenced both
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public opinion and a political elite where clear-cut ideological differences are not always easy to discern. If a realignment of politics occurs in the wake of the defeat of the PNTCD-led attempt to mount fundamental reforms, the new nationalist discourse could prove appealing, especially if a new governing majority emerges from the left-centre of Romanian politics.
By 1998, disquiet was expressed at senior EU levels that laws designed to offer minority protection and which Romania had been told would be necessary if her applications to join the EU and NATO were to go forward, were unable to command a majority even among the parties which had signed up to a pro-Western prospectus on the defeat of Iliescu in 1996.86 Thus it was no small achievement that the Hungarian UDMR remained inside the coalition as its term approached its end in 2,000, moderates being able to argue that enough progress had been made in securing minority rights to justify staying in.
The emphasis on trans-border cooperation with states from which Romania had previously held aloof receded in importance after a brief flurry of interest in Euro-regionalist concepts during 1997. Romania obstinately preferred to see itself as being 'in the immediate proximity of the Balkan peninsula', rather than a Balkan state per se.87 At the first meeting ever convened of the heads of all South-East European states, held in Crete on 3-4 November 1997, Romania's unwillingness to be involved in a problematic geopolitical region was obvious. Greece's initiative for 'the institutionalisation of a permanent structure of Balkan co-operation' (one backed by Richard Holbrooke, the architect of the United State's proactive policy in the region since 1995) was rejected by Romania.88
A fragmented political elite in Romania sees European integration as necessary for national recovery (and perhaps even survival), but there are deep reservations about renouncing the nationalist complexes that the founders of the European integration project challenged in the 1940s and 1950s. Since 1995 whenever prospects for integration with European institutions has faltered, so has Romanian enthusiasm for a post-nationalist agenda. It is no
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coincidence that Romania seemed to discard its anti-Hungarian complex in the first half of 1997 when it looked like having a real chance of being invited to join NATO at the July Madrid summit. There were cordial top-level bilateral meetings, declaration of a strategic partnership between Romania and Hungary, and laws were drawn up in Bucharest to give the Hungarians some of the cultural and linguistic rights they had long been demanding. But when Romanian expectations were dashed, laws strengthening minority rights failed in parliament despite the government's technical majority and the Hungarian party found itself isolated inside the coalition.89
There is no sign of the culture shift which will allow new forms of governance based on subsidiarity to replace the centralized nation-state on the jacobin model which has not served Romania very effectively in over a century of independence. Decentralization is a key part of the European integration process but legislation allowing sub-state poles of government to enjoy autonomy from the centre has been slow to emerge. Nationalist mentalities based on rigid defence of sovereignty and suspicion of neighbouring states have considerable staying-power in Romania. Even though there is abundant evidence that decentralization has been a key to the political stability and economic success of former dictatorships like Germany and Spain, these role models are unlikely to prove persuasive for much of the politico-administrative elite in Romania.
Conclusion
Romania has benefited far less from external efforts to promote democracy than most other ex-Warsaw Pact states. Measures such as US President George Bush's decision to annul Poland's large debt to the USA have not been taken in Romania's case. Instead the country's economy was further weakened by Western insistence that Bucharest comply with tough sanctions against former close trading partners Iraq and Yugoslavia in the early 1990s.
A more favourable attitude started to be shown towards Romania by the West following the 1996 presidential victory of Emil Constantinescu. He is unambiguously committed to Euro-Atlantic integration and broad adherence to the same goal has been shown by the unwieldy four-party coalition that provided three governments in the 1996-2000 period.
But it was only in the aftermath of the 1999 Kosovo conflict that the EU Commission and key state players in the EU and NATO showed a willingness to provide concentrated assistance to Romania which is required if it is to begin to bridge the gap between it and more favoured EE aspirants for EU entry. The EU commission's offer of a partnership with the government to jointly shape and implement an economic and administrative reform strategy, Commissioner Prodi's keenness to advance Romania's EU application, the large amount of PHARE aid donated to Romania in 2000, and the EU's stated intention to devote more time and energy to second-stream candidates like Romania than frontrunners offers a striking contrast with previous Western attitudes.
But it remains to be seen how concentrated Western attention will prove to be, especially if the PDSR returns to office in forthcoming elections. EU Enlargement commissioner Verheugen warned in February 2000 that Romania would face the isolation being visited upon Austria's new right-wing coalition, if populists and nationalists entered government at the end of the year.
It is clear that Brussels now recognizes that the obstacles in the way of Romania shedding its politically authoritarian and economically collectivist past are of such a magnitude that a special approach is required towards it from the gatekeepers of Euro-Atlantic integration. An approach involving active external engagement on the ground in rebuilding public institutions and a competitive economy is being pursued in a country where a large part of the power structure is still attached to authoritarian and collectivist values in politics and economics.
Anti-reformers who might, for convenience, be described as 'nomenklatura nationalists' are stronger in Romania than in most other post-communist states. They demonstrated their ascendancy by blocking economic reform between 1989 and 1996. But their advance has been contained by the fact that the main proponent of authoritarian politics in the region remains Russia. Russia appears keen to involve Romania in a series of economic agreements that would make the Romanian economy depend on its cheap energy supplies in return for political compliance. This would suit the powerful lobby of managers in the state-led Romanian energy sector who are hostile to genuine reform. But for most Romanians Russia remains 'a pole of repulsion' owing to long-term Russian bids to stifle Romanian independence. So it is difficult for Romanian interests hostile to the Western democratic project to take measures which are seen as analogous to ones being promoted by 'red-brown' forces in Russia itself. (Similarly, the surprising weakness of
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Russian-influenced organized crime in Romania can probably be ascribed to the fact that even for local criminal forces Russia remains an anti-model).
Pro-Western Romanians were relieved when the Russian elections at the end of 1999 resulted in a comprehensive defeat for the communists. But it remains to be seen if Vladimir Putin's nationalist bloc will prove to be less hostile to Romania's path of Euro-Atlantic integration than an unambiguously left-wing administration in Moscow.
Divided and demoralised reformers accepted the active assistance of multilateral organizations in order to draw up a strategy for economic recovery meant to prepare Romania for EU entry after 2007. But drawing closer to the West was unable to save them from electoral rejection at home. By 2000, most of the population, around 40% of which was facing absolute poverty, was no longer prepared to accept further economic misery in return for progress on foreign policy goals which previously had enjoyed overwhelming support. Stemming unemployment and poverty and dealing harshly with the corruption that was widely perceived to have got out of control took precedence over staying on good terms with NATO, the IMF or the EU. A nervous President Constantinescu abandoned a second-term bid rather than face the wrath of voters on the campaign trail. The PDSR obtained a near majority of seats in the 26 November election but it was the beneficiary of a negative vote rather than the repository of hopes that it would do better than the outgoing coalition. Far more unsettling was the remarkable success of the anti-western Greater Romania Party which reconciled the extremes of left and right. It mopped up many of the votes of the collapsed centre as well as the young, acquiring 25% of seats in parliament compared to a handful in 1996. Its fiercely anti-minority leader C.V. Tudor, formerly Ceauşescu's court poet, became the prime beneficiary of the rift between the main parties and society at large where the chief political players are often viewed as a separate caste ready to promote their group interests at the expense of most ordinary Romanians. The PRM is a haven for former and serving members of the security forces and has influential supporters in a string of government ministries. Unless the other parties behave in a more public-spirited way than they have done since 1989, nationalist mentalities will acquire an even stronger grip on the electorate than before, opening up the possibility of political isolation and renewed authoritarianism in Romania.
Tom Gallagher
Communist rule ended violently and abruptly in Romania in 1989, but in the 1990s a protracted and incomplete transition from that social system has occurred. Romania thus stands apart from Central European states with whom it prefers to be grouped and even with several in South-East Europe (SEE) or the Balkans, the geographical category into which international observers and many ordinary Romanian citizens feel Romania best fits.
1 Until the 1996 election victory of centre-right reformers, Romania experienced a transition from communist rule controlled by second-ranking members of the old regime; until the mid-1990s, when at last it appeared possible that they could be peacefully substituted in office, they were widely seen as reluctant democrats wedded to illiberal practices, with a near-monopolistic approach to political power.
The situation appeared recognizable to scholars familiar with Romania's long-term political evolution. In the past imported ideologies have been modified and drained of their reformist content to suit local elite requirements.2 This has led to huge discrepancies between constitutional forms and actual practices. Since Romanian independence in 1881, rhetoric about reform has often been a screen enabling a narrow oligarchy, whether aristocratic, mercantile, communist, or post-communist to pursue self-serving policies
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that produce a dangerous gulf between state and society. A legacy of foreign occupation stretching over centuries, and sharp internal cleavages—economic, cultural, and above all ethnic—retarded the progress of democratization.
From 1881 to 1938 Romania enjoyed over fifty years of stable constitutional rule which distinguished it from all other states in SEE, but institutions and civic culture were not democratic (nor are they today according to one of Romania's foremost political scientists).3 The inability of a poorly institutionalized state to integrate new territories with large minority populations acquired after 1918 led to the collapse of democracy twenty years later. For the next sixty years indigenous forms of development were pursued in turn by right-wing populists and national communists, following an interlude of communist rule shaped by internationalist (i.e. pro-Soviet) norms.
The self-image of Romania as 'a Latin country which has always believed itself to be an extension of the west towards the East', helps to explain why it has often differentiated itself from its neighbours.4 It may share the Orthodox religion with its Slav neighbours, but it stays aloof from most of them, especially Russia, which is seen as a long-term foe of Romanian independence. Along with Hungary, Romania is the only non-Slavic nation-state in the Danubian basin, but cooperation has been thwarted by the debilitating quarrel over Transylvania, part of Romania since 1918, but mainly Hungarian-ruled for hundreds of years before that. Even with its long-standing Romanian majority, this province has undeniable Central European characteristics. Thus Romania finds itself crossed by important cultural fault-lines. The pre-1918 state shaped by Byzantine culture and proximity to Ottoman power coexists with relatively new territories where the Romanian majority has been exposed to German influence and where minorities enjoyed influence greater than their numbers. The great powers exploited such internal cleavages and Romania suffered devastating invasions in both world wars (never recovering Bessarabia and North Bukovina seized by the Soviet Union in 1940). It is hardly surprising that recently acquired independence and dire threats to territorial integrity have allowed nationalism to occupy a salient role in political culture. Nor is it any more surprising that, often
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against a background of misrule, rulers have consistently sought legitimacy from citizens by invoking nationalism and portraying themselves as executors of 'the national mission'.
In this chapter I argue that the process of building democracy in Romania is dependent on a favourable external environment and active backing from abroad. The communist regime's determination to retain absolute control over politics and society and oppose any liberal initiatives in economics blocked off the possibility of a democratic transition largely resourced and driven from within. However, at least until 1999 Western interest in Romania and concern for the success of its democratic experiment has been weak, with most involvement coming from NGOs and international economic bodies whose influence over Western policy towards Romania is relatively limited. The difficulties in the way of Romania consolidating a fragile democracy by pursuing a strategy dependent on successful integration with Western economic and security organizations are spelt out. Instead, the case is made for a new approach to democracy-building from domestic reformers and international organizations that recognizes Romania's special problems, one that is not based around unrealistic targets which the country is unable to meet for the foreseeable future.
Fluctuating International Influence
Romania today is the second largest of the former Soviet satellites in Eastern Europe (EE) and there has been intermittent interaction with the West (even though the importation of Western political values is of debatable significance). Independence was acquired through the skill of Romanian politicians in dealing with the Western powers, ensuring that Ottoman overlordship was not substituted by Russian control. After 1960, the West enjoyed a wider range of diplomatic and commercial contacts with Romania than with any other Warsaw Pact state, despite the unyielding character of a Marxist-Leninist regime soon to be infused with 1930s-style ultranationalism. The bid by Nicolae Ceauşescu, general secretary of the Romanian Communist Party (PCR) from 1965 to 1989, to acquire autonomy from the Soviet Union made him seem a weak link in Soviet power and thus a leader apparently worth cultivating.5 Prestigious state visits from General De Gaulle and US President Nixon occurred in 1968 and 1969. In 1972 Romania was invited to join both the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund (IMF). It obtained preferential trading status from the European Union (EU) in 1973 and was awarded Most Favoured Nation trading status in 1974, the only EE state enjoying such a distinction.6 Moreover, in 1967 Romania was the first communist state to recognize the Federal Republic of Germany.7
The West indirectly contributed to the chain of events that led to the violent collapse of the Ceauşescu regime in 1989. While it preferred to overlook systematic human rights abuses until the last years of the dictatorship, it made available massive loans to Ceauşescu that were used to finance ill-conceived industrialization schemes that resulted in massive policy failures. At considerable cost to his people, Ceauşescu set out to repay these loans by 1990, but in December 1989 popular protests and a rebellion by second-ranking communists brought about his downfall.
Numerous conspiracy theories seek to explain the sequence of events leading to the overthrow and execution by his underlings of a previously unchallenged communist dictator. One that has enjoyed unusual staying-power despite the absence of corroborating evidence is that Presidents Bush and Gorbachev at their Malta summit in November 1989 worked out the details of Ceauşescu's removal and his substitution by communist reformers who would not disturb the balance of power in the area.8 In 1990 one of the most common chants of protestors angry at Western inaction as the political vacuum was filled by men with roots in the communist regime was 'Malta Yalta', indicating their belief that the democracies were ready to abandon Romania to Russian captivity for a second time.9
But, however unpalatable, Western passivity as coup leaders led by Ion Iliescu moved quickly to confirm their authority by holding
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elections in May 1990 before their competitors had the chance to organize themselves, probably has a more mundane explanation. No Western country saw Romania as being in its zone of influence. Neither Germany nor France had obvious economic or strategic interests there. Unlike Poland or Hungary, Romania lacked a large and vocal émigré community in the USA able to persuade politicians to adopt a vigilant approach to events in their former homeland.
Initially, there was relief in western capitals that Iliescu was able to co-opt the party and state bureaucracy which recognized that this paternalistic ex-communist was in a good position to safeguard their interests in troubled times. Anxiety built up, however, following Romanian-Hungarian clashes in the city of Tirgu Mures in March 1990 in which official complicity, at least at lower levels, seemed apparent.10 Analysts were already advising Western policy makers that the politics of ethnicity had the potential to sabotage the transition to open politics being attempted in EE.11 Anxiety gave way to displeasure when the state used violence against its political opponents. In May 1990 the US ambassador was recalled to Washington for consultations regarding violence and intimidation in the election campaign.12 In June when the government used vigilante workers to beat up opposition protestors in the capital, there was widespread outrage. The EU froze agreements with Romania and the US government condemned 'in the strongest possible terms, the Romanian government's brutal suppression . . . of legitimate forms of dissent and public protest'.13
But the West was disinclined to take punitive action against ex-communists seemingly turning Romania into a façade democracy. As events in Yugoslavia would demonstrate only too clearly, policy makers are reluctant to act as organizers, leaders, or peacemakers in a region where there are serious doubts about the potentialities of local elites and their populations to aspire to good government and modern forms of political conduct. Besides, the undeniable winner in May 1990 was Iliescu and his National Salvation Front (FSN).
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The Front's denial of state assets to a fragmented opposition made its victory a runaway one. But Iliescu was genuinely popular on account of relaxing the savage austerity of the Ceauşescu era and collectivized villagers, elderly citizens, and heavy industrial workers, all with reason to feel insecure about the future, found noisy electoral competition unsettling and were more comfortable with socialist paternalism.14
Little noticed as Western governments averted their gaze from Romania was the voluntary help provided by thousands of ordinary citizens and trained professional people from across Western Europe who were moved by the television footage from Romania at the end of 1989 to seek to help rebuild that shattered society. Such efforts reveal the existence of an international civil society capable of surmounting political and geographical barriers often more effectively than powerful and well-financed governmental and multilateral organizations.15 Private assistance meant to offer relief from the multiple hardships millions of Romanians were facing was soon followed by attempts to promote democracy and free institutions from private foundations, not least the Open Society Foundation, which was the brainchild of millionaire George Soros. These non-governmental initiatives are often ignored when drawing up a balance-sheet of external intervention in post-communist states, but there is no shortage of evidence to suggest that in Romania they may have been crucial in sustaining democratic values in the first half of the 1990s.16
NGOs played an active role in promoting free media, in monitoring local elections and then presidential and parliamentary elections in 1992, and in encouraging the government to show greater respect for human rights. The Iliescu regime was susceptible to international pressure in these areas. It felt it could give ground without undermining the basis of its rule. Indeed external monitoring of elections did not prevent widespread allegations of vote-rigging from domestic sources in the national polls of 1992.17 As will be seen, it was far less happy about accepting advice from Western
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creditors concerning how to introduce market mechanisms into a state-led economy. Nor did the electoral arithmetic after 1992 when it was dependent on ultranationalist parties for its parliamentary majority allow it to respond positively to requests from the Council of Europe, the European Parliament, and the OSCE that it provide better safeguards for its ethnic minorities. Nor until Romania formally applied to join the EU in 1995 and NATO in 1996 was there external scrutiny of key state institutions and laws and the degree to which they were compatible with the standards required by these organizations. In the early 1990s the ruling FSN had been able to draw up a new Constitution and restructure on its own terms, or leave relatively unaltered, institutions such as the judiciary, the intelligence services, and the armed forces.18
Following the outbreak of warfare in ex-Yugoslavia, Romania began to be seen, rather unexpectedly, as an island of stability in the Balkan maelstrom. The restoration of Most Favoured Nation trading status by the US Congress in October 1992 was followed by the signing on 17 November of an association agreement with the EU, the first major diplomatic successes obtained by Romania since 1990. Statements by US officials in 1993-4 that the presence of extreme nationalists in the government was a Romanian affair seemed to confirm that Iliescu could pursue an idiosyncratic approach to democracy building without incurring severe penalties.19 Of particular satisfaction was Romania's admission to the Council of Europe in October 1993. Membership was then seen as a gateway to wider European integration and Romania could claim that its human rights record was beyond serious reproach now that it could gain entry to such a prestigious body. But, soon afterwards, by admitting Croatia and Russia despite appalling human rights records, membership of the Council of Europe began to lose its lustre and ratings Romania received from human rights monitors such as Freedom House and the US government's Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor would place it near the bottom of the European league until well into the 1990s.
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When, in 1995, the minimalist Western approach to the Bosnian conflict was replaced by NATO-led military intervention, the repercussions were not long being felt in Romania. Following the Dayton peace accord of November 1995, there was growing interest in the stability of the former communist states bordering ex-Yugoslavia, especially among US officials. The need to isolate nationalist hard-liners in Bosnia and promote moderate forces capable of arranging compromises across the various ethnic divides, was at the centre of the strategy identified with Richard Holbrooke, a former US assistant secretary of state. The architect of the Dayton accord realized that the success or failure of the initiative depended, in part, on efforts to delegitimize conflictual nationalism in SEE.20 It is probably no coincidence that the criticism made by US Ambassador Alfred Moses on 22 February 1996 about the presence of ultranationalists in the Romanian government came not long after a visit to Bucharest by Holbrooke to discuss with Romanian officials the aims behind his Bosnia peace plan.21
With NATO prepared to include the former communist states of SEE inside a common European security umbrella provided they met a daunting range of civil and military conditions, far more attention began to be paid to the Romanian situation. US pressure contributed to a breakthrough in Romanian-Hungarian state relations in 1996 and the signing of a bilateral treaty between the two states on 14 September.22 Iliescu was unable to exploit the treaty for electoral advantage. The tone of the messages of congratulation from Western leaders was noticeably cooler than the ones sent to Bucharest in 1997 as Romanian-Hungarian relations dramatically improved under a very different administration and it was not without significance that in October 1995 France had awarded the Legion d'Honneur to Corneliu Copusu, a veteran survivor of communist prisons who had stitched together an opposition electoral alliance which would shortly challenge Iliescu's hold on power.
In the November 1996 presidential and parliamentary elections, voters opted for a new president and for parties that were felt to have more credibility in Western capitals. The industrial workers who had kept Iliescu in power since 1990 rejected him because his poorly institutionalized regime with a daunting record of incompetence was seen as jeopardizing their interests.23 With 95 per cent of Romanians endorsing NATO entry, foreign policy issues played a not insignificant role in securing what amounted to a peaceful change of regime.24 The choices Iliescu had been forced to make about the degree to which he was serious about integrating with the West undermined the cohesion of his regime and may have signalled to Romanians who took an interest in foreign affairs that the new times required new and untarnished people at the helm.
Thus despite Romanian events being a low priority for the West, external forces at different moments have played an influential role in strengthening weak democratic institutions and preventing a slide into post-communist autocracy. The strongly authoritarian instincts of the 1990-6 Iliescu regime were checked by the willingness of multilateral bodies like the EU and NATO to link financial and diplomatic backing with active respect for human and minority rights. Arguably, the victory of opposition reformers in the 1996 elections was enhanced by signs that the West was at last prepared to offer security guarantees to South-East Europe and envisage integrating countries making progress with democratization and economic reforms into pan-European institutions (though at a slower pace than Central European states).
Romanian Responses to the Outside World 1990-1996
Romania's perception of international events also influenced the progress of democratization after 1989. For a while, in 1990 the ruling FSN's attention was directed inwards as it sought to consolidate its authority in a society badly traumatized by an iron-fisted dictatorship and the violent nature of its demise. Little thought seems to have been given to how the West was likely to view the human rights abuses that occurred as the new regime took shape. The appointment as ambassadors to major Western capitals of Moscow-trained holdover from the communist era or else low-grade backers of the FSN, suggests that foreign relations were accorded
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a low priority.25 Emil Constantinescu, the liberal academic who became head of state in 1996, vividly described the form of post-communism emerging in Romania and how inimical it was to core Western values:
We are not talking about classic communism . . . but rather of a form that is both old since it awakens latent nationalism and new because of its goal, which is to preserve all that can be preserved, both in men and structures, of the old regime: as many as possible of the large enterprises, as many monopolies as possible, especially in the areas of energy and agriculture, as many of the political and economic leaders as possible, and as much as possible of an isolationist and anti-Western mythology, ready to halt all openings towards Europe and the rest of the world.26
Perhaps Iliescu hoped that, as in the communist era, cosmetic changes would be sufficient to allow Western financial and diplomatic support to buttress his rule. In April 1991, when France's President Mitterand became the first Western leader to pay Iliescu an official visit, it suggested that such a devious strategy might indeed be worth pursuing. Evidence that Iliescu was still far from certain about whether to align with the West even in an opportunistic way was provided in the same month when Romania became the only former Moscow satellite to sign a comprehensive treaty with the Soviet Union. The April 1991 treaty of friendship gave Moscow an effective right of veto over any Romanian alliance with a Western country. If it had not been abrogated by the collapse of the Soviet Union six months later, it might have placed Romania more firmly in the Soviet sphere of influence than it had been before 1989; and thereafter, senior officials remained anxious to appease Russian sensibilities. In July 1993, General Dumitru Cioflina, the chief of the army, stated that Romania was not going to enjoy closer relations with NATO than the ones it already had with Russia.27 While on a visit to Moscow in July 1995, Prime Minister Nicolae Vacaroiu declared that he was ready to realign the Romanian economy with Russia's because Western economic support had been so disappointing.28
Iliescu may have had reasons to keep relations with Moscow in good repair (such as access to cheap energy supplies) but isolation,
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or alignment with an internally exhausted Russia, were not realistic objectives for post-communist Romania.29 Besides, it is clear Iliescu hoped that Romania could benefit from Western economic and diplomatic support while being able to shape its own internal approach to democracy. Admission to European institutions, generous aid, official visits, and cordial interstate relations gradually became key goals. If accomplished, they could increase political stability and undermine opposition charges that Romania remained a pariah state under Ceauşescu's successors.
The first indication that Iliescu was not going to challenge Western interests as Slobodan Milosevic, the post-communist leader of Serbia was doing in 1991-3, came in the second half of 1990 during the Gulf Crisis. Romania held the presidency of the UN Security Council when Saddam Hussein invaded Kuwait and the necessity of her backing for the US-led action against Iraq was more important than it would normally have been.30 It was extended willingly by Iliescu even though Romania lost up to $3 billion because of the embargo imposed on what had been one her most important trading partners.31
The UN embargo imposed on rump Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) in 1992 was even more damaging to the Romanian economy, leading to estimated losses of $7 billion as a result of the disruption of trade.32 An admission in 1998 by Virgil Magureanu, the former head of the Romanian intelligence service that Romania had not wholly abided by the sanctions confirmed what a number of Western analysts had long suspected.33 The decision to allow large supplies of oil to be shipped to Serbia came from President Iliescu himself, according to his top aide.34 It was also to Serbia that Iliescu made his first official visit abroad in 1990 and Miloševih was
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received in Bucharest in 1994 with all due ceremony when he was still widely seen as an international pariah.35
Attitudes to Moscow and Belgrade at specific moments showed how real was the temptation for some neo-communist backsliding. The Vacaroiu government's willingness to take Western credits but spend them for political purposes that were inimical to reform (resulting in the suspension of the IMF's agreement with Romania in late 1995) was probably the most daring example of bogus change. But Iliescu and his entourage lacked the vision and the energy to follow the maverick path and look for yet another indigenous solution to Romania's daunting handicaps in the economic sphere. They were essentially mediocre politicians looking for some sort of modus vivendi with the West in the hope they could still enjoy the autonomy to pursue a semi-authoritarian course in Romania.36 This option became unrealistic as soon as Romania began to look seriously at integration into Euro-Atlantic security structures.
In January 1994, when NATO announced a cooperation programme with prospective new members called the Partnership for Peace, Romania was actually the first former Soviet bloc state to join. A process of reforming the Romanian military and bringing it closer to the model of armies in long-established democracies was established. Greater civilian control was asserted, several hundred hard-line nationalist officers were retired in 1995, and professional competence was given a higher priority than in other branches of the state. By early 1996 invitations had been extended to former Warsaw Pact states to join NATO and Romania applied in April of that year. The leading states in NATO seem to have concluded that SEE could not be left in a security vacuum after the war in the former Yugoslavia.
NATO made it clear that a candidate nation's chances of joining the Western military alliance depended on its performance in democratizing its society, reforming its economy, settling differences with adjacent states, and restructuring its military, in accordance with Western democratic standards. Romania's credentials for NATO membership were weaker than those of most other applicants. The country's political system, though pluralist, was displaying growing oligarchic tendencies. The transition from communism was proving painful and slow in the economic realm. Above all,
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the failure of bilateral treaty negotiations with Hungary and the Ukraine, and the delay in normalizing relations with Moldova, suggested to many NATO planners that Romania might be a consumer of security rather than a provider of it. Reviewing Iliescu's record, one local analyst concluded that 'the outcome of the disjunction between declaration and behaviour was the marginalization of Romania [and] the grave weakening of its international political position'.37
But Romania's gradual entry into a liberal international system limited his room to manœuvre. The external monitoring of human rights and governmental practices which he allowed meant the façade democracy that perhaps he would have been most comfortable with slowly gave way to a competitive system with enough genuine elements to secure his peaceful removal from office.
Dimensions of the Post-1996 Reform Push
In the euphoria of the moment, the unexpected transfer of power to the opposition alliance known as the Romanian Democratic Convention (CDR) following elections in November 1996 was hailed as a relaunch of the revolution stalled since 1990. But it was a repudiation of the incompetent Iliescu regime rather than a positive endorsement for the opposition. No blueprint for economic reform had been worked out in advance by the Christian Democrat and National Peasant Party (PNTCD), the dominant force in the victorious alliance and the only major party of pre-war vintage in the region to be restored to government in the 1990s. To form a viable government, the PNTCD swallowed its reservations and formed a coalition with the Democratic Party (PD) which had broken away from the Iliescu camp in 1992. It was a marriage of convenience between an ill-matched couple, inveterate anti-communists and reform-minded junior ex-communists. For such a coalition to honour its promise to relaunch a moribund economy and halt tumbling living standards, a culture of compromise would need to replace the partisanship which had disfigured Romanian politics since 1989.
In 1995 a rare degree of consensus had been exhibited by all the major parties when unanimous backing was given in parliament for Romania's application for EU entry. So popular was the desire to 'return to Europe' among the Romanian public that similar
endorsement was given to Romania's NATO bid even from extreme nationalist parties. Under President Constantinescu, a post-nationalist agenda of fence-mending with neighbours and reconciliation with minorities was emphasized. The new head of state argued that the chief threats to Romanian security were internal in origin rather than external, which was a fresh departure in Romanian politics.38 He emphasized the moral danger and subversion of democratic values posed by corruption, the danger of the penetration of criminal organizations into the very heart of government; and the need to switch from a parasitic and exploitative capitalism to a growth-generating one which did not forget its responsibility for contributing to the public good.39 In 1997 corrupt officials were removed from different branches of the state. But lack of enthusiasm for the anti-corruption drive from the courts and the prosecution service soon blunted its effectiveness. A cigarette smuggling scandal involving senior members of the president's military entourage in 1998 showed how hard it was for the president to rely on trusted personnel who shared his aim of creating a law-based state where there was equality for all before the courts.40
The president has important mediating powers rather than executive ones, so the brunt of the reform challenge was faced by the government headed by Victor Ciorbea. This upright and economically literate premier soon discovered how great was the shortage of loyal and competent officials willing to launch a shock therapy programme under which Romania implemented reforms that Central European states had dragged out over 7-8 years. An unholy alliance of anti-reform bureaucrats and managers of loss-making state firms was hard to dislodge even in the absence of its former political patrons. But popular enthusiasm about the ability of the state to protect the common good gave the Ciorbea government the breathing-space to challenge the sacred cow that the state must rule in the name of the ethnic majority alone. Ministers from the UDMR, the Hungarian minority party, were appointed to the new government, even though they were not essential for its survival. Proposed changes to the law gave Hungarians the right to be schooled in their own mother tongue at all levels of education, as well as the right to use their language in courts of law and the local administration. A cautious entente
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with Hungary blossomed and what leaders from both states described as a strategic regional partnership began to emerge. Measures to strengthen bilateral economic and military cooperation were agreed in top-level visits.41 Ciorbea openly stated in 1997 that he wished Romania to benefit from Hungarian investment and its greater experience of market economics so as to help relaunch the Romanian economy.42 The previous government had portrayed such investment as tantamount to the recolonization of the country.
The new post-nationalist agenda of interethnic and interstate cooperation rightly earned Romania numerous plaudits from world leaders as its relations with Hungary moved from being a subject of occasional international concern to a positive example for resolving a thorny ethnic problem. Notice was also taken of the breakthrough in relations with the Ukraine that includes territory lost by Romania to the Soviet Union in 1940. A bilateral treaty on 2 June 1997 recognized that the borders between the two states were 'inviolable' and paved the way for practical measures of regional cooperation that will determine whether treaties with formerly suspicious neighbours are empty formulae or else augur a new era of partnership.43 Progress in regularizing ties with Russia was much slower. No longer did Russia share a land frontier with Romania, but Russia was helping to shore up the self-styled breakaway Republic of Transnistria on the right bank of the river Dniester which, with the support of the Russian 14th Army, had refused to become part of the new state of Moldova that had declared independence from Moscow in 1991. With Moldova negotiations were long in train for a bilateral treaty. Bucharest wished for a document that 'contains nuances demonstrating the special nature of relations between the two states', their historic affinities based on common language and the fact that historically the territory comprising the state of Moldova is viewed by most Romanians as part of their traditional homeland, while the Chisinau authorities preferred the classic form of treaty between two sovereign states.44 The signing of a bilateral treaty with Russia, scheduled for 27 April 1996, was postponed at the last minute by the Iliescu government owing to a storm of protest raised by the then
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opposition at the fact that condemnation of the 1939 Molotov-Ribbentrop pact (paving the way for the Soviet annexation of the Romanian province of Bessarabia in 1940) was not in the main treaty, but placed in a separate annexe.45
Romania's image as a stabilizing force in a disorderly Balkan neighbourhood won it high-level support in NATO, especially from Latin members with France in the vanguard. But it was not enough to overcome scepticism about Romania's abilities to cure its economic ills and not be a financial drain on the organization. Lingering doubts also remained that Romania would be a consumer rather than a provider of security. The rebuff delivered after the NATO summit in Madrid on 12 July 1997 had no adverse effects on public opinion and did not generate the nationalist backlash feared in some quarters. An opinion poll in late May showed that 29 per cent of voters blamed Iliescu's PDSR for any failure of Romania's NATO bid compared with 16 per cent holding the Ciorbea government responsible.46 There was little noticeable public anger that Hungary had been selected and Romania spurned. Nor had there been a public outcry over the government's liberal minority policy, because it was widely seen as helping to end Romania's international isolation. The Romanian electorate showed patience and even maturity though it was hard not to disguise the fact that the government was using a foreign policy goal symbolizing 'the return to Europe' to extract more moral sacrifices from a hard-pressed population.47
But the government parties were unable to promote a culture of cooperation that would enable the coalition to survive in difficult times. Disputes over patronage between the PNTCD and the PD meant that reform plans hastily worked out in the winter of 1996-7 were never really implemented. Government came to a standstill in the first quarter of 1998 as the PD refused to support the budget
end p.398
or other important bills until the PNTCD replaced Ciorbea with a more acceptable premier. Infighting among the ruling centre parties at a time of mass social hardship benefited the ugly nationalist fringe of Romanian politics whose poll ratings rose in 1997-8.
The widespread verdict of the sixteen-month Ciorbea government was that it had been in office but not in power. The power of the managers of state firms remained as strong as ever as did the capacity of these loss-making operations to swallow up huge amounts of public funds. While price controls had been lifted in 1997 and the currency freed, there had been minimal progress in restructuring the unproductive state-led economy. The failure of the Ciorbea government to match rhetoric with action had a demoralizing effect at home and eroded foreign confidence in the ability of Romania to throw aside a totalitarian legacy and catch up with its neighbours.
International Perspectives on Romanian Reform 1996-2000
South-East Europe was already a growing security concern for the West thanks to the Bosnia crisis when the dramatic results of the 1996 Romanian election occurred. The outcome suggested that there were parts of the Balkans where democracy could sink native roots in unpromising conditions. In a few months Romania went from being 'a no hope' outsider for NATO entry to being a serious contender. However irresolute he might sometimes have been in domestic politics, President Constantinescu soon acquired the reputation of being one of the most eloquent champions of reform to have emerged in EE since 1989. By contrast with his predecessor who had received few invitations to prestigious Western states, Constantinescu was soon enjoying a high profile in the West. There was no shortage of commentators ready to pronounce that Romanian political life was beginning to outgrow the Balkan stereotypes dominated by images of partisanship, collectivist values, and nationalism. On several occasions in 1997, US president Clinton expressed his admiration for the Romanian-Hungarian entente, claiming that it was a model for resolving intractable interethnic disputes.48
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Public statements emanating from NATO in 1996-7 indicated that it was efforts to bring the Romanian military into line with the armed forces capability of member states that most impressed NATO planners. In promoting its case for first-wave entry, Bucharest described the Romanian military as a stabilizing force both internally and in the regional context. There was no praetorian tradition in Romania, the armed forces had not been integrated into the Warsaw Pact (although Romania was a member), and 80 per cent of military equipment was produced at home.49 The Foreign Ministry's White Book on Romania and NATO emphasized that:
Defence policy is made by civilian authorities. The military do not decide what are the national security risks, nor do they make the decisions on the ways and means to counteract them. Under the current legislation, the Armed Forces cannot impose their point of view with regard to any particular problem of interest to the society as a whole.50
In 1998 the military's image was tarnished owing to the involvement of senior elements in corruption and to the determination of top commanders to secure an amnesty for officers who had given the orders to fire on unarmed civilians in December 1989.51 These events suggested that there was still a long way to go before the malign influence of the Ceauşescu era could be eradicated from the armed forces. But of greater concern to the West was the existence of no less than nine intelligence services that at different times have enjoyed considerable freedom of action from their nominal political masters.52 Iliescu had created parallel structures in this sphere as in the domain of law enforcement in order to prevent his authority being challenged.53 The existence of state bodies with near identical functions that often sought to neutralize each other's effectiveness impeded the efforts of reformers to dismantle the communist legacy in many areas of state activity.54 At least the Romanian Information Service (SRI), the chief domestic intelligence service and successor to the Securitate (in some eyes the chief power in the land before Ceauşescu's overthrow) had undergone a process of reform.55 But the SRI's capacity to distort or even derail the democratization process was still regarded as considerable. In January 1999, following the narrow failure of an uprising by miners from the Jiu Valley protesting against IMF-backed plans to trim their industry, a rueful president admitted that he had learnt far more about what was happening from the media than from the intelligence services.56
Virgil Magureanu, who remained in charge of the SRI until April 1997, was one of the chief architects of the 1990-6 Iliescu regime and had been heavily implicated in the coup that toppled Ceauşescu.57 His resignation as head of SRI in that month was widely seen as an attempt to assuage fears in the Western intelligence community about including as a NATO member a state where the security services had, until recently, played an omnipotent role in national affairs.58
Overlapping authority, poor management, and inability to define priorities were aspects of the Romanian administrative culture that left negative impressions on external officials vetting Romanian credentials for Euro-Atlantic integration.59 The gap between the government announcing a decision and its actual implementation is greater in Romania than in many other countries. Western creditors, represented by the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank, grew increasingly exasperated during the death agonies of the Ciorbea government about the incapacity of the ruling parties to renounce politicking in order to pass a budget, never mind tackle structural reform. In May 1998 the World Bank suspended an accord designed to achieve the latter aim. Shortly beforehand, its Bucharest representative, Francois Ettori had warned that the marathon crisis had 'opened up a widening gap
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between Romania and other countries of Eastern Europe . . . Also threatened were Romania's chances of entering the European Union along with other countries.'60
In July 1997 the European Commission had recommended that Romania, along with five other states, be left out of the accession process getting underway at the end of the year because they appeared to be far from meeting the criteria from EU entry, something Premier Ciorbea admitted himself.61 The economic gap not only between Romania and EU states but between Romania and successful EU aspirants from Eastern Europe such as Poland and Hungary was immense. The volume of foreign investment per head of population in Romania between 1989 and 1996 and the volume of exports per head from Romania in 1996 were both lower than for all other former communist states in Eastern Europe.62 But in December 1997 the gloom was lifted somewhat at the Luxembourg summit of EU heads of government, when it was decided to extend simultaneous invitations to all eleven aspirant members, but to proceed at a slow pace with countries like Romania which clearly fell far short of entry requirements. Further encouragement for Romania was offered in March 1998 when the EU decided that the pre-accession states least prepared for entry would receive a disproportionately large share of funds from the EU so as to catch up with the fast-track candidates.63 In the year 2000 Romania was due to receive 650 million Euro to help it meet EU standards on a wide range of indicators.
In October 1999 Gunter Verheugen, the EU Commissioner for Enlargement, obtained the agreement of the Romanian government (headed by Radu Vasile since April 1998) that the EU would play an active role in supervising the formulation and implementation of the country's medium-term economic strategy between 2000 and 2004. Inevitably, Romanian sovereignty is infringed under such an arrangement. But the government had come to recognize that its failure to reach key policy targets vital in order to keep alive its EU integration hopes (not least the restructuring of loss-making state industries) stemmed from the post-communist state's limited administrative capacity.
In December 1999 EU pressure resulted in the passage of a law meant to depoliticize the top bands of the civil service, improve
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coordination between ministries, and regularize appointment procedures. Instilling a public service ethos in a bureaucracy with Romania's legacy of misrule will not happen overnight, but such a law may encourage competent and motivated officials to stay in the public service rather than move to the better-paid private sector.
At the Helsinki summit in the same month, the EU formally invited Romania to take part in talks for full membership. Romano Prodi, the EU Commission president was hopeful that Romania's application was bound to succeed when he was in Bucharest in January 2000 for talks with the new Romanian premier Mugur Isarescu, the former state bank governor at the head of the same four-party coalition in office since 1996.
Romania's bid to join NATO has failed to generate the momentum of its EU application despite President Clinton declaring on a visit to Bucharest on 11 July 1997, after the Madrid summit, that 'the door to NATO is open, will stay open, and we will help you pass through it'.64 If nothing else, this visit showed that Washington felt it important to provide top-level support to Romania's reformers, perhaps out of a belief that their success could have a stabilizing influence in South-Eastern Europe as a whole.65 But Romanians took most comfort from the official NATO statement issued at the end of the Madrid summit, negotiated between Secretary of State Madeleine Albright and her French counterpart Hubert Vedrine which in diplomatic language mentioned that Romania was at the forefront of countries due to join NATO in a second wave of expansion.66 However, the attention span of the West towards the problems of South-East Europe has always been limited unless unrest threatens the security of the wider European theatre.
Kosovo: A Catalyst?
The 1998-9 Kosovo crisis, culminating in NATO's military campaign against Serbia that began on 24 March 1999 transformed Romania from a Balkan backwater to a 'front-line state'. NATO required
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military facilities from Romania as well as Bulgaria in its drive to force Slobodan Milosevic to give meaningful autonomy to the Albanian majority in Kosovo and to halt ethnic cleansing. The strategic importance of Romania increased as an aerial war got underway and plans for a ground invasion of Kosovo were hastily drawn up. The importance of the South-East European flank to NATO's security, something that most NATO planners had underestimated, seemed vindicated by the Kosovo war.
On 22 April the Romanian parliament approved NATO's demand for an unlimited use of Romanian airspace. On 18 April Romania had denied Russia use of its airspace to fly humanitarian aid to Belgrade. When it came to choosing between religious and historical ties with Serbia and persisting, in dangerous circumstances, with a pro-Western foreign policy that hitherto had enjoyed massive popular backing, the Romanian government quickly concluded that it had no alternative but to align with NATO.
The pro-NATO stance of a previously fractured government was impressive, especially in light of the fact that public opinion, under the influence of a nationalist media, was turning against NATO. The government was encouraged by a string of declarations, such as that of President Clinton on 12 April that the West 'should try to do for Southeastern Europe what we helped to do for western Europe after World War II and for Central Europe after the Cold War'.67
On 10 June 1999 the German foreign minister Joschka Fischer formally launched a stabilization plan for the Balkans that involved the EU being the main source of funds for a project designed to prevent future conflict and integrate the region with the rest of Europe. But Romania was disappointed when Fischer, on a visit to Bucharest on 8 July, said that the Stability Pact should not be understood as a means of granting material and financial rewards for economic losses, its aim being to promote 'economic development opportunities in the region on a long-term basis'.68 German caution contrasted with the declaration of US Secretary of State Madeleine Albright on 10 June that 'Europe has to pay for the reconstruction of the Balkans', the US having assumed much of the military burden.69
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When the fiftieth anniversary NATO summit passed in April 1999 with no progress in Romania's application, President Constantinescu complained that 'an admission date [to NATO] some time before 2002 is an unjust and faraway prospect for our countries which have assumed the same risks as other NATO countries'.70 The liberal president's patience seemed to snap when he declared on 13 July that 'Every day personalities from NATO and the EU come to Bucharest and tell us that during the conflict we behaved like member states of NATO. But nobody offers us security guarantees or speaks about recovering our losses in respect of the embargo [on trade with Yugoslavia] . . . While we are patted on the back and congratulated, our losses mount day by day.'71
Romania was left with two concrete assurances from NATO delivered presumably because of its highly supportive stance in the Kosovo crisis. During the conflict, high-level support for its EU membership bid emanated from Britain and Germany, hitherto unenthusiastic about the prospect of Romanian entry.72 Romania (along with other multiethnic states in the region) was also promised that no change of boundaries was planned in Yugoslavia as part of an eventual peace settlement, a reassurance designed to dampen the claims of nationalists who were arguing that Kosovo offered a precedent which might lead to the detachment of Transylvania from Romania.73
During the Kosovo crisis while Romania found itself courted by Western powers, it also watched as NATO went to elaborate lengths to mollify the Russian authorities in order to obtain at least their reluctant acquiescence for its actions in Kosovo. Despite statements from Blair, Prodi, and Albright identifying Romania with the Western family of nations, fears remained that Western countries might do a deal with Russia which would place a country like Romania in the Russian sphere of influence in return for NATO expansion elsewhere. In 1994, Ion Mircea Pascu, shortly to become deputy defence minister, actually expressed the view that Germany and Russia had reached a secret understanding to that effect in the early 1990s.74 In 1997 Russia was increasingly adamant, through the pronouncements of its then foreign minister, Evgheni Primakov, that 'the extension of NATO has already reached its maximum point and that the interests of European stability require a stop to be imposed in the process'.75 At the same time, Moscow reportedly offered Romania security guarantees and economic incentives in return for abandoning its bid to join NATO.76
More than in most former communist states, the success of the democratic transition in Romania depends on the supportive external environment. Poorly institutionalized parties lacking clear-cut ideologies or governing programmes, authoritarian power-structures, the weakness of civil society, and declining living and health standards, do not offer a propitious domestic environment. Without clearly focused and long-term Western help, the prospects of success for what is an audacious experiment in fostering pluralism in a society ravaged by totalitarianism (after fifty years of relatively democratic rule) are slim. Indeed as the range and scale of Romania's problems became evident after 1996 along with the incapacity of domestic reformers to deal adequately with them, constructive outside engagement began to appear a sine qua non in order to sustain a feeble reform process, particularly in the economic sphere.
It is unclear what will be the long-term fate of a developmental strategy for Romania partly crafted and supervised by the EU, especially if the PDSR (well ahead in the polls since 1999) returns to power in elections due at the end of 2000. Previously, the issue of decriminalizing homosexuality was the one that produced the most frequent interventions from elected officials in the European Parliament and the Council of Europe.77 But the government was unable to persuade its own parliament that liberal European values were superior to conservative ones, as championed by the Orthodox Church, the main opponent of law reform in this area.
Indignation has long been expressed in the Bucharest press that the West has imposed strict conditions on the treatment of a range of minorities while itself continuing to discriminate against Romania as a whole.78 Romania's inclusion in a EU blockade of
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countries for which strict visa requirements need to be met has become a cause célèbre. It makes obtaining a visa to travel to EU states extremely difficult for most Romanians and it was only in early 2000 that the EU signalled its willingness to take Romania off the list of European countries from whom visas are required. Many Romanians contrast the fact that tariff barriers have been lowered (in line with Romania's EU agreement), allowing West European goods to flood the country, thus jeopardizing local agriculture and industry) while Romanian citizens are effectively blockaded from travelling westwards.79
In the EU, fear of unwelcome immigrants from countries like Romania and Bulgaria (with the mobile Roma minority at the top of the list) outweighs concern that nations involuntarily severed from the rest of Europe during the Cold War, still lack easy access to the West. When President Constantinescu raised the issue of visas on a visit to Germany in March 1998, he got an unavailing response from his hosts. Indeed, it appears that to justify their approach, the Bonn authorities leaked to the press the results of an investigation that accused staff in the Romanian embassy of accepting bribes from suspected Romanian criminals in return for granting forged visas.80
There was general goodwill for Romania after it ditched rulers widely seen as neo-communist in 1996. But the degree of attention has been uneven and optimism in the West about its potential for switching to the fast-track of economic and institutional reform was soon dashed by the political turbulence of 1998. Only countries with cultural links to Romania have shown a real interest in its fate. France, and to a lesser degree the other South European states are the main examples.81 Despite being the EU state with the biggest interest in stabilizing the former communist states to its east, Germany, under Chancellor Helmut Kohl, made it clear to Romania that progress with its NATO and EU bids largely depended on its own efforts to speed up reform at home.82 Accordingly, hopes that Germany's ruling Christian Democrats might warm to the
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Romanian cause because Christian Democrats were the majority force in Romania's ruling coalition proved illusory.
The United States lacks the organic links with Romania that large émigré communities provide. Romania may have become a greater priority for Britain as a result of the Kosovo crisis, but it is unclear how long this will last. Russia still regards Romania as its backyard despite no longer sharing a land-frontier with the Danubian state, a cause of real, and perhaps not unjustified, apprehension in Bucharest.
Policy Drift Encourages Nationalism
Lack of progress with foreign policy goals seen as crucial for strengthening democracy has seen the return of a quasi-nationalist discourse even from the pro-Western government. In May 1998, the new prime minister, Radu Vasile proclaimed that the new budget was '100% Romanian', having observed that his predecessor might well have been called 'IMF', given the leverage the latter had enjoyed over economic policy in 1997.83 In June 1998, Vasile seemed to reject the president's thesis that the major threat to Romania came from its internal debility not from external threats when he predicted that foreign intelligence agencies interested in destabilizing Romania were likely to intensify their activities in the period before NATO's April 1999 summit.84 It came as no surprise for some that when ejected from the premiership and expelled from the PNTCD at the end of 1999 Vasile and his supporters looked for a new political home in a small ultranationalist party.
In an increasingly introspective atmosphere, much of the enthusiasm for Romanian-Hungarian détente also evaporated. Elements in both the PNTCD and the PD started to adopt intransigent attitudes towards the Hungarian minority as the need to appeal to a home audience took precedence over adhering to European norms on minority rights. Christian Tudor Popescu, the influential chief editor of Adevarul, was arguing in mid-June 1998 for the need to redefine Romanian politics by abandoning the obsession with Euro-Atlantic integration and concentrating on avoiding economic collapse, so as 'to avoid at any price the disintegration of the unitary Romanian state'.85 An increasingly populist media (private television being to the fore) has influenced both
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public opinion and a political elite where clear-cut ideological differences are not always easy to discern. If a realignment of politics occurs in the wake of the defeat of the PNTCD-led attempt to mount fundamental reforms, the new nationalist discourse could prove appealing, especially if a new governing majority emerges from the left-centre of Romanian politics.
By 1998, disquiet was expressed at senior EU levels that laws designed to offer minority protection and which Romania had been told would be necessary if her applications to join the EU and NATO were to go forward, were unable to command a majority even among the parties which had signed up to a pro-Western prospectus on the defeat of Iliescu in 1996.86 Thus it was no small achievement that the Hungarian UDMR remained inside the coalition as its term approached its end in 2,000, moderates being able to argue that enough progress had been made in securing minority rights to justify staying in.
The emphasis on trans-border cooperation with states from which Romania had previously held aloof receded in importance after a brief flurry of interest in Euro-regionalist concepts during 1997. Romania obstinately preferred to see itself as being 'in the immediate proximity of the Balkan peninsula', rather than a Balkan state per se.87 At the first meeting ever convened of the heads of all South-East European states, held in Crete on 3-4 November 1997, Romania's unwillingness to be involved in a problematic geopolitical region was obvious. Greece's initiative for 'the institutionalisation of a permanent structure of Balkan co-operation' (one backed by Richard Holbrooke, the architect of the United State's proactive policy in the region since 1995) was rejected by Romania.88
A fragmented political elite in Romania sees European integration as necessary for national recovery (and perhaps even survival), but there are deep reservations about renouncing the nationalist complexes that the founders of the European integration project challenged in the 1940s and 1950s. Since 1995 whenever prospects for integration with European institutions has faltered, so has Romanian enthusiasm for a post-nationalist agenda. It is no
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coincidence that Romania seemed to discard its anti-Hungarian complex in the first half of 1997 when it looked like having a real chance of being invited to join NATO at the July Madrid summit. There were cordial top-level bilateral meetings, declaration of a strategic partnership between Romania and Hungary, and laws were drawn up in Bucharest to give the Hungarians some of the cultural and linguistic rights they had long been demanding. But when Romanian expectations were dashed, laws strengthening minority rights failed in parliament despite the government's technical majority and the Hungarian party found itself isolated inside the coalition.89
There is no sign of the culture shift which will allow new forms of governance based on subsidiarity to replace the centralized nation-state on the jacobin model which has not served Romania very effectively in over a century of independence. Decentralization is a key part of the European integration process but legislation allowing sub-state poles of government to enjoy autonomy from the centre has been slow to emerge. Nationalist mentalities based on rigid defence of sovereignty and suspicion of neighbouring states have considerable staying-power in Romania. Even though there is abundant evidence that decentralization has been a key to the political stability and economic success of former dictatorships like Germany and Spain, these role models are unlikely to prove persuasive for much of the politico-administrative elite in Romania.
Conclusion
Romania has benefited far less from external efforts to promote democracy than most other ex-Warsaw Pact states. Measures such as US President George Bush's decision to annul Poland's large debt to the USA have not been taken in Romania's case. Instead the country's economy was further weakened by Western insistence that Bucharest comply with tough sanctions against former close trading partners Iraq and Yugoslavia in the early 1990s.
A more favourable attitude started to be shown towards Romania by the West following the 1996 presidential victory of Emil Constantinescu. He is unambiguously committed to Euro-Atlantic integration and broad adherence to the same goal has been shown by the unwieldy four-party coalition that provided three governments in the 1996-2000 period.
But it was only in the aftermath of the 1999 Kosovo conflict that the EU Commission and key state players in the EU and NATO showed a willingness to provide concentrated assistance to Romania which is required if it is to begin to bridge the gap between it and more favoured EE aspirants for EU entry. The EU commission's offer of a partnership with the government to jointly shape and implement an economic and administrative reform strategy, Commissioner Prodi's keenness to advance Romania's EU application, the large amount of PHARE aid donated to Romania in 2000, and the EU's stated intention to devote more time and energy to second-stream candidates like Romania than frontrunners offers a striking contrast with previous Western attitudes.
But it remains to be seen how concentrated Western attention will prove to be, especially if the PDSR returns to office in forthcoming elections. EU Enlargement commissioner Verheugen warned in February 2000 that Romania would face the isolation being visited upon Austria's new right-wing coalition, if populists and nationalists entered government at the end of the year.
It is clear that Brussels now recognizes that the obstacles in the way of Romania shedding its politically authoritarian and economically collectivist past are of such a magnitude that a special approach is required towards it from the gatekeepers of Euro-Atlantic integration. An approach involving active external engagement on the ground in rebuilding public institutions and a competitive economy is being pursued in a country where a large part of the power structure is still attached to authoritarian and collectivist values in politics and economics.
Anti-reformers who might, for convenience, be described as 'nomenklatura nationalists' are stronger in Romania than in most other post-communist states. They demonstrated their ascendancy by blocking economic reform between 1989 and 1996. But their advance has been contained by the fact that the main proponent of authoritarian politics in the region remains Russia. Russia appears keen to involve Romania in a series of economic agreements that would make the Romanian economy depend on its cheap energy supplies in return for political compliance. This would suit the powerful lobby of managers in the state-led Romanian energy sector who are hostile to genuine reform. But for most Romanians Russia remains 'a pole of repulsion' owing to long-term Russian bids to stifle Romanian independence. So it is difficult for Romanian interests hostile to the Western democratic project to take measures which are seen as analogous to ones being promoted by 'red-brown' forces in Russia itself. (Similarly, the surprising weakness of
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Russian-influenced organized crime in Romania can probably be ascribed to the fact that even for local criminal forces Russia remains an anti-model).
Pro-Western Romanians were relieved when the Russian elections at the end of 1999 resulted in a comprehensive defeat for the communists. But it remains to be seen if Vladimir Putin's nationalist bloc will prove to be less hostile to Romania's path of Euro-Atlantic integration than an unambiguously left-wing administration in Moscow.
Divided and demoralised reformers accepted the active assistance of multilateral organizations in order to draw up a strategy for economic recovery meant to prepare Romania for EU entry after 2007. But drawing closer to the West was unable to save them from electoral rejection at home. By 2000, most of the population, around 40% of which was facing absolute poverty, was no longer prepared to accept further economic misery in return for progress on foreign policy goals which previously had enjoyed overwhelming support. Stemming unemployment and poverty and dealing harshly with the corruption that was widely perceived to have got out of control took precedence over staying on good terms with NATO, the IMF or the EU. A nervous President Constantinescu abandoned a second-term bid rather than face the wrath of voters on the campaign trail. The PDSR obtained a near majority of seats in the 26 November election but it was the beneficiary of a negative vote rather than the repository of hopes that it would do better than the outgoing coalition. Far more unsettling was the remarkable success of the anti-western Greater Romania Party which reconciled the extremes of left and right. It mopped up many of the votes of the collapsed centre as well as the young, acquiring 25% of seats in parliament compared to a handful in 1996. Its fiercely anti-minority leader C.V. Tudor, formerly Ceauşescu's court poet, became the prime beneficiary of the rift between the main parties and society at large where the chief political players are often viewed as a separate caste ready to promote their group interests at the expense of most ordinary Romanians. The PRM is a haven for former and serving members of the security forces and has influential supporters in a string of government ministries. Unless the other parties behave in a more public-spirited way than they have done since 1989, nationalist mentalities will acquire an even stronger grip on the electorate than before, opening up the possibility of political isolation and renewed authoritarianism in Romania.
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